

THE THOMIST

A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY



EDITORS: THE DOMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JOSEPH

Publishers: Sheed & Ward, Inc., New York City

VOL. III

OCTOBER, 1941

No. 4

THE CONFLICT OF METHODS AT THE END OF THE MIDDLE AGES¹



I

THIS PAPER will deal with an historical fact, which has been, to my mind, of major importance in the development of modern western thought: I mean the conflict of methods that, at the end of the Middle Ages and above all at the time of the *new philosophy* of Bacon and Descartes, caused modern Physics, the modern explanation of nature's phenomena, to seem radically and absolutely incompatible with Aristotelian metaphysics and scholastic philosophy. I should like briefly to examine the philosophical implications of this fact. Perhaps the conclusion thus attained may shed some light on the discussions of our age.

The conflict of which I speak had begun in the Middle Ages—already in the 13th century. At that time it appeared as a conflict between the schools of Oxford and the schools of Paris. The University of Paris was dominated by the

¹ Paper read at the Ninth Conference on Methods in Philosophy and the Sciences, held at the New School for Social Research, New York, April 27, 1941.

Aristotelian reform whose masters were Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas; its main task was to build up a synthesis of traditional Christian thought by the light of a metaphysics and a theology renewed, as to their conceptual systematization, by the principles of Aristotle—of an Aristotle recast and baptized by Thomas Aquinas; its chief concern was, therefore, metaphysical and theological. The University of Oxford was inspired, on the contrary, by the old Augustinian tradition, that is, in brief, by Platonism (by a Platonism in which many Aristotelian notions had a place); and, at the same time, the Oxonians were dominated by the desire of applying the Platonist-mathematical conception of the world to the explanation of physical phenomena. Both mathematics and experience were their guiding rules. Even in philosophy and theology, the influence of this logico-mathematical and empiricist trend of mind played a major part. Already Roger Bacon asserted: "It is impossible to know things of this world, unless mathematics is known." And it is from his pen that the term "experimental science" appears for the first time in the history of human thought. Later on, in the 14th Century, many Doctors of the University of Paris, John Buridan, Albertus of Saxony, Peter of Ailly, Nicole Oresme, were to accept in philosophy the Nominalist inspiration, and at the same time to prepare in mechanics and physics the discoveries and the new concepts which characterize modern science. They were the precursors of Leonardo da Vinci and Galileo.

II

If we seek to bring to light the philosophical roots of the question, we must first note that Aristotelian metaphysics and the Aristotelian philosophy of nature—at least taken in their genuine significance, in their true structure—did not intend to explain phenomena, but to discover the ontological structure of things and the hierarchy of essences in terms of intelligible being. Starting from sense experience, they did not remain on the plane of experience, but tried to perceive the intelligible trans-sensible features of the nature of things thanks to an analysis

grounded on the first intuitions of the intellect, above all on the metaphysical intuition of being; thus they conceived reality in terms of substance and accident, of qualities, of causes—that is, of the four genera of causes, the principal of which was final causality.

Nevertheless, and that was the great misfortune of Aristotelianism, Aristotle himself and his mediaeval followers were not content with this ontological or properly philosophical analysis. Putting too great and too bold a confidence in the philosophical intellect and the philosophical tools, they naturally extended their ontological explanation of the supra-empirical structure of things into an explanation of the empirical phenomena. In point of fact their philosophy of nature, as is well known, was both a philosophy of nature and a science, a scientific interpretation of the detail of phenomena. And this second part, the scientific part, was condemned to failure. Still, in the 17th Century, the treatises of philosophy contained explanations (or pseudo-explanations) of ice-crystals, of the rainbow, discussions on the vacuum, and so forth.

Now I arrive at the point which matters most to the present issue. What is really new in the achievements of the science which became predominant in the 16th and 17th centuries, of “modern science,” is properly speaking a physics of the physico-mathematical type. (In other scientific domains which are not thus absorbed by mathematics, modern science doubtless owes its material or technical perfection, and an autonomous conceptual lexicon which permits infinite progress in the analysis of phenomena as such, to the attraction exerted by physico-mathematics on the other kinds of knowledge, which henceforth see in the former the exemplar of knowledge.)

In truth, the epistemological principles of the Ancients considered in their very nature could easily have adapted themselves to the new physics; the logical type to which that science corresponds, and of which *astronomy* was the best example during antiquity, theoretically had its place set down in the Scholastic synthesis of sciences. This logical type is that of a science in a sense intermediary between Mathematics

and Physics, but actually *mathematical* as regards its typical mode of explanation, since what is *formal* and consequently specifying in it (its formal object and its medium of demonstration) is mathematical. The explanatory deduction is mathematical. Physical reality, although of prime importance to it as subject-matter, is basically, for it, a material reservoir of facts and verifications. And thus, while natural philosophy may be characterized as a physical knowledge properly philosophical and ontological, or metaphysical by participation, the new physics, on the contrary, according to the methodological principles of the Schoolmen, must be called a physical knowledge properly mathematical, or a science *formally* mathematical and *materially* physical: a formula which, to my mind, condenses all its properties. Doubtless the conception of physico-mathematics that the French physicist Pierre Duhem (and Hirn before him) defended was too mathematical and not sufficiently physical, nevertheless Duhem was right in thinking that phenomena can be analysed quantitatively without the existence of qualities being denied, and that the scientific method derived from Galileo and Descartes can be used without its involving in any way philosophical incompatibility with Aristotle's metaphysics.

But in point of fact knowledge of a physico-mathematical sort was limited amongst the Ancients and the Schoolmen to certain very particular disciplines, such as astronomy or acoustics; their physics, as I previously noted, consisted in a natural philosophy (philosophical knowledge of physical data) which involved a physics of pure observation philosophically interpreted, and if certain medieval thinkers and scientists have been the precursors of physico-mathematics, the idea of establishing a universal mathematical interpretation of physical reality by submitting the fluent detail of phenomena to the science of number nevertheless remained foreign to the majority of them.

Therefore, on the day when quantitative physics, having its own specific character and possessed of its own exigencies, moved to take its place within the order of sciences and to

proclaim its rights, it was to enter inevitably into conflict with the philosophy of old—not only because of the errors which vitiated the latter in the experimental field, but also, and this is more remarkable, because of the radical difference which separates—with respect to what is genuine and legitimate in each one of those two manners—the old manner of approaching physical realities from the new manner of approaching them.

III

The errors I have just mentioned and which vitiated the physics of old, singularly jeopardized, moreover, the position of the defenders of Aristotle. Indeed, as much as Aristotle's physics deserved, in the eyes of a Thomist, to be upheld in its first principles (the theory of matter and form, of the continuous, of time, of life, etc.)—in all that part which actually constitutes *natural philosophy*—just so much was Aristotelian physics weak and insufficient in the part which tried to constitute an inductive science, and which applied to the experimental analysis of the detail of phenomena. Let us briefly mention here the errors in Aristotle's mechanics: the disregarding of *mass* in dynamics and the insufficient mathematical analysis of motion and of speed, the explanation of the motion of projectiles by the propagation in the air of a moving wave or by so-called antiperistasis—a concept owed not to Aristotle but to Simplicius—the belief in a difference of *nature* between celestial motion, considered as circular, and terrestrial motion, considered as rectilinear, as well as between celestial bodies, considered incorruptible and terrestrial bodies considered corruptible, the theory of heavy and light bodies; let us also mention the errors of the medieval physics in the designation of the simple constituents of bodies (the theory of the four elements), the errors about light (considered instantaneous), about the earth (for example, the denial of antipodes), and, above all else, the errors of the Ptolemaic system in astronomy.

All these errors, however great they may have been from the point of view of positive science, in reality provided only

ineffectual weapons against Aristotelian metaphysics and natural philosophy, for they were not necessary consequences drawn from the principles of Aristotle and were merely the result of oversimple inductions which interpreted natural phenomena in such a way as to conform to common appearances. But, at a superficial glance, it was all too easy to impute to the philosophy of the Ancients the wrongs of their science.

And further, if on the one hand the hypotheses which treat of the configuration of the physical world have only a secondary and incidental importance for the pure intelligence, whose metaphysical certainties do not depend in the least on the map of the heavens, on the other hand these same hypotheses—without speaking of their properly scientific value—are of capital importance to the imagination. In this respect the revolution caused in astronomy by the Copernican theory was to play in the history of ideas a part which cannot be too highly stressed. Widely exploited by the protagonists of mechanist philosophy, dramatized by Galileo's condemnation, it has taken on amongst those thinkers who think as most men live, that is, within the senses, the value of a revolution in the metaphysical conception of the intelligible universe, while in truth it was but a revolution in the scientific representation of the visible universe. Because it shattered century-old habits of imagination, it seemed to tear down all the science of the past; because it showed that sensible appearances had misled common opinion with regard to astronomy, it provided empirically-minded philosophers with a pretext for despising the natural intuition of first principles. Because it set back much further than did the Ancients the limits of the corporeal world, making the imagination dazzled by immensity, there was a rush to assert the infinity of the world, as though the ocean were not just as *finite* as a drop of water. Because it made of the earth a tiny globe in the universe, and no longer the material center of the spheres, that doctrine of finality was declared outdated which held the human being as the ideal center of the creative intentions; as though the metaphysical hierarchy of essences were linked to the volume of the earth or to its position, and as

though the divine Intelligence should have taken less care of a little ball in motion than of a great ball at rest.

Finally, while "humiliating" man in the corporal order by assigning him a habitat geometrically less honorable, it gave him the opportunity of exalting himself infinitely in the spiritual order, by considering himself as a sovereign thought which hovers over the abyss of a nature in which everything is blind necessity, and which measures it by its own knowledge. Thus the very thinkers who introduced into modern philosophy the principle of *egocentrism* and whose descendants were to make truth revolve around the human mind, were to profess a righteous indignation over the vanity of *geocentrism*, and wrapped themselves in their humility to banish from science the anthropomorphic consideration of final causes. If one imagines that the universe is finite and that all corporeal things are made for man, it is, wrote Descartes, "that instead of knowing the perfections which belong really to us, one attributes to other creatures imperfections they do not have, so as to raise oneself above them,"² and that, "entering into an impertinent presumption, one wants to become part of the counsel of God and with him to take charge of managing the world, all of which causes an infinitude of vain worries and annoyances." The belief in final causes, Spinoza will say, derives only from the egoistic ambition of men "to use Nature for their own blind cupidity and insatiable avarice": whence a covey of illusions which could never have been dispelled "unless mathematics, which does not deal with final causes but only with essences and properties of geometric figures, had shown men another rule of truth." And Laplace will write:

Seduced by the illusions of the senses and of selfishness, man long considered himself the center of stellar motion, and his vain pride was punished by the fear with which the stars inspired him. At last, several centuries of work have pulled down the veil which hid from his eyes the order of the world [*it is a true revelation*] . . . then he saw himself on a planet almost imperceptible in the solar system, the vast extent of which is itself only a point in the

² Letter to Elizabeth, September 15, 1645.

immensity of space. The sublime results to which this discovery has led him are well equipped to console him for the rank it assigns to the earth, by showing him his own greatness in the extreme smallness of the basis which has helped him to measure the heavens. . . .

IV

To settle the conflict which set up the new physics against Aristotle's philosophy, would have required minds of exceptional vigor, capable of discerning behind the cloud of confusion of which we have just spoken, the essential lines and fundamental compatibilities of the two disciplines, at the very moment when both were least conscious of their limits—the old being in the midst of decadence and the new still in the process of formation. Unfortunately most of the Scholastics of the 15th and 16th centuries had fallen as far from the metaphysical wisdom of Thomas Aquinas as from the scientific initiatives of the 14th century, and, according to Melchior Cano's expression, knew only how to wield long sticks. As for the naturalists, captivated by their initial successes and deprived of metaphysical standards, it was not from them that one could hope for an equitable appreciation of the elements of the struggle. Both the former and the latter refused to distinguish in fact between natural philosophy and experimental science. The former, the Schoolmen, in spite of the warnings of St. Thomas, related the fate of Aristotle's metaphysics to that of the inductive hypotheses of antiquity, and the latter, the naturalists, confused the newly born mathematical physics with the most arbitrary metaphysics, with materialistic, hylozoistic, cabalistic, or pantheistic, and, especially, with mechanistic metaphysics.

It is well to insist on this last confusion whose influence made itself felt on the entire development of modern science, and which, at the outset, completely hid from the initiators of the new physics the true nature of that science. Indeed they thought that they were determining the ontological causes of things, discovering the essence of bodies and the supreme reasons of the physical order, in short, setting up a natural philosophy;

since they were working, and this because of the very nature of their science, with only quantitative standards, they were condemned from the first to admit only extension and motion as the principles of the corporeal world. Thus it is not enough to note that the physico-mathematical method was finally evolved by anti-scholastic thinkers, whom the very excess of their confidence in the application of mathematics to sense-perceived nature led instinctively to mechanism. We also must emphasize that the natural and irrepressible drive of the intelligence towards being and causes, when it met the physico-mathematical method must almost necessarily cause this discipline to be mistaken for a natural philosophy. It is because of this almost inevitable illusion that the new scientific method found itself from the very beginning, by virtue of the historical conditions of its genesis, quite ready to undergo the contamination of extraneous philosophies, and to become dependant upon a metaphysics like the Cartesian mathematism—an accident inversely resembling that which had linked Aristotle's metaphysics to the erroneous theories of the physics of old.

But if physico-mathematics were a natural philosophy, if it made manifest the essences and causes at work in the corporeal world, then it would be a knowledge having the ontological essence of physical reality as its proper and specifying object; and from then on we would see subverted and destroyed the genuine structure of this science. It would no longer be a science *formally* mathematical and *materially* physical, it would become a kind of monstrosity, a science which would be at the same time *formally* physical and ontological as to its specifying objects and *formally* mathematical as to its medium of demonstration and explanation. The natural and necessary proportion between the end and the means, between the specifying object and the explanatory tools in knowledge would be broken.

That implies that physico-mathematics would cease being a science properly speaking, and would rather become a kind of practical discipline, a kind of art applying to pure sensorial information gathered about the physical world, as to some

raw material, a method which elaborates them mathematically and draws from them regulating formulae for human practice and human industry. We may wonder whether modern civilization, in its bourgeois age, has not understood physics in this way. The Marxist epistemology with its integral practicism, does naught but push to extremes such a misconception of science. There is in the human mind no specific energy of knowledge (what the ancients called *habitus*), no intellectual virtue, in other words, no internal quality of science which corresponds to "science," thus conceived and put to work. Such a science, if it existed, would require of the physicist only a certain mathematical training (which could be nothing more than the habit or custom of handling formulae) in combining experiments and in working over their results to submit them to the mathematical treatment. Yet as a matter of fact, it is, for some strata of our contemporary culture, science thus misconceived which is asked to supplant philosophical and metaphysical wisdom, and to supply the supreme food of the human mind. Thus truth is used for error, a delusive social myth is built up with the help of the sciences of phenomena, fallen from their true type, replacing philosophy in people's minds and, at the same time, conceived as essentially practical. Scientists themselves are clearly conscious of the object and limits of science, but in the common opinion of people, the false idea of science to which I allude does not imply any awareness of this very object and these very limits. It is not surprising that the pedagogical use of such a "science" so little *cultivates* reason in the masses which receive from it their educating influences.

V

But let us leave this parenthesis, and come back to the consideration of physico-mathematics in its genuine logical nature, and to the conflict that arose between this discipline and the traditional philosophical disciplines, at the time of the Renaissance and at the time of Descartes. If the reflexions and distinctions I outlined in this paper are well grounded, we see how

the long-existing dissension which, in view of the infirmity of human nature ordinarily separates metaphysicians from scientists, was then to become an irremediable opposition—existing as it did between metaphysicians attached to the knowledge heritage of old, but in fact unfaithful to wisdom, unaware of the methodological limitations of philosophical or ontological explanation, and who wanted to set up a science of phenomena by means of their pseudo-philosophical formulae, and scientists dazzled by their new science, who wanted to set up a prime philosophy by means of their figures. The struggle having been brought onto the actual field of the study of phenomena, it was easy to foretell which would be the vanquished. To sum up, it is easily understood that for three principle reasons the intellectual world must almost necessarily at the outset of the modern era, have been the victim of a misunderstanding:

1) because of the introduction of quantitative physics, a new science legitimate in itself and in no way essentially incompatible with the old system of knowledge, but in actual fact in conflict with that system;

2) because of the confusion of the natural philosophy and the metaphysics of Aristotle, with the false hypotheses of the science of the ancients;

3) because of a fundamental error on the nature of physico-mathematics, itself taken for a philosophical or ontological explanation of the world and made a fellow traveller of mechanistic metaphysics.

In truth, there is no conflict between physico-mathematics and metaphysics or philosophy, because they do not only correspond to two fundamentally different methods of approaching reality, but also aim at two different fields of knowledge, two different *formal* and specifying *objects* within reality; each one has its proper object, its proper aim, its proper field, and therefore its proper means of analyzing the subject matter belonging in this field. Philosophy looks after essences and analyzes things in terms of being. Physico-mathematics looks after a mathematical reading or deciphering of phenomena. The two

disciplines do not hunt on the same soil. Each one can develop ad infinitum on its own plane without encountering the other. Physico-mathematical analysis of sound can progress ad infinitum, on the plane of acoustics, without interfering with or entering into conflict with the artistic or poetic laws developing on their own plane of musical creation. Physico-mathematical analysis of the particles composing the atom can progress ad infinitum, on the plane of micro-physics, without interfering with or entering into conflict with the ontological analysis of corporeal reality and of intelligible properties of being, which analysis progresses for its part on the plane of philosophy of nature and metaphysics. Perhaps these considerations might help settle the discussions on teleology which play an important part in contemporary thought, above all in the biological domain, and to show how the concept of finality has to be removed, as an extraneous one, from experimental, particularly from physico-mathematical science, and at the same time to be maintained, as a legitimate and indispensable one, in philosophical and metaphysical knowledge. What seems to me to be essential in this matter, is to emphasize this fact, that there is a natural and inescapable proportion between means and ends, methods and objects, and that, every time we deal with genuine kinds of knowledge, the difference between *methods* presupposes as its very reason, as its very root, a more fundamental and more enlightening difference between *objects*.

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CHARITY AND THE SOCIAL ORDER

1915

I. INTRODUCTION

THE QUEST of man for unity and order is the main-spring of all that is history. For tranquillity of order his wars have been waged; for order of mind his art and culture ebb and flow; for unity with the Deity, there are his religions, his churches, his homes, his schools. This search for unity springs from his very nature. As an individual substance man is one, and the whole world about him must contribute to that oneness, else it is meaningless. As a rational creature endowed with an intellect whose work is the perception of relationships, man seeks unity in order, the stuff of which relationships are made. As a being endowed with free will, always acting for an ultimate end of his own choice, an end which gives unity and purposiveness to his acts, man puts order into his world of activity.

This continual quest of order on the part of man is admirably illustrated, perhaps through sheer contrast, in that vastly complex and somewhat disordered thing called society, the broad realm of man's activities with his fellow creatures. More particularly we refer to such activities of men as are the objects of the social sciences—the relations of man to the material necessities upon which depends his livelihood, and his relations to the various groups to which, of choice or necessity, he and his fellow men belong.

Order requires a certain unity, and unity derives from a principle—a common source, a radical oneness. Socio-economic relations being so manifestly complex, having neither the concreteness of the visible creation nor the absoluteness of the spiritual world, have always challenged the ingenuity of man to discover or invent principles of social order. Nor has man shirked the task. There is, for instance, the individualist prin-

ciple of Herbert Spencer: "Every man has freedom to do all that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man."¹ The class principle finds this expression in Karl Marx: "The economic structure of society is the real foundation on which rise legal and political superstructures and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness."² Totalitarianism, as explained by Benito Mussolini, accepts the state as principle: "Fascism conceives of the State as an Absolute, in comparison with which all individuals or groups are relative, only to be conceived in their relation to the State."³ The racism of Hitler claims blood as the principle of social structure: "All that is not race in this world is trash. All world historical events, however, are only the expression of the race's instinct of self-preservation in its good or in its evil meaning."⁴ A very recent and even more universalist social philosophy enuntiates its principle in the name of democracy which "is the plentitude of heart-service to a highest religion embodying the essence of all higher religions. Democracy is nothing more and nothing less than humanism in theocracy and rational theocracy in universal humanism."⁵

More in the realm of reason is justice as the natural principle of society. It is stated thus by Aristotle: "Since in every art and science the end aimed at is always good, so particularly in this, which is the most excellent of all, the founding of civil society, the good therein aimed at is justice; for it is this which is for the benefit of all."⁶

Nor does the Catholic Church, with her theology and supernatural philosophy of living, fail to propose a fundamental principle for the social order. It is charity, love of neighbor.

¹ H. Spencer, *The Principles of Ethics* (New York: 1897), II, 46.

² K. Marx, *The Critique of Political Economy* (New York: 1904), p. 11.

³ B. Mussolini, "The Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism," trans. from *Enciclopedia Italiana. International Conciliation*, No. 306 (New York: 1935), p. 13.

⁴ A. Hitler, *Mein Kampf* (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1939), p. 406.

⁵ *The City of Man* (New York: 1940), p. 33.

⁶ Aristotle, *Politics* (New York: Everyman's Library, 1921), Bk. III, c. 12, p. 88. Cf. *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 79, a. 1.

"These things I command you, that you love one another":⁷ this Christian principle of living—love, the fulfilling of the law—has been given modern application in the recent Papal encyclicals on social problems. Pope Leo wrote: "For the happy results we all long for must chiefly be brought about by the plenteous outpouring of charity. . . ."⁸ Pope Pius XI noted that, "in effecting this reform, charity 'which is the bond of perfection,' must play a leading part. . . ."⁹ The present Pontiff has spoken of the same need: "The first of these pernicious errors, widespread today, is the forgetfulness of that law of human solidarity and charity which is dictated and imposed by our common origin and by the equality of rational nature in all men . . . and by the redeeming Sacrifice offered by Jesus Christ. . . ."¹⁰

Charity as an ordering principle in society would seem to be necessary both from the view of the modern disorder before our eyes, as well as from the fact that the most talked of remedy, justice, is unable to cope with the situation. The modern disorder is both practical and speculative. The wars waging throughout the world, the political, social, and economic revolutions to which every nation is in some way subjected, are more than sufficient proof of the practical disorder. The lack of order in the speculative world is illustrated by the ideologies in conflict, philosophies of force and self-interest that waver between the impossible extremes of unity without order, which is collectivism, and order without unity, which is individualism.

The inability of justice alone to achieve social peace is pointed out by Pope Pius XI: "For justice alone, even though most faithfully observed, can indeed remove the causes of social strife, but can never bring about unity of hearts and minds. Yet this union, binding men together, is the main principle of stability in all institutions, no matter how perfect

⁷ *John*, xv, 17.

⁸ Encyclical Letter *Rerum Novarum* (New York: Paulist Press, 1931), p. 35.

⁹ Encyclical Letter *Quadragesimo Anno* (New York: Paulist Press, 1931), p. 44.

¹⁰ Encyclical Letter *Summi Pontificatus* (New York: Paulist Press, 1939), p. 11.

they may seem, which aim at establishing social peace and promoting mutual aid. In its absence, as repeated experience proves, the wisest regulations come to nothing."¹¹ Several reasons may be adduced in proof of this.

Justice, from its very nature, has as its task to equalize a debt. But the mere equalization of a debt owed to another is not sufficient to restore social order in the present state of things. Therefore justice alone is inadequate to perfect the reform needed in society. Simple justice requires that men do no injury to one another, that they pay their debts. But it is not enough for social order that men do not injure one another; they must help one another. Over and above paying a debt, they must as social animals bestow the gift of mutual aid.¹² "For justice is about works done in respect of another person under the aspect of the legal due, whereas friendship considers the aspect of a friendly and moral duty, or rather that of a gratuitous favor. . . ." ¹³ Society is so complex that the personal responsibility for injustices is often obscured, especially in the highly developed system of private enterprise; and secondly, even where the demands of justice are quite clear, it is often morally impossible for individuals to right the wrongs already existing. For example, that a just wage must be a living wage is an admission that not a few employers would be willing to make; and yet in a highly competitive industry, one in which their interests are inextricably woven, employers might find it impossible to pay a living wage and still survive.

Besides this practical argument, there is another reason for the inadequacy of justice to fill the bill of reforming the social order. The common good requires communion, a union of minds and hearts, and not merely an external communication which provides for an orderly relation of objective reality to the individual. Justice, concerned with the objective thing, the *jus*, that which is owed to another, fosters communication between individuals. But communication supposes a state of

¹¹ *Quadragesimo Anno*, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

¹² Cf. St. Thomas, *III Cont. Gent.*, 117-18, 128-29.

¹³ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 23, a. 3, ad 1um.

separation between consciousnesses—he who owes something to another has that which is not his own, while he to whom the thing is owed is lacking something which belongs to him. The equality is restored by the transferal of the object, the thing, from one to the other. This transferal completes the function of justice, regardless of the willingness of the debtor to part with the thing or the appreciation of the one to whom it is returned. On the other hand, communion involves participation, a union of consciousnesses. This participation, this communion, can take place only between person and person, and not between person and thing as happens in justice. An end common to person and person, the one loving and the one loved, affords the basis for this union of consciousnesses, and since all men share in the ultimate end of eternal beatitude to which they are ordered by God, this end provides the supreme basis for communion among men. Consequently, charity, which effects the union of men with their ultimate end, through which the interpenetration of the one loving and the one loved in God is accomplished, is required for that communion of minds and hearts of which social peace is born.¹⁴

The following statement of Pope Pius XI might be urged in objection: "All the institutions of public and social life must be imbued with the spirit of justice, and this justice must above all be truly operative. It must build up a juridical and social order able to pervade all economic activity."¹⁵ Certainly such a "juridical and social order" achieved through justice, as the Pontiff envisions, would provide peace. Through justice alone, no; through justice informed by charity, yes, for the same Holy Father urges: "Social charity should be, as it were, the soul of this order."¹⁶

The objection might be considered in another light. Since the object of justice, particularly legal justice, is the common good, and the maintenance of the common good insures social order, it would seem that justice alone is sufficient. St. Thomas

¹⁴ Cf. *III Cont. Gent.*, 117. Cf. also N. Berdyaev, *Solitude and Society* (New York: 1938), pp. 184-93.

¹⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 29.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

shows, however, that even the virtue which is ordered to the common good is imperfect unless actuated by charity.

If we take virtue as being ordered to some particular end, then we may speak of virtue being where there is no charity insofar as it is directed to some particular good. If this particular good is not a true, but an apparent good, it is not a true virtue that is ordained to such a good, but a counterfeit virtue. . . . If, on the other hand, this particular good be a true good, for instance the welfare of the state, or the like, it will indeed be a true virtue, imperfect, however, unless it be referred to the final and perfect good. Accordingly, no strictly true virtue is possible without charity.¹⁷

Having shown the necessity of charity for the reconstruction of the social order, a brief treatment of its nature must be introduced. Charity, is defined by St. Thomas as "a friendship of man for God, founded upon the fellowship of everlasting happiness."¹⁸ It is, first of all, "friendship of man for God," with the two main elements of all friendship, similarity and intercommunication or communion. Through his intellectual nature on the natural plane, through sanctifying grace, the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity, the infused moral virtues, and the gifts of the Holy Ghost on the supernatural level, man is like to God. The communion or intercommunication between friends is realized between God and man by the life of grace inasmuch as by faith man comes to an adequate though only imperfect knowledge of God as He has revealed Himself to man, and inasmuch as, by prayer, man communicates with God and God with man through the operation of the gifts of the Holy Ghost.¹⁹ St. Thomas summarizes the foundation of charity in these words: "The friendship of charity is based on the fellowship of happiness, which consists essentially in God, as the First Principle, whence it flows to all who are capable of happiness."²⁰

¹⁷ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 23, a. 7.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, q. 24, a. 2.

¹⁹ Cf. L. M. Bond, O.P., "A Comparison Between Human and Divine Friendship," *THE THOMIST*, III (1941), 93.

²⁰ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 26, a. 2.

Charity embraces a threefold object—God, self, and neighbor. “God is loved as the principle of good, on which the love of charity is founded, while man, out of charity, loves himself by reason of his being a partaker of the aforesaid good, and loves his neighbor by reason of his fellowship in that good.”²¹

In this operation, charity is singularly active, it is the driving power, the form of all the other virtues. Since in morals the form of an act is taken chiefly from its end, and since charity directs the acts of all the other virtues to the ultimate end, God, it is said to be the form of the other virtues, “not as being their exemplar or their essential form, but rather by way of efficient cause, insofar as it sets the form on all.”²² Incidentally this concept of charity as the form of all the driving powers of living throws a new light on the word “reform” as used in the recent statement of the Archbishops and Bishops of the Administrative Board of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, entitled *The Church and Social Order*: “When we speak of the establishment of a right social order, we understand thereby a *reform* in the concept and organization of the state respecting its responsibility for public welfare; secondly, a *reform* in the other fundamental social institutions; and thirdly, and quite emphatically, a *reform* or correction of morals.” (Author’s italics.)²³

Whatever God requires of man is included in a precept.²⁴ He requires man to seek good in all his actions, especially the good which is the goal of life, obtained through charity. And as St. Thomas explains: “Since good is the object of dilection and love, and since good is either an end or a means, it is fitting that there should be two precepts of charity, one whereby we are induced to love God as our end, and another whereby we are led to love our neighbor for God’s sake, as for the sake of our end.”²⁵ These two precepts are:

²¹ *Ibid.*, a. 4; cf. q. 27. a. 3; q. 25, a. 1.

²² *Ibid.*, q. 23, a. 8, ad 1um.

²³ *The Church and Social Order* (Washington: N. C. W. C., 1940), p. 28.

²⁴ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 44, a. 1.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, q. 44, a. 3.

"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole mind"; and "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."²⁶ On these two commandments depend the whole Law and the prophets.²⁷ St. Thomas, in his opusculum *De Duobus Praeceptis Caritatis*, beautifully shows how the Ten Commandments, the eternal Magna Charta of human living, particularize the obligations of charity, three precepts relating to the love of God, and seven referring to the love of neighbor.²⁸

For a proper understanding and, especially, for the prudent and fruitful application of the virtue and precept of charity, the doctrine on the order in charity is of vital importance. Who comes first in our affections—God or neighbor, God or self, self or neighbor, parents or children, friends or enemies, etc., etc.? The answer to all these extremely practical problems which vex social thinkers today is to be found in the Twenty-Sixth Question of St. Thomas' tract on charity in the *Secunda Secundae* of the *Summa Theologica*. In the first article of that question, the Angelic Doctor establishes the existence of an order in charity. He reasons that wherever there is a principle there is order, since "before" and "after," the requisites for order, are used in relation to some principle. But in those things which are loved out of charity there is a principle. Therefore there is an order in charity. St. Thomas sums up his conclusion thus: "There must be some order in things loved out of charity, which order is in reference to the first principle of the love, which is God."²⁹ The obligation of observing this order, of which we shall see more later, is of divine precept. "The mode which is essential to an act of virtue comes under the precept which prescribes that virtuous act. Now the order of charity is essential to the virtue, since it is based on the proportion of love to the thing beloved."³⁰

²⁶ *Matthew*, xxii, 37, 38.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 40.

²⁸ Cf. *The Commandments of God* (London: 1937), pp. 27, 88-89.

²⁹ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 26, a. 1.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, q. 44, a. 8.

The necessity, nature, and obligation of charity having been set forth, a statement of the problem of this paper is now opportune. Because there is a great need of a reconstruction of the social order, and because amidst a maze of conflicting remedies the Church, in her traditional theology and in the encyclicals of her modern Pontiffs on the social question, teaches that charity is the "bond of perfection" that will reunite society, and because an understanding of the order in charity is essential for a proper appreciation of the profoundly social acts and effects of the virtue and the vast problems connected with them, it is proposed: first of all, to set forth the doctrine on the order in charity with special reference to love of neighbor as outlined by St. Thomas Aquinas; secondly, to sketch the historical evolution of some modern theories of social reconstruction which claim love in some shape or form as a principle of social order, viz., individualism, classism, statism, racism; and lastly, to compare the Catholic doctrine with that of these several modern "isms." It is an attempt to interpret social thinking, Catholic and non-Catholic alike, in the light of that tremendously important, often misunderstood, infallibly proclaimed thing, called love.

II. ORDER IN LOVE OF NEIGHBOR

In this section, the doctrine of St. Thomas on the order in love of neighbor will be briefly presented, in elucidation of that great social bond which should be the soul of the new social order, and in preparation for an examination of the sociologicistic concepts of love and self-interest which will be undertaken in succeeding sections. The absolutely first consideration of the order of charity has to do with the *object*, since the object determines the order in human affairs. Following the treatment of the object will come an explanation of the *manner* of the love of neighbor—a search into the significance of those highly important words, "as thyself." Lastly, the problem of the *degrees* of love of neighbor will be studied with a view to the establishment of a precise—as precise as principles will per-

mit—determination of the order to be observed in the love of all men, be they kinsfolk, friends, or enemies. Having understood the “why,” “how,” and “to what degree” of the virtue of charity, we shall better appreciate the implications of contrary doctrines as they are presented later on, even before a definite criticism of them is made.

* * *

Treating of the precept of charity, “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself,” in answer to the question whether the precept is fittingly expressed, St. Thomas replies affirmatively, since the precept indicates both the reason for loving and the mode or manner of love. The reason, he writes, “is indicated in the word *neighbor*, because the reason why we ought to love others out of charity is because they are nigh to us, both as to the natural image of God, and as to the capacity for glory.”³¹ Were all men of a keener intellect there would be no need of giving this particular commandment on the love of neighbor. The law of the love of God would have been sufficient. The precepts are to the law what propositions are to the speculative sciences in which the first principles virtually contain the conclusions. In moral affairs the end has the character of a principle, and the love of God is the end to which love of God is ordained. But since some who know the principles are unable to consider all that is virtually contained in them, it is necessary that for them scientific conclusions be traced to their ultimate principles. Thus, in the matter of charity, as St. Thomas observes, “it behooved us to receive precepts not only of the love of God but also of the love of our neighbor, on account of those who are less intelligent, who do not understand that one of these precepts is included in the other.”³²

When St. Thomas says that the reason for loving according to the second precept of the New Law is indicated in the word *neighbor*, it is not to be understood that the motion of love falls first upon the neighbor and through him to God. Charity

³¹ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 44, a. 7.

³² *Ibid.*, a. 2.

essentially is a friendship between two people, the soul of the individual man and God. Man loves things other than God only so far as they pertain in some way to God—an extension of the love of man for God in Himself. It is in this way that all men, even one's enemies, fall within the great orbit of charity.

Friendship extends to a person in two ways: first in respect of himself and in this way friendship never extends but to one's friend: secondly, it extends to someone in respect to another, as, when a man has a friendship for a certain person, for his sake he loves all belonging to him, be they children, servants, or connected with him in any way. Indeed, so much do we love our friends, that for their sake we love all who belong to them, even if they hurt or hate us; so that, in this way, the friendship of charity extends even to our enemies, whom we love out of charity in relation to God, to whom the friendship of charity is chiefly directed.³³

It is upon this concept that the whole order of charity is based. The fundamental reason for loving our neighbor is not a common nature, common nation, common economic or social goals—grounds adduced by the new humanitarianism, racism, fascism, communism—but the common ground of divine life which God grants to all who are His.³⁴ It is not the humanitarian notion of service through neighbor to God; rather it is service to neighbor through God. "We do not reach God

³³ *Ibid.*, q. 23, a. 1, ad 2um.

³⁴ In the opusculum, *De Duobus Praeceptis Caritatis*, St. Thomas lists four things which lead us to the love of our neighbor:

(1) The first is the love of God; because if "any man say: 'I love God,' and hateth his brother, he is a liar" (I *Jn.*, 4: 20).

(2) The second is God's commandment. For Christ on the point of His departure impressed on His disciples this precept above all others: "This is my commandment, that ye love one another, even as I have loved you" (*Jn.*, 15: 12).

(3) The third is our common nature: for as it is said (*Eccclus.*, 13: 19), "every animal loves its like." Wherefore seeing that all men are like in nature they should love one another: and consequently to hate one's neighbor is not only contrary to the divine law, but also to the law of nature.

(4) The fourth is the profit to be gained thereby: in as much as charity puts whatever we have at another's service: for it is charity that unites the Church and makes all things common (*The Commandments of God* [London, 1937], pp. 18-19).

through our neighbor, rather we reach our neighbor through God. . . . There are no short cuts to altruism; we must go the long, triangular way around, through God to neighbor.”³⁵

After determining the object of love of neighbor, the manner or mode of this love has to be treated. The very precept given by Christ specifies how man should love his fellow-men—as *thyself*. St. Thomas has succinctly explained the meaning of this phrase:

The mode of love is indicated in the words *as thyself*. This does not mean that a man must love his neighbor equally as himself, but in like manner as himself, and this in three ways. First, as regards the end, namely, that he should love his neighbour for God’s sake, even as he loves himself for God’s sake, so that his love for his neighbour is a *holy* love. Secondly, as regards the rule of love, namely, that a man should not give way to his neighbour in evil, but only in good things, even as he ought to gratify his will in good things alone, so that his love for his neighbour may be a *righteous* love. Thirdly, as regards the reason for loving, namely, that a man should love his neighbour not for his own profit, or pleasure, but in the sense of wishing his neighbour well, even as he wishes himself well, so that his love for his neighbour may be a *true* love: since when a man loves his neighbour for his own profit or pleasure, he does not love his neighbour truly, but loves himself.³⁶

The norm of the love of neighbor is the love of self—of self

³⁵ W. Farrell, O. P., *A Companion to the Summa* (New York: 1940), III, 68.

³⁶ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 44, a. 7; In the opusculum, *De Duobus Preceptis Caritatis*, St. Thomas lists five points which should be observed in the love of neighbor:

(1) The first is that we must love our neighbor as truly as we love ourselves; and this we do if we love him for his own sake and not for ours. . . .

(2) The second is that we must love him ordinately; that is to say, we must not love him more than God, or as much as God, but in God even as thou must love thyself. . . .

(3) The third is that we must love our neighbor efficaciously: since thou not only lovest thyself, but thou dost endeavour to get good things for thyself, and to avoid what is bad for thyself. . . .

(4) The fourth is that we must love our neighbor perseveringly, even as we persevere in loving ourselves. . . .

(5) The fifth is that we should love our neighbor justly and holily, that is, not with a sinful purpose, since neither should we love ourselves thus, seeing that by doing so we lose God (Cf. *The Commandments of God*, pp. 20-22).

in order to God. "The love by which we love ourselves is the form, the basis, of the friendship which we have for others."³⁷ It may immediately be objected that man cannot love himself out of charity, since charity is a type of friendship, and friendship is between two persons; whereas in love of self but one person is considered. If we consider charity under the general notion of friendship, it is quite true to say that man is not a friend to himself. He is precious more than a friend. Friendship implies union; but a man, in self-love, more than being united to another, is one with himself, and unity is greater than union. On the other hand, if we speak of charity in its specific nature, as denoting man's friendship with God in the first place, and secondly, with the things of God, among which is the man himself who has charity, then man can be said to love himself.³⁸ Approaching charity in this light, it becomes clear not only that the individual should love himself, but also that he should love himself next to God and more than his neighbor.

God is loved as the principle of good, on which the love of charity is founded; while man, out of charity, loves himself by reason of his being a partaker of the aforesaid good, and loves his neighbor by reason of his fellowship in that good. Now fellowship is a reason for love according to a certain union in relation to God. Wherefore just as unity surpasses union, the fact that man himself has a share of the divine good, is a more potent reason for loving than that another should be a partaker with him in that share. Therefore, man, out of charity, ought to love himself more than his neighbour, in sign whereof, a man ought not to give way to any evil of sin, which counteracts his share of happiness, not even that he may free his neighbour from sin.³⁹

The efficacy of the basic golden rule depends on this truth: we do unto others as we do unto ourselves. St. Thomas quotes Aristotle's comment in the *Ethics*:⁴⁰ "The origin of friendly relations with others lies in our relations with ourselves." Without succumbing to Spencerian individualism, we can say that

³⁷ Farrell, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

³⁸ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 25, a. 4.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, q. 26, a. 4.

⁴⁰ *Ethics*, Bk. IX, 4, 8.

true altruism has as its basis a sound egoism, an egoism based on the love of God.

Lest this establishing of self-love as a norm of man's social relations be confused with erroneous notions prevalent in modern social theory, it is well to recall St. Thomas' distinction of the three types of self-love.⁴¹ He teaches that self-love may stand in a threefold relation to charity. First of all, when a man places his end in the love of his own personal good, as is the case with individualist philosophies, self-love is contrary to charity. When a man loves himself for the sake of God and in God, it is included in charity. Thirdly, self-love is distinct from charity, but not contrary to it, when a man loves himself from the viewpoint of his own good, but not establishing his own good as an ultimate end; though distinct from it, this self-love is referable to charity.

A further explanation of the meaning of love of self is to be found in the tract on charity in the *Summa Theologica*:

Love of self is common to all, in one way; in another way it is proper to the good; in a third way, it is proper to the wicked. For it is common to all for each one to love what he thinks himself to be. Now a man is said to be a thing in two ways: first, in respect of his substance and nature, and this way all think themselves to be what they are, that is, composed of soul and body. In this way, too, all men, both good and wicked, love themselves, in so far as they love their own preservation. Secondly, a man is said to be something in respect of some predominance. . . . In this way, all do not think themselves to be what they are. . . . Now the good look upon their rational nature or the inward man as being the chief thing in them, wherefore in this way they think themselves to be what they are. On the other hand, the wicked reckon their sensitive and corporeal nature, or the outward man, to hold the first place. Wherefore, since they know not themselves aright, they do not love themselves aright, but love what they think themselves to be.⁴²

The characteristics of true self-love are five, corresponding to the five things which Aristotle proved proper to friendship.

⁴¹ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 19, a. 6.

⁴² *Ibid.*, q. 25, a. 7.

Just as every one wishes his friend to be and to live, desires good things for him, does good things to him, takes pleasure in his company, and is at peace, of one mind, with him, sharing his joys and sorrows, so also the good love themselves as to the inward man because they wish his preservation in its integrity. They desire spiritual goods for him; they do their best to obtain them; they take pleasure in entering into their own hearts with the good thoughts of the present, memory of past accomplishments, and hope of future success, all fecund sources of spiritual pleasure; finally, they are at peace, they experience no clashing of wills, since their whole soul tends to one thing, God.⁴³

Having established that God is to be loved first of all out of charity, secondly self, and then our neighbor, it now remains to determine the order, if such there be, in the love of neighbor. It was taught in the time of St. Thomas, and it is being taught today, that one ought to love all neighbors equally as far as the interior affection is concerned, but not as regards the outward effect, in which a gradation of love is quite evident, and necessarily so. St. Thomas rejected this opinion as "unreasonable," and maintained that even as regards the interior affection we ought to love one neighbor more than another. The affection of charity, which is an inclination of grace, is not less orderly than the natural appetite which is the inclination of nature. Grace perfects, it does not destroy nature. In the physical order the natural inclination of a thing is proportioned to the act or movement which is becoming to the inward nature of that thing. So in the supernatural order, the inclination of grace which is the effect of charity is proportionate to those actions which are performed outwardly. The exterior act is in proportion to the interior love.⁴⁴ Had Herbert Spencer appreciated this principle, he would not have blamed the anomaly of a theoretical "ethics of amity" and a practical "ethics of enmity" upon the true Christian love of neighbor.⁴⁵

⁴³ Cf. *ibid.*

⁴⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, q. 26, a. 6.

⁴⁵ Cf. H. Spencer, *Principles of Ethics* (New York: 1897), I, 313-18; 322-24.

Once the correspondence between the outward action and the interior affection is evident, then a definite order in the love of neighbor can be shown to exist, based upon the nature of the virtue of charity itself. Order depends upon a principle, and since in charity the principle of love is God and the person who loves, the affection of love increases in proportion to the nearness of the neighbor to one or the other of these terms.⁴⁶

The love of neighbor may, like every act, be considered in relation to its object or to its agent. The relation to the object is the basis for specific differences⁴⁷ in the love of neighbor, while the relation to the subject or agent founds the differences in the intensity of the love. Regarding the specific differences in the love of neighbor, St. Thomas has this to say:

Now the object of charity's love is God, and man is the lover. Therefore the specific diversity of the love which is in accordance with charity, as regards the love of our neighbour, depends on his relation to God, so that, out of charity we should wish a greater good to one who is nearer to God; for though the good which charity wishes to all, viz., everlasting happiness, is one in itself, yet it has various degrees according to various shares of happiness, and it belongs to charity to wish God's justice to be maintained, in accordance with which better men have a fuller share of happiness.⁴⁸

The intensity of the love of neighbor, however, is measured with regard to the man who loves. Since union is the secret of love, "man loves those who are more closely united to him, with more intense affection as to the good he wishes for them, than he loves those who are better as to the greater good he wishes for them."⁴⁹

⁴⁶ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 26, a. 6.

⁴⁷ The words "specific differences" are not to be understood as implying different species of charity. Charity is one because its end, namely the goodness of God, is one; and the fellowship of everlasting happiness on which this friendship of God is based, is also one. "Charity is simply one virtue, and not divided into several species." (Cf. *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 23, a. 5.) Cajetan explains St. Thomas' use of the words as implying not specific differences as such, but differences which are reductively or by a similitude specific (*specifica reductive seu similitudinarie*). (*Op. cit.*, II-II, q. 26, a. 7.)

⁴⁸ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 26, a. 7.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

A difficulty immediately presents itself if the above doctrine stand alone. If the specific differences, or what we might term the objective evaluations of love, be based on the relation of our neighbor to God, and if the intensities of love spring from our subjective affection for those united to us, how explain the fact that we actually love and prefer some who are closely connected to us more than others who, to all appearances, are more virtuous and therefore closer to God? Is it simply a matter of the intensity of the love, or is it an objective evaluation by which, for example, a man loves his mother more than he loves the heroic saint? In the same article in which he lays down the principles for the objectivity and intensity of love, the Angelic Doctor gives two additional reasons for what seems to be an objective diversity of the love of neighbor which is in accordance with charity.

First, though the objective goodness of a neighbor is to be estimated by his closeness to God, our love for some blood relative, whose claim to virtue is not equal to that of a holier person, may⁵⁰ nevertheless be greater than our love for the latter. For there are some neighbors, i. e., blood relatives, fellow countrymen, who are connected with us by their natural origin; this connection cannot be severed since that origin makes them to be what they are. "But," as St. Thomas observes, "the goodness of virtue, wherein some are close to God, can come and go, increase and decrease. . . . Hence it is possible for one, out of charity, to wish this man who is more closely united to one, to be better than another, and so reach a higher degree of happiness."⁵¹

There is yet another reason why, out of charity, we love more those who are more nearly connected with us, since we love them in more ways. We should love all men out of our common charity, but with some we have certain other friendships over and above the common bond of charity. Even as the art which is concerned with the end commands the art concerned

⁵⁰ Cf. Cajetan. *Commentarium in Summam Theol.*, II-II, q. 26, a. 7.

⁵¹ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 26, a. 7.

with the means, so charity commands each act of another friendship, be it based on race, nationality, or mutual interest, for these friendships should be, and in virtuous people are, directed to the ultimate in friendship, which is the love of God. "Consequently this very act of loving someone because he is akin or connected with us, or because he is a fellow-countryman or for any like reason that is referable to the end of charity, can be commanded by charity, so that, out of charity both eliciting and commanding, we love in more ways those who are more closely connected with us."⁵²

In judging, therefore, of the order to be observed in the love of neighbor, three elements cooperate in forming our estimation—the closeness of the neighbor to God, the number of reasons for loving him, and the closeness of his union with self. The last two reasons really converge into one, for the number of reasons for loving our neighbor are considered only insofar as they bring him closer to the one loving. Mere multiplication of common ties, as, for example, membership of neighbors in the Kiwanis and Rotary Clubs, in the same political party, or automobile and golf associations, does not of itself constitute a justification of greater love for one bound to self by these ties. The relationships which give title to greater love are those that bring the neighbor closer to the self than others not bound to the self by these ties.

In applying these norms, it is to be noted, first of all, that a judgment on the closeness of our neighbors to God is in itself very difficult. Unless by reason of state or office or fixity of life (as is the case with those in the religious and episcopal state, those ordained to the priesthood, and the souls of the faithful departed) certain people are marked as being close to God, there is no very sure manner of determining which of our neighbors are closer to God. And since virtue is not only difficult of perception, but also transitory in the sense that it may be forfeited by sin, the judgment is rendered the more precarious. In treating of the virtue of humility,⁵³ St. Thomas

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ *Ibid.*, q. 161, a. 3.

is very careful to speak of virtue which *appears* to be in others, and because one cannot well judge of the virtue of others, St. Thomas teaches that humility does not require that that which is of God in one's self be subject to that which appears to be of God in another (*ei quod apparet esse Dei in altero*).

Accordingly, the most practical norm for judging of the self's love for others is this: *those who are more closely united to the self are to be loved more out of charity*. At first sight this criterion seems highly egotistical and, moreover, contrary to the norm originally laid down by the Angelic Doctor, namely, that those who are closer to God are to be loved more out of charity. However, if we conceive of the principle of the order in charity for any particular person, not as God simply or the self simply, but as the relationship between God and the self—the friendship itself and not merely the persons between whom the friendship exists—then we can see how this criterion is valid. On the part of the neighbor loved, it is not a question of a mere relationship between himself and the one loving (thou—ego); rather there is a proportional relationship between himself and the principle, which is the friendship existing between God and man, i. e., the one loving [thou—charity (ego-God)]. Similarly, in charity, the one loving, the self, loves the neighbor more who is more closely connected with him by ties of family, blood, country, or by some other legitimate bond, not inasmuch as this or that tie binds the neighbor closer to the self as self alone (self-thou), but because this or that tie, capable of being elevated and supernaturalized in the love of God, actually, if imperated by charity, binds the neighbor closer to the self as loving God [self-charity (thou-God)].⁵⁴

⁵⁴ Cf. Cajetan, *op. cit.*, II-II, q. 44, a. 8: In eodem articulo dubium est de ratione reddita in littera, scil., "cum ordo caritatis accipitur secundum proportionem dilectionis ad diligibile." Quoniam superius, dictum est quod ordo caritatis attenditur penes duo, scil. diligentem et diligibile. Quomodo ergo nunc soli diligibili attribuitur?

Ad hoc dicitur quod verba litterae sunt intelligenda de diligibili simpliciter, vel huic. Ita quod ordo caritatis meae accipitur secundum proportionem dilectionis vel ad diligibile simpliciter, vel ad diligibile mihi. Ut sic quicumque ducatur ad proportionem diligentis ad diligibile, ut hic dicitur. Nec discrepat a supra-dictis;

This conception of charity is tremendously important, and essential to an understanding of the role of love of neighbor in the social order. It makes manifest how charity may gather up and sanctify all the legitimate human ties and affections binding men together in the exercise of social life. At the same time, this truth discloses the root of the social "isms" contrary to that of charity—individualism and collectivism. Once take God out of the relationship between self and neighbor, and the way is paved for two socially false principles—either the self assumes the prerogatives of the divinity which it has displaced in the relationship, to the destruction of ordered (because the principle has been destroyed) love of neighbor, as happens in individualism; or the neighbors, at least taken together, are made the ultimate end (because their relationship to God is gone), to the destruction of the personality of the self, as happens in collectivism.

The doctrine of the Angelic Doctor plus the elucidations and distinctions of the more penetrating commentators on this subject may be briefly recapitulated as follows:

First, we may love one person more than another in three ways: (1) *objectively*, in that we love more him to whom we wish the greater good; (2) *appreciatively*, in that we love more him whom we prefer (*simpliciter*) and esteem more than another, so that we fear more to lose his friendship than that of another; (3) *intensively*, in that we love one more than another with a warmer affection, with a greater intensity of act and vehemence of will.⁵⁵

With the help of these distinctions, the question as to whether we should love more those who are better, i. e., closer

ad quae se remittens hic auctor voluit haec intelligi juxta supra determinata, quae ad hanc brevem glossam reducuntur. Ordo enim caritatis ex parte diligibilis habet ut propinquius Deo magis diligatur: ex parte autem diligentis habet ut propinquius mihi magis diligatur a me. Sed hic ordo reducitur ad proportionem dilectionis ad diligibile: quia propinquius mihi est magis diligibile a me. Et propterea sicut actus dilectionis respectu magis propinqui Deo est improporcionatus objecto nisi magis ametur quam minus propinquum; ita actus meae dilectionis respectu domestici mei est improporcionatus objecto nisi magis ametur a me quam extraneus.

⁵⁵ Cf. Toletus, *Commentarium in Summam S. Thomae*, II-II, q. 26, a. 2.

to God, or those who are more closely united to us, may be resolved in the following conclusions:

(1) Those who are better, the more virtuous, are to be loved more in one way, that is, *objectively* and *directly*, by a love based on the spiritual goodness they already possess. We ought to rejoice in the goodness possessed by them, to wish them the greater beatitude that is due to them by reason of this goodness. They are closer to God, more worthy, and therefore we owe them more reverence, veneration and honor.

(2) Those who are more closely united to us are, all things being equal,⁵⁶ to be loved more in all the other ways, viz.,

a) First of all, *intensively*. Love is a motion of the one loving towards the one loved, and since the impetus of motion falls more forcibly upon that which is closer than that which is farther removed, so the motion of love for those closer to us is more intense than that for others.

b) Secondly, *appreciatively*. Those should be loved more who are loved by more titles, more modes of love or friendships which are imperated by charity. And since those who are more closely related to us are united to us by titles or friendships over and above the common friendship of charity, they are to be preferred before and esteemed more than others not so closely related, insofar as these other relationships are imperated by charity.⁵⁷

c) Lastly, those who are more closely united to us may be loved more *objectively* but *indirectly*: objectively in the sense that we may wish them a greater goodness than others who, though more virtuous, may yet lose the goodness which they

⁵⁶ Cf. F. Sylvius, *Commentarium in Totam Secundam Secundae S. Thomae Aquinatis* (Venice: 1726), III, 130. Quando non omnia cetera sunt paria, potest esse, quod magis debemus diligere et adjuvare meliores. . . .

⁵⁷ Cf. Cajetan, *op. cit.*, Coniunctiores secundum pluribus titulis magis diliguntur quam alii: diliguntur enim tamquam aeternae vitae capaces, tanquam consanguinei, tanquam concives et familiares, etc. Et hoc non solum dilectione naturali, sed etiam charitativa: nam charitas imperare potest actus aliarum amicitiarum, et eos ad finem suum supernaturalem ordinare; ergo qui sic sunt coniunctiores, debent magis diligere.

have; and indirectly, in that the good we wish those more closely united to us is not yet possessed, in contrast, e. g., to the objectively direct love of the saints in heaven who already possess their beatitude.⁵⁸

For the translation of these principles into social practice, yet more qualifications have to be made (the threefold division of unions into carnal, spiritual, and civil, the special principles regulating the love of others according to these types, as well as the variations in the obligation and order of charity according to the different kinds of necessity in which our neighbors find themselves) all of which are vital to a comprehension of the influence of charity in the social order. The consideration of these, however, we shall leave to the final discussion where we shall show their relation to the multiple "isms" that have attempted to supplant the love of neighbor as the crowning, all-pervasive principle of social structure.

For the present, we shall continue our review of the doctrine on the order in charity treated by St. Thomas in the *Summa Theologica*.⁵⁹ After answering the question as to whether we ought to love more those who are better or those who are more closely united to us, the Angelic Doctor proceeds to more particular considerations based on the various kinds of union. Man ought to love more those who are closely united to him. Union is the norm of comparison; where it is a question of more reasons for loving our neighbor, there are several unions to be considered; where it is a question of only one relationship compared to another, one union will be more intense or remiss.

In affirmative answer to the question "Whether we ought to love more those who are connected with us by ties of blood," St. Thomas considers the nature of the union of blood relatives in itself, and states that it is prior to and more stable than all others, "because it is something affecting the very substance, whereas other unions supervene and may cease altogether."⁶⁰

⁵⁸ Cf. B. H. Merkelbach, *Summa Theologiae Moralis* (Paris: 1935), I, 696-97.

⁵⁹ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 26.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, a. 8.

While the Angelic Doctor admits that other friendships may be stronger because of something that is proper to each of them, the friendship of kindred, because of this union of blood, is more stable; and stability, the continuance of the perfection which is act, is to be preferred to that which is transitory. Love of kinsfolk would, then, all things being equal, come first in the order of love of neighbor. Again it is grace building upon nature.

But even within the family circle there are varying gradations of charity to be observed. Should a man, out of charity, love his children more than his father? Should a man love his mother more than his father? Should a man love his wife more than his father and mother? The answers to these queries are given by St. Thomas in his treatment of the order of charity. Because a man's father is a principle of his being, and so more like to God the first principle of all being, a man ought to love his father more than his children as far as the reasons for loving are concerned. But considering the question from the viewpoint of the union, a man ought to love his children more than his father. Children are part of their parents, and so the love of a father for his children is more like a man's love for himself. The *effective* implications of the *effective* love of father and children make the doctrine clearer in a practical way. Since the debt due to a principle is submission of respect and honor, and debt due to the effect is one of influence and care, a man is chiefly obliged to show honor to his father, the principle, and care to his children, the effects of his being.⁶¹ Regarding a man's love of father and mother, if the father be considered precisely as father and the mother precisely as mother, St. Thomas teaches that the father ought to be loved more than the mother, since the father is an active principle of generation and the mother a passive and material principle.⁶² That which is active is more perfect than that which is passive. As for a man's love for his parents and

⁶¹ Cf. *ibid.*, a. 9 c., ad 1um; *Comm. in V Ephes.*, lect. 10.

⁶² *Ibid.*, a. 10.

his wife, he should love his parents more as principles, but on the part of the union, he should love his wife more.⁶³

Passing from the family circle to that of a man's friends, those who have been benefactors to him or those whom he has benefited, since benefactors are principles of a man's good in that they contribute to his spiritual or bodily welfare, they are to be loved more as far as the reason for loving is concerned than those whom a man benefits. On the part of the connection between the benefactor and the beneficiary, however, those whom one benefits are to be loved more than one's benefactor, because the act of giving is more perfect than the receiving of gifts. "It is the lover's part to act, since he wills and works the good of the beloved, while the beloved takes a passive part in receiving good, so that to love surpasses being loved, for which reason the greater love is on the part of the benefactor."⁶⁴

The precept of charity obliges to the love of all neighbors, enemies as well as kindred and friends. The love of one's enemies may be understood in three ways:⁶⁵ first, the love of enemies as such; secondly, the love of enemies as to their nature but in general; and, thirdly, a special movement of love towards enemies in particular. Obviously, charity does not oblige in the first sense; love of that which is evil in another is incompatible with the love of the greatest good, God. Man is bound to love his enemies as to their nature and in general, since they are not contrary to him as men and they are capable of happiness. As for the special movement of love towards enemies, it is not absolutely required, but pertains to the perfection of charity. Charity does require that man be prepared in mind to love his enemies individually, if the necessity were to occur. Signs and favors of love such as are shown to neighbors in general must be shown to enemies as well as to friends, but the favors or signs of love which man shows to particular friends are not due

⁶³ *Ibid.*, a. 11.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, a. 12.

⁶⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, q. 25, a. 8.

to enemies, save in case of urgency.⁶⁶ "If thy enemy be hungry, give him to eat; if he thirst, give him drink."⁶⁷

In summary, we have seen that the object of love of neighbor is God. All neighbors fall within the ken of charity because they are capable of possessing the eternal happiness of the greatest good, and in our love we wish them a share in that goal which is God. The manner or mode of love of neighbor is expressed in the words, *as thyself*, which indicate that the form which specifies man's love of self in God is that which regulates his love of those about him. A profoundly significant corollary of this is the truth that increase in charity is not so much a question of ever-greater absorption in the service of others, but rather a deepening of the love of God in oneself. That more beneficial work for others often follows on this intensity of self-love is quite true, but it is an effect, not a cause of greater love. The diverse approximations of man's neighbors to this norm of self-love provides the basis for an order in the love of kindred, friends and even enemies. It is always a question of going back to the principle, the love whose end is God and whose subject is self.

The social implications of this doctrine are great, and were it more fully understood and practiced a new harmony would soon pervade the structure of society. One in its object, universal in its extension, hierarchical in its application, charity is indeed the "soul" of a social order possessing unity in diversity and diversity in unity.

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(Part II will appear in the next issue.)

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, a. 9.

⁶⁷ *Proverbs*, xxv, 21.

TWO STUDIES IN METAPHYSICS

I

MATHEMATICAL AND METAPHYSICAL ANALOGY IN ST. THOMAS

IT is a significant fact that St. Thomas, following Aristotle, uses the words "analogy" and "proportion" interchangeably; that is, he takes them to be synonymous. For instance, in his *Commentary on the Metaphysics* we find the expression "proportion or analogy" (*proportione vel analogia*);¹ in his *Commentary on the Ethics*, the expression "according to analogy, that is, the same proportion" (*secundum analogiam, idest proportionem eandem*);² and lest there be any doubt about the matter at all, in the *Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate* we have the categorical statement that "according to analogy" means nothing else than "according to proportion."³ Ordinarily, however, we think of "proportion" as being primarily and above all a mathematical term, and the theory of proportion as belonging primarily and in the strict sense to the science of mathematics, and in particular to geometry. Hence if by "analogy" St. Thomas only means "proportion," then it would seem that if the theory of analogy has any really scientific application in philosophy, this application must consist in some sort of extension of the *mathematical* notion of analogy into the domain of philosophical science. One may well ask, however, how any such extension could possibly be valid, for is it not true that in philosophy we are outside the

¹ In *V Metaph.*, lect. 8, Cathala ed., n. 879.

² In *IV Ethic.*, lect. 7, n. 96. In his Commentaries on the *Physics* and the *De Coelo et Mundo* of Aristotle, see also: *I Phys.*, lect. 18, n. 7 (Leonine ed.); I. 13, n. 9; *I De C. et M.*, I. 14, ns. 3-4; II, I. 11, n. 4; and in his *Comp. Theol.* see ch. 27. Cf. also *Opusc. De Prin. Nat.*, in fine.

³ Q. 2, 11, corpus.

order of quantity in the ordinary mathematical sense? Is this not especially true in metaphysics? Certainly, in philosophy we have attained to a level of abstraction outside or above the corporeal order, but where there are no bodies, how can there be any quantity? Where there is no quantity, how can there be any proportions or "analogies" in a truly scientific sense—in any sense other than a merely literary or metaphorical one? If "analogy" does have a truly philosophical role, that role must be something more than, and other than, that of a mere figure of speech, no matter how suggestive it may be. Nevertheless, it is true that St. Thomas defines analogy in terms of proportion.

In fact, he says that "properly speaking, proportion is nothing else than the relation of quantity to quantity, as for instance, in the case of one (quantity) being the equal of another, or the triple of it."⁴ It is, as he says in the *Summa Theologica*, "a certain relation of one quantity to another, according as the double, triple, and equal, are species of proportion."⁵ Obviously, it is here a question of predicamental or dimensive quantity, i.e., of that quantity which depends on extension and is applicable only to bodies; so "proportion" here signifies a definite, precise, determinate relation of one dimensive quantity, continuous or discrete, to another, e.g., the relation of a surface to a surface or of a number to a number.⁶

Now this is proportion taken according to the first imposition of the name.⁷ In this sense proportion is univocal; it applies only to the class of dimensive quantities, with respect to which it always has the same meaning, namely, definite or fixed relation of one quantity to another (*certa habitudo unius quantitatis ad alteram*), and this holds whether the quantity in

⁴ *De Ver.*, q. 8, a. 1, ad 6um.

⁵ *I.*, q. 12, a. 1, ad 4um.

⁶ Number in the properly mathematical sense is an abstraction from real, discrete, dimensive quantity, and therefore applies properly only to the latter. (See below note 11.)

⁷ See J. M. Ramirez: "De Analogia . . .," in *La Ciencia Tomista*, vol. xxiv, p. 23.

question be "commensurable" or "incommensurable."⁸ Always it is a question of ratio in the strict Euclidean sense,⁹ namely of a determinate relation between dimensive quantities or "magnitudes," whether commensurable or incommensurable. The ratio need not be expressible in strict numerical units; it may not be determinable by exact numerical calculation, as in the case of the relation between the diagonal and the side of a square. Nevertheless, mathematical ratio is always formally univocal because it has a formally identical signification wherever it is found.

Proportion or analogy in the mathematical sense is univocal. The basic reason for this is that such analogy is restricted to the genus or class of dimensive quantities, for a genus is predicated of its inferiors according to a formality which is absolutely the same in them all (*secundum rationem omnino eandem*). Thus "animal" is predicated univocally of horse and of cow; it designates a certain character formally identical in them both, by reason of which they can be placed in the same class.¹⁰ For instance, let us consider a typical mathematical proportion, or what in Thomistic language is called a "proportionality," i. e., a proportion of proportions: thus $6/2 = 21/7$. It is evident that the common notion (triplicity) which is realized in both these proportions is univocal; "triple" said of 6 in respect of 2 is identical in signification with "triple" said of 21 in respect of 7. The same must be said of all strictly mathematical concepts; they are all formally univocal because they apply only within the order of dimensive quantity, whether continuous or discrete, for in this sense of the term, quantity is generic, and every genus is predicated univocally of the things that come under it.

Mathematical "proportions" (ratios) and "proportionalties" (proportions strictly so called) are analogies only as regards the manner in which they are expressed. Formally and intrinsically and properly they are not analogies, because they

⁸ See *Euclid's Elements* (Heath trans., 2nd ed., 1926), vol. II, p. 117.

⁹ *Ibid.*, Book V, definitions iv, vi, and above all v.

¹⁰ St. Thomas Aquinas: *IV Meta.*, lect. 1, n. 535 sq.; cf. X, lect. 3, n. 1966.

do not concern concepts which are formally and intrinsically and properly analogical. True, they exhibit an analogical "form," and bear upon the *relation* between entities rather than upon the entities themselves. It is true also that no notion which is intrinsically analogical, that is to say, apt of its very nature to be realized in the order of existence according to *essentially diverse modes*, is found in them. Mathematical ratios and proportions are not true analogies; they are "univocities" in the guise of true analogies. It is because they look so much like analogies that they are so often mistaken for them—an error which, pressed far enough, may undermine the whole structure of a philosophy.

We have seen that St. Thomas defines analogy in terms of "proportion," and that according to the first imposition of the name proportion is nothing but a definite, fixed relation of one dimensive quantity, continuous or discrete, to another, quantity of this sort being the proper subject of mathematics.¹¹ Mathematical quantity is not the only sort of quantity. Analogy, in the proper and philosophical sense, is not defined in terms of mathematical quantity. If this were so, analogy would be reduced to univocity. Analogy is not so defined because quantity is twofold, being not only dimensive but also "virtual"; and virtual quantity is quantity of *power* or *perfection*.¹²

Whereas dimensive quantity exists only in corporeal things, virtual quantity exists in all things. Thus the name proportion,

¹¹ Besides mathematical number (which, being an abstraction from real discrete dimensive quantity, is limited to that order), there is transcendental number, but such number is not *mathematical* but metaphysical, or, if you like, trans-mathematical. Those who argue that number (by which they mean mathematical number) is really transcendental, for the simple reason that all things whatsoever can be numbered (is not God Himself *One and Three*?) forget that only in the transmathematical sense is number analogical. "Number" cannot be predicated univocally of diverse orders of being. Thus a form is not "one" in the same sense that a material individual is; and mathematical number applies properly only to the latter type of being: it implies the division of matter, and it is univocal.

¹² *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 32, a. 1, ad 1um; *Q. D. de Ver.*, q. 29, a. 3 ("ad cuius evidentiam . . .").

which was first imposed to signify the relation of one dimensive quantity, continuous or discrete, to another, was extended to signify any relation whatever of virtual quantity to virtual quantity. This sort of quantity is transcendental; it "wanders through" all the categories, for virtual quantity follows upon being; from the fact that a thing *is*, it has virtual quantity as regards its perfection in the order of being.¹³

Virtual quantity resides first of all in the perfection of the form or nature of a thing. Thus heat is called "great" because of its intensity or perfection. Secondly, we find virtual quantity in the effects of form, the first of which is being, for every thing has being *according to* its form. The second effect of form, however, is operation, for every agent acts through its form. Hence there is virtual quantity both in the order of being and in the order of operation; in the order of being inasmuch as things of a more perfect nature have greater duration; in the order of operation, inasmuch as such things have greater power of acting.¹⁴ So, finally, by extension, "proportion" came to mean any relation whatsoever of one thing to another (*quaelibet habitudo unius ad alteram*).¹⁵ Thus matter is said to be "proportionate" to form;¹⁶ the knowable object to the knowing faculty;¹⁷ the effect to its cause; potency to act, and conversely.¹⁸

Composite (as distinguished from simple) proportion entails at least four terms, and is called "proportionality." In mathematics, "proportionality" designates the strict equality of two relations, taking "equality" according to the first imposition of the term in respect of mathematical quantities. When St. Thomas defines proportionality as the *equality* of two propor-

¹³ *Q. D. de Ver.*, *ibid.* " . . . ex hoc quod dicitur (i. e. quaelibet res) *ens*, consideratur in eo *quantitas virtualis* quantum ad *perfectionem essendi*."

¹⁴ *Summa Theol.*, loc. cit.; cf. I-II, q. 52, a. 1; *V Metaph.*, lect. 18, n. 1036-1038, and *I Sent.*, d. xix, q. 3, a. 1.

¹⁵ *Summa Theol.* I, q. 12, a. 1, ad 4um; *Q. D. de Ver.*, q. 8, a. 1, ad 6um.

¹⁶ *Q. D. de Ver.*, *ibid.*

¹⁷ *Summa Theol.* III, Suppl. q. 92, a. 1, ad 6um.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* I, q. 12, a. 1, ad 4um.

tions,¹⁹ therefore, he is giving primarily its mathematical definition; but when he speaks of proportionality as the *likeness* of two proportions,²⁰ he is giving its properly metaphysical definition.²¹ Just as there is a simple proportion between 4 and 2, and 20 and 10, in the order of dimensive quantity, so, in the order of virtual quantity there is a simple proportion between matter and form (in the physical order), and between essence and existence (in the metaphysical order). And just as there is equality in the proportions between 4 and 2, and 20 and 10, so there is likeness in the proportions between matter and form, and essence and existence (*esse*): matter : form, in the physical order, : : essence : existence, in the metaphysical order. Indeed, proportion is itself proportional. Thus proportion of virtual quantity : proportion of dimensive quantity : : proportionality of virtual quantity : proportionality of dimensive quantity.²²

Now it is true that St. Thomas sometimes gives mathematical examples to explain metaphysical and theological analogy.²³ In fact we find it very convenient to express such analogies in the form of geometrical proportions; e. g.,

$$\frac{\text{matter}}{\text{form}} = \frac{\text{potency}}{\text{act}}; \frac{\text{the created}}{\text{participated being}} = \frac{\text{the Uncreated}}{\text{unparticipated Being}}$$

Such formulas must not be interpreted in the quantitative mathematical sense. As Penido says,²⁴ philosophical analogy differs *toto coelo* from mathematical analogy. Le Rohellec likewise warns us not to be deceived by examples taken from arithmetic and geometry, lest the metaphysical problem of analogy

¹⁹ *V Ethic.*, lect. 5, n. 939-940.

²⁰ *Q. D. de Ver.*, q. 23, a. 7, ad 9um; *IV Sent.*, d. xlix, q. 2, a. 1, ad 6um.

²¹ See M. T.-L. Penido: *Le Rôle de l'analogie en théologie dogmatique* (Paris, Vrin, 1931), p. 23.

²² See *Summa Theol.*, loc. cit.; *Q. D. de Ver.*, q. 8, a. 1, ad 6um; *III Contra Gentiles*, ch. 54, in fine; *In Boet. De Trin.*, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3um; *III Sent.*, d. I, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3um. Cf. Cajetan, *De Nominum Analogia* (ed. Zammit, Rome, 1934), pp. 24-25.

²³ E. g., *In I Sent.*, d. XXXIV, q. 3, a. 1, ad 2um.

²⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 22-23.

be brought down to the mathematical level.²⁵ Mathematical examples are here nothing but examples; their value is purely illustrative.

Now "proportion" can be taken strictly or broadly. Strictly, "proportion" designates the relation of *two* quantities, *dimensive or virtual*, according to a *determinate* excess or adequation. If you have more than two terms, therefore, or even if you have only two terms, the relation between which is not determinate or finite, then in either case you will not have proportion in the strict sense. Hence when St. Thomas denies that there is any proportion between the finite and the infinite, between God and creature, it is because they are not proportional to one another in this strict, determinate, and finite way.²⁶ Broadly considered, however, there is a proportion between two terms which are even infinitely distant, and in this sense St. Thomas admits a proportion between the creature and God. That is to say, where "proportion" designates any relation whatsoever of one thing to another, it can be truly said that there is a *proportion* between the creature and God.²⁷

The crucial point is that proportion must and can not be understood univocally. This means that proportion, in the philosophical sense, cannot be understood mathematically, for if you take proportion mathematically, you are taking it according to the first imposition of the name—you are taking it univocally. To take proportion univocally is to mathematicize the doctrine of analogy. It is perfectly evidence that "proportion" is not univocal. In all things there are proportions—analogies—because there are relations and comparisons, but there are as many modes of proportion as there are modes of

²⁵ See his article, "De Fundamento . . .," in *Divus Thomas* (Placentiae), vol. 29, (1926), 79.

²⁶ E.g., this is evident in *Q. D. de Ver.*, q. 2, a. 3, ad 4um; a. 11 ("unde dicendum est . . ."). Cf. *Q. D. de Ver.*, q. 3, a. 1, ad 7um.

²⁷ *Summa Theol.* I, q. 13, a. 1, ad 4um. See also *Q. D. de Ver.*, q. 8, a. 1, ad 6um; q. 23, a. 7, ad 9um; *Q. D. De potentia*, q. 7, a. 10, ad 9um; *Contra Gentiles*, c. 54, in fine; *IV Sent.*, d. XLIX, q. 2, a. 1, ad 6um; *Summa Theol.* III, Suppl., q. 92, a. 1, ad 6um ("vel dicendum" . . .).

being. Proportion is itself proportional; analogy is itself analogical. It follows that there is something proportionately common in all proportions. Thus by abstracting from all particular proportions and types of proportion, we are left with a notion in the highest degree universal, the notion of *proportional likeness*. This notion expresses the essence of analogy as such.²⁸ It is the only kind of likeness we have in the only true metaphysical analogy—analogy of proper proportionality.

Analogy of proper proportionality does not require that the terms of the similar relations be really distinct. When we say that God "is to" His Being as the creature "is to" its being, it is evidence that the first relation is an identity. Nevertheless, analogy of proper proportionality remains in effect, because it concerns the likeness of relations—in this case, the perfect correspondence between essence and *esse*, both in respect of God and of the creature. Indeed, the analogy as such abstracts from the fact that this instance of proportional likeness requires in the case of the first proportion, identity, of the second, distinction. It likewise abstracts from the "distance," not merely between the *terms* of the relations, but also between the relations themselves. St. Thomas states that that likeness which consists in agreement of proportions obtains in the case of things which are very "distant" from one another, as well as between things which are not. Thus the likeness of *proportionality* between 2 and 1, and 6 and 3 is no greater than that between 2 and 1, and 100 and 50.²⁹ The same applies to the case noted above.

Whereas in a case of mathematical proportionality the common notion is univocal in the two proportions, in a case of metaphysical proportionality the common notion is analogical in the strict sense in the two proportions. For instance:

$\frac{\text{matter}}{\text{form}} = \frac{\text{essence}}{\text{existence}}$ the common notion being that of potency-act, which is realized diversely in both proportions, because it is here a question of two different orders of reality, the physical

²⁸ See Ramirez, *art. cit.*, p. 30.

²⁹ *Q. D. de Ver.*, q. 2, a. 11, ad 4um.

and the metaphysical, hence of two essentially diverse modes of being.³⁰ The analogous, says St. Thomas, is divided according to *diverse modes* (*analogum dividitur secundum diversos modos*):³¹ The community here is only relative or proportional. The same applies to truth as attributed to the Divine Intelligence, the human intelligence, and to things: "the divine intellect is a measure that is not measured; natural things are measures which are at the same time measured; but our intellect is not a measure but only a thing that is measured."³² So when we use the expression "proportional likeness" to designate the very essence of analogy, we are saying that the character of analogy as such is not that of something common to the *terms* in any given analogy, but to the *relations* between them. Analogy is likeness of *proportions*, *proportional* likeness.³³ St. Thomas, indeed, characterizes analogy as mutual likeness of proportions (*similitudo ad invicem proportionum*).³⁴ The essence of metaphysical analogy lies in proportionality.

All beings are proportionately one in being, yet every being in respect of its *esse* is diverse simply from every other being. Thus analogy is not a weak univocity. Nor is it merely the least common denominator between univocal and equivocal predication, for in the last analysis, analogy is based on the diversity of the act of being of all beings, of their *esse*, and the similarity between the *esse* and *suppositum* (subject receiving *esse*) of all beings. The relation between the act of being of one essence and the act of being of another essence will *always* be analogical by analogy of proper proportionality. This holds even for beings of the same genus or species. The unity of all beings in being is only proportional, consisting as it does only in the analogical community of relations which all beings maintain with one another through their *esse*.³⁵ Now only a true

³⁰ Form is metaphysical, whereas form-matter is physical. Cf. *De Ente et Essentia*, cap. IV, V.

³¹ *I Sent.*, d. XXII, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2um.

³² *Q. D. de Ver.*, q. 1, a. 2.

³³ Cf. Penido, *op. cit.*, pp. 24-25.

³⁴ *Q. D. de Ver.*, q. 2, a. 11; q. 23, a. 7, ad 9um, *et alibi*.

³⁵ See St. Thomas, *Opusc. De Natura Generis*, cap. 1; *I Sent.*, d. XXXV, q. 1, a. 4.

analogy has scientifically certain or demonstrative value, and we have a true analogy only where the members of the analogy—the analogates—are somehow (i. e., proportionately) identical in a common term which is formally, entitatively, necessarily present in them. Without this inner, necessary connection of being, the argument-by-analogy lacks a true middle terms.³⁶ The analogous form as common term in which all the analogates share must be present in them formally, by intrinsic necessity.

Such is being, which is in the highest degree formal in all things,³⁷ in all degrees, kinds, differences, and properties of things, so that without it they would be nothing at all. If being were univocal there would be only one essence, hence only one being, hence no multiplicity, hence absolute monism. If being were univocal, it would be a genus, but being is essentially included in everything of which it is predicated; hence it cannot be limited by any difference (*differentia*); hence it cannot be a genus.³⁸ The analogates of being, i. e., all things, are mutually diverse and have unity only by reason of the fact that being is present in them as their act. Thus metaphysical analogy is rooted in the transcendental-ontological relation in which all beings stand to being as such, for being as being signifies only being, pure act, no defect, no non-being, no potentiality. This is why the ultimate basis of every analogy is the division of being by potency and act. We have only to bear in mind the fact that all analogy presupposes multiplicity of being, inasmuch as in analogy a common name is predicated of several inferiors. Remove plurality and you remove analogy, indeed, even univocity, for the univocal predication of a common character requires the existence of at least two things mutually diverse. Without the real division of being by potency and act, the multiplication of beings is impossible, and Parmenides' dilemma remains.

³⁶ Cf. Manser, "Die analoge Erkenntnis Gottes," in *Divus Thomas* (Frib.), vol. 6 (1928), 398.

³⁷ *Summa Theol.* I-II, q. 94, a. 2; *Q. D. de Pot.*, q. 3, a. 16, ad 4um, et alibi.

³⁸ *Summa Theol.* I, q. 3, a. 5; *I Cont. Gent.*, c. 25.

If a perfection is multiplied, it is divided, and if it is divided, it is limited. Clearly, there can be a multiplication of acts, of perfections or of forms only in the measure that the subjects which receive them are multiplied. Our humanity, for instance, would remain unique if there were no subjects or human individuals to multiply it. So, wherever there is the finite and the multiple there is an act that is received, a capacity or subjective potency which restricts that act in receiving it, and divides it in communicating it to a plurality of diverse subjects. In a word, wherever there is the finite and the multiple, there is real composition of potency and act. Where act is pure and unreceived there is nothing but the limitless and the unique.³⁹

The distinction between essence and existence (*esse*) follows upon that between potency and act: potency : act :: essence : existence. Outside God there is a real distinction between the first two; hence between the second two, taking essence as real subjective potency (receptive capacity) and existence as ultimate act. If there is no real distinction between essence and *esse* in things other than God, i. e., in all creatures, then there is no analogy of *being*. If being *were* not *multiple*, then being would not be *spoken of* as *multiple*. Being would then be predicated of all things, of God and of creatures, in the same way (*secundum rationem simpliciter eandem*). "Being" would then signify the same order to being, viz., by identity, but where there is no diverse order to being, predication remains entirely univocal, and if being is univocal, then all other perfections are likewise univocal. Again, if being is univocal, it is a genus or class, and if it is a class, then it is as such an *ens rationis*—a purely logical entity. If however being is a purely logical entity, then there is no analogy. As we have seen, diversity in modes of existing is required for analogy—and that, coupled with a certain unity, is all that is required. Remove the analogy of being, however, and you remove all diversity in modes of existing, and hence all analogy. It is therefore clear that analogy is based on the real division of being by potency and act.

³⁹ See St. Thomas, *Comp. Theol.*, c. 18; also *I Cont. Gent.*, c. 43, and compare c. 28 along with II, c. 52.

Only in metaphysical analogy, that is, in analogy of proper proportionality, is the common analogous *ratio*, to wit, being, formally and by intrinsic necessity present in all its analogates as an "inhering form," so that Cajetan considers it the only true analogy.⁴⁰ Metaphysical analogy bears on the likeness of proportions or relations between diverse modes of being of proportionately the same reality. Thus, essence : existence :: potency : act (being). The proportional likeness which is the basis of metaphysical analogy is a similarity of dissimilars (*similitudo dissimilium*)⁴¹ founded not, as in the case of univocal likeness, on unity of species or genus, however distant, but on diverse and unequal participation in an essential perfection proportionately common.⁴² Analogical likeness is opposed to *all* degrees of univocal likeness. Now the analogical perfection of analogical perfections is being. Being, like all transcendental concepts, is analogical by analogy of proper proportionality, for being is analogous by its very essence and is therefore apt to be realized in subjects which differ absolutely and totally by their essence, as God and creatures do.⁴³ (It is of course not analogous in the manner of a concept formally univocal which can be applied "analogically" to diverse subjects, as in the case both of analogy of attribution and analogy of metaphor.⁴⁴ Being is found intrinsically in God and creature, substance and accident, in all modes and types of being, no matter how diverse.

When Aristotle defined metaphysics as the science of "being as being and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature,"⁴⁵ that is, the science of being and the transcendentals, the properties of all being as being, he set the theme for all subsequent metaphysical speculation of a truly scientific character. Aristotle well knew that all multiplicity and diversity

⁴⁰ *De Nominum Analogia*, cap. 3.

⁴¹ See St. Thomas, *Commentary on Psalm xxxiv*, v. 7.

⁴² *Q. D. de Ver.*, q. 2, a. 11, ad 2um; cf. *Q. D. de Pot.*, q. 3, a. 4, ad 9um; *I Sent.*, d. XLVIII, q. 1, a. 1.

⁴³ Cf. Maritain, *Les Degrès du Savoir*, Paris (1932), p. 423.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 821-826 (Annexe II).

⁴⁵ Aristotle, *Meta.* IV, 1 (Ross trans.).

is proportionately or analogically one in being (in *ens in communi*). Both Aristotle and St. Thomas were clearly aware of the fact that the unity of metaphysics, and hence its very existence as a science, is made possible only through the reduction of its multiform objects (substance, accident, becoming, the opposites, even non-being) to the analogical unity of being.⁴⁶ This reduction can be effected, for though being is diversely participated in all things, it exists in them all as one common thing (*unum quid commune*). The unity of analogy is a unity of relation, of ordination to being (*habitus ad esse*). Being exists in all that is; is, as such, one, true, good, something. All entities, no matter how different, have an entitative ordination to being, to the one, the good, and the true. Thus we are able to attain an analogy in which essentially diverse things are proportionately one, because all such things agree in the same transcendental relation—ordination to being—for they all have being; are one, true, good, proportionately to their being. All beings, then, have a relation, a proportion, to being, and herein they are all one. Even opposites (non-being herein included), have a certain relation to being. As St. Thomas puts it, "it must be said that something, according to analogy, is common to being and non-being, for non-being itself is called being analogically."⁴⁷ In analogous things not diverse *realities* are considered, but diverse *modes of being* of the same reality.⁴⁸ Now that "same reality" is a reality that is proportionately one in all its inferiors. Such is being; such is every metaphysical object.

Penido is not reveling in hyperbole when he says that in the doctrine of analogy lies "the salvation of metaphysics."⁴⁹ That is true in a very proper and precise sense, for metaphysics is the science of being, and being is analogical of its very nature.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, XI, 3, with St. Thomas' Commentary, lect. 3, and *In IV Meta.*, lect. 1, n. 534.

⁴⁷ *Q. D. de Ver.*, q. 2, a. 11, ad 5um: "Dicendum quod enti et non enti aliquid secundum analogiam convenit quia ipsum non-ens ens dicitur analogice."

⁴⁸ *Q. D. de Pot.*, q. 9, a. 2, ad 6um: "In analogicis considerantur non diversae realitates, sed diversi modi essendi eiusdem realitatis."

⁴⁹ Penido, *op. cit.*, pp. 96-97.

It is clear that all properly metaphysical concepts are analogical, because they all stem from and are reducible to the concept of being. All science is of being, of one sort or another, under one aspect or another.⁵⁰ It is no less clear, therefore, that without the analogy of being there can be no scientific knowledge of any sort, for although some scientific knowledge is possible without any *knowledge* of the analogy of being, no scientific knowledge is possible without the actual analogy of being. Penido is speaking of the necessity of analogy for science *in general* when he points out that the problem of the Divine Names is only the theological aspect of a general question—the possibility of science. “Science,” he says, “must reduce the multitude of things to unity, alone intelligible. [The multiple as multiple is not intelligible.] But how can the *same* notion apply to several realities? Either everything is equivocal, heterogeneous, in which case science is impossible; or everything is univocal and homogeneous, . . . and science is a tautology. There you have the antinomy. And just as the ontological conflict was resolved by the concept of potentiality intercalated between being and nothing, so likewise here, it finds its solution in analogy, which is midway between the univocal and the equivocal.”⁵¹ The “analogy of being” rests on the fact that beings are really many and diverse, and yet at the same time really (though only proportionately) one. Were there no real unity in multiplicity or identity in diversity, there would be no analogy of being, but if being were not intrinsically analogical, there would not even be *two* beings really diverse. To know that things are many, and yet at the same time somehow one, is to know, at least implicitly, that being is analogical. If we knew the many were not somehow really one, we would know science to be impossible, for scientific knowledge is common or universal knowledge, even when that knowledge bears on particular sensible things. There is no science of the singular

⁵⁰ St. Thomas, *IV Metaph.*, lect. 1, n. 530: “. . . Scientiae aliae, quae sunt de entibus particularibus, considerant quidem de ente, cum omnia subjecta scientiarum sint entia . . .”; cf. Aristotle, *Metaph.* IV, 1.

⁵¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 77.

as singular, nor of the many as many. As the scholastics put it, sense is of singulars, intellect of universals,⁵² and science is the work of intellect, whose very nature it is to seek oneness and universality in the many and the particular.

It is the principle of analogy alone which "saves" metaphysics, and indeed really makes possible any and all science properly so called. It is the principle of analogy alone which solves the antinomy of the one and the many in all its varied manifestations. Thus it is this principle, and this principle alone, which enables us to avoid the pitfalls of monism and anthropomorphism, on the one side, of pluralism and agnosticism on the other; it is by virtue of this principle alone that we are not compelled to make the fatal choice between the opposing errors for which these names stand. It is because being is really analogical and our knowledge of being analogical that we do *not* have to choose between metaphysical and epistemological univocity, on the one hand, and metaphysical and epistemological equivocity on the other. However, we would fall into perhaps a greater error than either of these if we allowed the discovery of this principle to be an occasion for intellectual presumption or pride. This cannot happen so long as we keep clearly in mind what this principle implies for our knowledge, for the fact is that our analogical knowledge (the only sort of knowledge we can have in metaphysics as well as in theology), though certain and formal and proper so far as it goes, does not "go" very far. To know this and the reason for it, is already to be humbled.

Though it concerns the highest and most perfect objects, analogical knowledge is very imperfect *as knowledge*. Analogical concepts do not abstract perfectly from their inferiors, as univocal concepts do; hence they have not, like the latter, a simple unity in respect of them, but only a proportional unity, for the unity of those inferiors consists only in the community of relations or proportions which they have with one another

⁵² E. g.: "Differt sensus ab intellectu et ratione quia intellectus vel ratio est universalium, quae sunt ubique et semper; sensus autem est singularium." (St. Thomas, *De Sensu et Sensato*, I. 1.)

through the possession of a common analogical perfection. It is evident that all analogical knowledge is incomprehensive, inexhaustive, non-definitive. (Only generic or specific objects can be defined.) Analogical knowledge is in the highest degree universal, and therefore in a precise sense indistinct. Metaphysical ideas are analogical ideas, and analogical ideas are not at all "clear and distinct ideas" in the Cartesian sense. Only univocal ideas are "clear and distinct." (That is why the Cartesian mode of thought is incompatible with the metaphysical mode of thought properly so called.) When we measure the actual content of our analogical knowledge against the absolutely inexhaustible intelligibility of its objects, we see at once that that knowledge is slight even to the point of tenuity. However, it is the most perfect sort of knowledge that we can naturally have of such objects. It is not to be despised, therefore, or in any way undervalued, but cherished and sought for to the extent of our powers. What St. Thomas says about our knowledge of "divine things" is true also of our knowledge of metaphysical things: "The human intellect desires and loves more, and takes greater delight in, the knowledge of divine things, although it can ascertain but little about them, than in the perfect cognition which it has of the lowest things."⁵³

II

ON BEING: ITS MEANING AND ITS ROLE IN PHILOSOPHY

There is no doubt that the big word in Thomist philosophy is the word *being*. If being is a mere word, however, and if every science is about being, under one aspect or another, then we shall be in the uncomfortable position of having to admit that every science is merely about words. Thus all "sciences" will be reduced to grammar, and a pseudo-grammar at that, since words themselves have no meaning apart from the ideas

⁵³ *III Cont. Gent.*, cap. 25: *Intellectus humanus magis desiderat et amat et delectatur in cognitione divinorum, quamvis modicum de illis perspicere possit, quam in perfecta cognitione quam habet de rebus infimis.*

they signify, nor ideas apart from the beings they represent. What I wish to do here is to defend the doctrine that since every science is concerned with being, under one aspect or another, the term being is not a mere sound devoid of meaning, but a name of the utmost significance.

We scholastics—especially we Thomists—are always talking about “being.” It is not at all remarkable that we sometimes leave the impression that we really do not know what we are talking about, that we have, in fact, so far hypnotized ourselves with “being” that we actually use it as a sort of magic formula to banish real doubts and circumvent real problems. I shall try to show that this impression is not well-founded, that, whatever basis it may have in the teachings of ill-informed Thomists, it has no basis in the teaching of Thomism itself.

One of the simplest and best ways to approach the problem of being (extremely complex though it is, since the whole of philosophy is bound up with it) is, I think, through grammar—philosophical or speculative grammar. Thus, grammatically, “being” is the participle of the verb “to be.”

A participle is a concrete term which implies two things: a form and a subject of that form, a thing having that form. Except in the case of subsistent forms, form is nothing in itself. Form is nothing apart from the thing actualized or “informed”; it is merely the act whereby something exists as a determinate thing. In technical language, that is, form is a *quo*—a “by which”—and not a *quod*, not a subject or thing. Thus, although we always speak of forms as if they were themselves things, it is important to remember that in the natural order, at least, forms are nothing at all apart from the realities which they inform.

A participle, I said, is a concrete term which implies two things, or rather two elements: a form and a subject receiving it. For example, writing implies both the act of writing and the subject who performs that act. There is no such thing as a pure act of writing apart from someone that writes. In the same way, being, considered as a participle, signifies something which is composed of the form or act of being and of that which

exercises that act. The act of being is what we mean by the term *existence* (or better, *existing*), and the subject exercising that act is what we mean by the term *essence*. Thus being always presents two aspects: the aspect of existence (act of being), and the aspect of essence (subject exercising that act); so essence and existence are nothing at all in themselves. Existence, as act of being, is nothing at all apart from the subject having being, just as writing as an act is nothing at all apart from a writer. Similarly, essence, as subject of being, is nothing at all apart from the act of being which that subject exercises; no subject, as subject, exists; a subject exists only in virtue of exercising the act of existence. Essence, then, like existence, is a pure "by which"—a *quo* and not a *quod*. However, we speak of essence as if it were a thing, a reality on its own account, whereas in fact essence is merely an element of things—that by which things are *what* they are, as existence is that by which things exist. Hence the error of those who, like Santayana, make of essence a thing, a reality on its own account.¹ Let us not be victimized by language; let us look to the reality behind the word, inadequate and inexact as that word so often is. To sum up: as a participle, being signifies something which is composed of existence (in the sense stated above), and of that which has existence. In other words, being always presents an act-aspect and a subject-aspect. This already foreshadows what we have to say about being considered nominally or as a noun.

From the metaphysical angle, perhaps the most important point about nouns is that they signify things in their essence-aspect. (Participles, which are verb-forms, signify things in their existential aspect.²) Thus, simply to know the essence or

¹ I submit that Platonists, or Platonic-minded thinkers, regularly fall into this error, that they overlook the duality in the very notion of being. Dropping out the act-aspect, they are left with the subject-aspect. They therefore translate "being" as "essence." This is indeed inevitable, for Platonism itself is a philosophy, not precisely of being but of essence—not of being *qua* being, but of being *qua* intelligible, and this makes a world of difference.

² For definitions of the *noun* and the *verb*, see Aristotle: *Periherm.*, I. ch. 2, 16a 19; ch. 3, 16b 6, with St. Thomas' *Commentary*, lect. 4 and 5. Cf. Maritain, *An Introduction to Logic* (N. Y., 1937), pp. 54-56.

whatness of a thing designated by a noun is not to know whether or not that thing exists. Indeed, no knowledge of the existence of a thing is included in the knowledge of its essence. I can know what man is without thereby knowing whether any man exists or not. Names signify things through concepts, but the knowledge of a thing grasped in the concept is, so far, only a knowledge of its essence or some aspect thereof. As was said, however, essence is nothing in itself; it is a mere "by which," not something that exists. For this very reason essence always connotes existence, whether actual or possible. Thus, to consider being nominally is to consider it primarily from the standpoint of essence, yet with the implication of existence, whether actual or only possible.

In which of these senses, then—as essence, or as existence—is being the proper object of metaphysics or first philosophy? The answer is: in both senses. The being which is the object of metaphysics is not being simply and solely in the participial sense, or being as the act of being itself. This is evident if we consider that being in this sense is an essential predicate in respect of God alone, an accidental predicate in respect of all other things, i. e., of all creatures, for in the case of God alone is existence necessarily connected with essence. In respect of no creature does essence necessarily imply existence. God alone is the cause of His own existence; rather, God alone *is* His own existence.

Now, being taken as a noun abstracts from the act of being or existence itself, and signifies essence by connoting existence. Being in this sense, therefore, is an essential predicate in respect of all beings; it is predicable of absolutely all beings, not only of all actual beings, but also, since it abstracts from the act of existence, of all possible beings, and even of logical beings, which have existence only in the mind. Thus, whereas being in the participial sense, as signifying the very act of existence itself, belongs to all beings other than God only contingently, temporally, and mutably, in the nominal sense, as signifying essence taken in abstraction from existence, being is necessary, eternal, and immutable. Every being is necessarily, eternally,

and immutably constituted by its essential notes, just as man, for instance, is necessarily, immutably, and from eternity, a rational animal.

We should now be in a position to understand what is meant by saying that the formal object of metaphysics is *being as being*. Of course, if both "beings" in this formula have the same meaning, then we have asserted a bare tautology. This, however, is not the case, for, as we have seen, being always presents a double aspect; it has two "faces." Thus the first "being" in our formula is being taken as a noun; it is being as signifying primarily essence, that is to say, being in the sense of something common to all beings, hence predicable of all beings—something in virtue of which each and every being is *what* it is. The first "being" in the formula, then, is being under the aspect of essence. The second "being" is being under the aspect of existence, actual or possible. The expression "being as being," therefore, means this: being, under the aspect of essence, as existing or as capable of existing. Being is simply that which *is* or can *be*. The "that which" gives us the essence-aspect, the "is or can be," the existence-aspect, actual or possible.

The school of Aristotle and St. Thomas has always held that there is a science which treats of being as being, its properties and causes, that there is only one such science, namely metaphysics or first philosophy, that all the other sciences treat of being not as being, but as of such and such a sort. Thus the object of natural philosophy—what the ancients called *physica*—is being as sensible and mobile. This object is attained by formal abstraction of the first degree, namely by abstraction from "singular matter" alone, i. e., from the individuating conditions of natural bodies. Hence natural philosophy treats of the actions and passions of bodies, the laws of generation and corruption, of movement. It considers mobile being precisely as mobile. To use Maritain's expressions,³ the "objective light" under which it attains its object is a type of abstraction in the

³ J. Maritain, *A Preface to Metaphysics* (N. Y., 1939), pp. 81-82.

sense of intellectual "visualisation" whereby the strictly singular and contingent characteristics of bodies are disregarded in order to consider their common sensible and mobile and empirically ascertainable properties and qualities. Thus natural philosophy abstracts from "singular matter," but not from "sensible matter." Secondly, the object of metaphysics is clearly not being under the aspect of quantity, whether continuous or discrete. This is the object of mathematics,⁴ an object attained by abstraction of the second degree, namely by abstraction from all sensible matter, but not from "intelligible matter," i.e., not from ideal quantity.⁵ The objective light under which mathematics attains its object, namely the mode of abstracting and defining with intelligible matter alone, is a type of intellectual visualisation whereby every reference to the external senses and hence to sensible matter is removed. To attain the veritable object of metaphysics, however, we must advance beyond these two lower degrees of abstraction to the third and highest degree, namely abstraction from *all* matter. The intelligible light proper to this science is a type of intellectual visualisation whereby the object is grasped by the intelligence solely with reference to its own intrinsic intelligibility, so that to have grasped what philosophers call "being as being" is to have "in-spected" being itself in its own intrinsic intelligibility.⁶

There is perhaps little danger of confusing the "being" of the natural philosopher or that of the mathematician with the "being" which is the object of metaphysics, but there are certain other "beings" which are far more confusable. Thus the vague being-in-general of common-sense perception is not at all the being as being of the metaphysician, but it is, so to speak, close enough to the being of the metaphysician to be easily

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 82-83.

⁵ Here it is a question not of quantity as a real accident of corporeal substance, but of quantity (number or extension) considered in itself, ideally or abstractly. Such quantity is an object of thought which cannot exist apart from sensible matter, but which can be conceived apart from it. Sensible matter does not enter into the definition of mathematical objects as such.

⁶ Maritain, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

confused with it. The being of the metaphysician lies hidden in the being of common knowledge and everyday experience. As Maritain points out,⁷ one must look for being where it is hidden, namely in the most common being, which is found translated and expressed by the most commonplace, the tritest of all words—by the word “is.” Again, being *as known*, or more precisely, the *known as known*, is not the object of metaphysics, but of logic. The proper object of logic is the *ens rationis*, the object known, precisely as known, so that the formal aspect under which logic considers things is that being which they have in the mind itself—their intentional being.⁸

This is a crucial point, for throughout the whole history of thought there has been a tendency to identify real being, i. e., the actual being of things independently of thought, with intentional being, the being given to things *in* the mind *by* the mind itself. Herein, I think, lies the root and source of idealism in philosophy, the fundamental argument of which may be stated as follows: being or the real is known only in idea; therefore the real *is* idea. Of course we do not find this argument stated explicitly in this form in books of idealist philosophy, but we do often find something very much like it implied. A striking modern example of this basic argument occurs in the “Appearance and Reality” of Mr. F. H. Bradley, the only real difference being that instead of “idea,” the predicate is here “experience.” “Anything in no way felt or perceived,” he says, “becomes for me quite unmeaning”; whence he concludes that “for me experience is the same as reality.”⁹ The argument, then, is this: the real comes to me only in experience; therefore the real is experience. Numerous other examples might be adduced. For instance, we find fundamentally the same argument in Bosanquet,¹⁰ where we are presented with a sort of pan-logism (of Hegelian inspiration, of course), arising from the identification of real with intentional being. A far more interesting case is that of Hegel himself. He sees no distinction between logic and

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 33-36.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 144-145.

¹⁰ E. g., see *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, Lect. II.

metaphysics; indeed, his logic *is* metaphysics, not *a* metaphysic. Here again we have the same false identification. What results from it is a theory, not of being, but of pseudo-being.¹¹

Hegel proposed to exhibit in the most strictly scientific way the so-called dialectical process of reality by taking his point of departure from the idea of "Pure Being." Moreover, he claimed that his whole "Science of Logic" was rationally compelling because rigorously deductive from beginning to end. Now Being—Pure Being—he says, "is pure indeterminateness and vacuity . . . in fact, Being, indeterminate immediacy, is Nothing—neither more nor less."¹² But Being and Nothing (which are both equally nothing) unite, and the result is Becoming! Now the Pure Being or Pure Nothing which Hegel took to be the starting point of logic *or* metaphysics is not, in fact, the starting point of either science. Hegel's Pure Being is rather "being" grasped by that type of abstraction whereby the mind abstracts universal wholes from their singular embodiments, passing thus to universals more and more extensive and less and less comprehensive, more and more "wide" and less and less "deep." It is, indeed, the ultimate term of this abstractive process—a mere *ens rationis*. As Hegel clearly saw, being-in-general in the highest degree abstracted from every determination whatsoever is equivalent to our thought of "nothingness." Nothing at all can actually be deduced from such a concept; it is as empty of content as any concept possibly can be. If, therefore, we take being as the most universal, the most empty and bare of our logical structures, we are making a most serious mistake, for we shall then have approached the confines of nothingness. Our philosophy will have been robbed of philosophical content. Hegel's "Logic" is a logic which has lost contact with reality, and his philosophy, being idealist, is not truly speaking in the order of metaphysical science.

An idealist philosophy may be immensely interesting and instructive in itself, but it will not be metaphysics precisely because, so long as it remains true to its own character, it will

¹¹ Cf. Maritain, *op. cit.*, pp. 36-37.

¹² *Science of Logic*, translated by Johnson and Struthers, vol. I, pp. 81-92.

never penetrate to the order of being as being; it will be a philosophy not of that which *is* as such, but of that which is or can be *thought*. It will be not a philosophy of being as being, but of being as intelligible essence. This is true of the most respectable of all idealisms—the “objective idealism” of Plato, but whoever follows the idealist way must take the inevitable idealist consequences. For him who does so, ideas will not be concepts whereby he touches directly the illimitable riches of existence, but the very termini of his knowledge—whether, with Plato, he proceeds to hypostasize them or not. The point is this: a true realist philosophy is not content to stop with the essence or with being as intelligible content; it must go on to grasp the existence in its very dynamic actuality. Indeed, it starts with dynamic actualities and stops only when it has found their measure and their source in that supreme dynamic actuality which is God, and has known Him as perfectly as human reason can.

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THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

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PART II

THE END OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY: THE COMMON GOOD

THIS is the second in a series of articles devoted to understanding, as well as demonstrating, the truth that Democracy is, on moral grounds, the best form of government. In a prefatory note to the whole series, we pointed out that "the word 'democracy,' through its use in propaganda of all sorts, has come to stand for almost anything that one can be politically for or against." We mention this again in order to remind the reader of our plea: that he "avoid a too hasty or a too simple application of our thesis to current events, . . . by not identifying Democracy with the existing governments of England or the United States."

In this article, we shall try to answer that objection to our theory, which argues from the unity of the common good as the end of political activity to the impossibility of a moral hierarchy of forms of government. We find it necessary, therefore, to begin by clarifying the terms in which the objection must be stated.

1. In the practical order, the last end is the first principle. As the first truth is that without which no others can be known, so the ultimate good is that upon which depends the goodness of everything else we seek. But the last end is not the only principle in the practical order. Just as, in speculative matters, there are secondary truths—secondary in the sense that their knowability depends on knowledge of the first truth—so, in practical matters, there are subordinate ends, goods which are sought for their own sake as well as for the ultimate good they also serve as means. We customarily speak of such goods as *intermediate ends*, thereby indicating their dual character: as

ends, though not *ultimate*; as means, though not *merely* so. Such goods always function as secondary principles: as indispensable means, in the order of execution, to the achievement of the ultimate good or last end. But they may also sometimes function as first principles: as the ultimate good to be achieved in a certain, restricted sphere of activity. Here is another point of comparison between the practical and the speculative. The principle of contradiction is *the* first principle, without qualification or restriction, whereas an axiom of geometry is a first principle, though first only in a restricted subject-matter. Similarly, the ultimate good is the last end *simpliciter*, but other goods may be last ends *secundum quid*.

There is no difficulty about viewing the same good both as an end *secundum quid* and as a means to *the* end *simpliciter*. But not all intermediate ends are first principles, though all are secondary principles. Thus, the moral virtues are intermediate ends: they are indispensable means to happiness; they are also perfections worth having for their own sake, and, as such, they are *bonum honestum*, not *bonum utile*; but they are not also first principles *secundum quid* because moral activity, without qualification, is defined by happiness as the first principle *simpliciter*. In contrast, the common good is not only an indispensable means to happiness, but also the end of political activity as such.³⁵ It is, therefore, the first principle in a certain sphere of moral activity, qualified as political, though happiness remains the first principle of moral activity considered without

³⁵ It may be objected that the virtues, moral and intellectual, can also be regarded as first principles *secundum quid*. They are the proximate ends of education as a special sphere of activity. But it should be noted that education is a *special* sphere of activity, it is not moral activity taken without qualification. The sphere of moral activity without qualification is the individual pursuit of happiness, and here the virtues are always secondary principles: intermediate ends and indispensable means. Here, then, is the case in which an intermediate end cannot be regarded *as if* it were just an end and not a means. Although the common good is a means in the moral order, taken without qualification, it must also be regarded as *the* end, and not a means, in the political order. Cf. Maritain, *True Humanism* (New York: 1938), pp. 127 ff., 142 ff., 169 ff.; also *Freedom in the Modern World* (New York: 1936), pp. 42 ff., 47 ff.

qualification. The distinction between politics and ethics as practical sciences, as well as the subordination of politics to ethics (analogous to the subordination of natural philosophy to metaphysics), turns upon the double-edged fact that the common good is a first principle *secundum quid*; for in having its own first principle politics has a certain autonomy, yet it is subordinate to ethics in that this first principle must also be regarded as an indispensable means, as secondary in relation to the first principle of ethics, which is happiness. The ordination of the common good to happiness does not prevent us from seeing the analogous roles they play as first principles or last ends, *secundum quid* and *simpliciter*. And this analogy can be extended to include secondary principles: as moral virtue is the indispensable means directly productive of happiness, so good government is the indispensable means directly productive of the common good. Viewing the political sphere in its limited autonomy (whether as a department of practical science or as a domain of moral activity), we see that *common good* and *good government* are the basic terms, just as *happiness* and *virtue* are the basic terms in ethics.³⁰

These terms are now sufficiently clear for us to state two problems which concern political theory generally, and the theory of Democracy in particular. The first problem is whether the common good is the last end in the temporal order, as well as the last end in the political sphere; or, in other words, whether in the temporal order there is something more ultimate than the common good, i. e., temporal and natural happiness, in contrast to eternal and supernatural beatitude. The second problem is whether there is only one end of political activity, or

³⁰ Whether as principles of political science, or as principles of political activity, the common good and good government are related as primary and secondary: as the end and its means. Analogous to virtue as *good habit*, *good government* is not a mere means, but an intermediate end; it is a *bonum honestum*, not a *bonum utile*, in the political order. When we speak of good government as an intermediate end in the political order, we are recognizing its status as a means to the common good as the final end of *that order*. This relationship is unaffected by the fact that the common good and good government are both intermediate ends, and hence means, in relation to happiness as the final end *simpliciter*.

several alternative ends unequal in goodness; in other words, whether "common good" has one signification, which is univocal, or several which are analogical. Once these questions are asked, it is immediately apparent that the basic terms—happiness and common good—are far from clear, certainly not clear enough to indicate self-evident answers. It should be apparent also that the two problems are related. Though we shall deal with the second of these problems in this Part, and reserve the first for Part III, it will be impossible not to anticipate here matters which will be more fully discussed later.

The answer to the first problem is that there is a happiness which is the end *simpliciter* in the temporal order, and that, in the temporal order, the common good is the end only of political activity, not of moral activity taken without qualification. The answer to the second problem is that "common good" has both univocal and analogical significance, signifying both a single end of all political activity and also a set of alternative, unequal ends. Upon the defensibility of these answers, the theory of Democracy rests its case against objections which have been raised. Before we proceed, in this Part, to explain the answer to the second problem, let us briefly review the objection which posed the problem.

The notion of a hierarchy of forms of government, graded in moral excellence, was considered objectionable. To say, as we do, that Democracy is, on moral grounds, the best form of government, presupposes such a hierarchy of good political forms.³⁷ The objection was not to the *opinion* that democracy is, under certain circumstances, better than monarchy or oligarchy, because it is a more efficient means for achieving the common good; but to the *conclusion*, which we hold to be demonstrable, that Democracy is, absolutely speaking, better than any other form of government, because it accomplishes a greater common good than they can effect.³⁸

³⁷ Vd. Part I, *supra*, in THE THOMIST, III, 3, pp. 415-422.

³⁸ For the distinction between Democracy (in relation to Royal and Republican forms of government) and democracy (in relation to monarchical, oligarchical,

The reason for the objection can be simply stated. The goodness of government is as a means to the common good. The common good is the last end in the order of political activity, and just as there cannot be more than one last end *simpliciter*, so in any restricted sphere of activity there cannot be more than one last end *secundum quid*. Now the end is the principle of moral specification, dividing the means as good and bad according as they serve or disserve it. Hence, there can be only one moral distinction between governments as good and bad, and any further inequality among good forms of government must be with respect to their efficiency as means to the same end.

The objection is not wholly false, for it insists upon part of the truth: that there is a generic distinction between all good and all bad forms of government, and that this can be made only by reference to a single end, served or disserved.³⁹ The objection is false only in what it neglects or denies, namely, other significations of "common good," which represent a plurality of ends in the political order, capable of specifying the diverse forms of government as morally unequal. Moreover, good government is not a mere means. The place it occupies in the order of political goods is analogous to that of virtue in relation to happiness. Good government is an intermediate end in the political order and has an intrinsic goodness, the goodness of a *bonum honestum*. Hence a moral inequality may be discovered among forms of government, viewing them as ends rather than as means. Since they are both ends and means, there must be, of course, a perfect correlation between these two ways of viewing them.⁴⁰

and other *modes* of government), vd. Part I, *supra*, *loc. cit.*, pp. 422-425; for the distinction between forms and modes of government, vd. fn. 12 *supra*; for the discussion of the best *relatively* and the best *absolutely*, vd. pp. 432-436.

³⁹ Vd. Part I *supra*, *loc. cit.*, p. 414.

⁴⁰ The several sources of inequality among the virtues may be illuminating here by way of comparison. The supernatural are superior to the natural virtues by reason of the end they serve. The cognate end of the natural virtues is natural, temporal happiness; the natural virtues may serve the higher end of eternal beatitude, but they are not adequate means thereto. Here we find an inequality in means which derives from an inequality of ends, related within the analogy of

But the objector may still argue that a plurality of common goods (as ends in the political order) is impossible, and hence that only a generic moral distinction between governments (as good or bad) can be made; for, even though good forms of government may have a certain intrinsic goodness because they are ends as well as means, their status as intermediate ends requires us to see their intrinsic inequality as ends in relation to their inequality as means serving ultimate ends unequal in grade of goodness. If, then, there is only one ultimate end in the political order, there can be no moral inequality among good forms of government. To support his contention here, the objector argues that the end must be proportionate to the nature of the agent. The unity of human nature entails the unity of its end. The diversity of eternal beatitude and natural happiness as ends does not violate this principle because this diversity of ends is relative to human nature in radically different conditions: as supernaturally elevated by grace, and as natural (whether in the hypothetical state of pure nature or in the historic condition of fallen nature). But the common good is entirely a temporal and natural end; as such, it can be "known only from the nature whose end it is."⁴¹ Here, then, strict unity of nature makes a plurality of ends impossible.

In principle, the objection is sound, but the application of this principle to the order of political activity requires certain qualifications, not needed in the sphere of ethics. With respect to the common good as end, the adequate agent is not a single

happiness as perfect and imperfect. In the purely natural domain, there is a further inequality between the intellectual and the moral virtues due again to the good being served: the intellectual virtues are less good because they serve to make a man good only in a certain respect, not simply as a man; or, in other words, they confer an aptitude for good activity of a special sort, whereas the moral virtues dispose a man to live his whole life well. The analogy is instructive because it shows us a generic distinction (between virtue and vice) in terms of service and disservice of an ultimate end, which is quite compatible with further specific distinctions among virtues as morally unequal, both because of gradations of goodness in diverse ends being served and also because of intrinsic inequality in the goodness of the specific virtues as intermediate ends. Vd. *Summa Theologica*, I-II, 66.

⁴¹ Dr. Charles O'Neil, in *The New Scholasticism*, XV, 1, p. 79.

man but a multitude of men as politically organized. Furthermore, whereas happiness is the well-being of a man, the welfare of a single human life, the common good is the well-being of a political community, the welfare of a multitude's social life. The being which is the agent in the case of the common good, the being in whose perfection the common good exists, is not a human being *without qualification*. Hence, as we shall see, a plurality of common goods is not impossible by reason of incompatibility with the unity of human nature.

The points which we have made so far do not answer the objection. Rather they indicate what is involved in answering the objection, whose falsity arises from the inadequacy of its analysis of specifically political goods, relying on a too simple, and unqualified, transposition of principles from the ethical to the political domain.^{41a} To present the more adequate analysis, upon which our complete answer depends, we shall proceed, first, to make precise the distinction of *any common* good from goods which are *not common*; second, to define the mode of being of the political common good in relation to human nature and the nature of the state; third, to give an adequate account of means and ends in the political order; then, to determine the one (univocal) and the many (analogical) significations of "common good"; finally, in terms of all this, we shall be able to solve

^{41a} To his original objection (vd. *loc. cit.* fn. 41 *supra*), Dr. O'Neil has now added a note on "The Unity of the Moral Order" (*The New Scholasticism*, XV, 3, pp. 280-3). This note, and the question it raises, adds nothing to the main point of Dr. O'Neil's earlier remarks, except, perhaps, a more tentative state of mind about the whole problem. It does, however, confirm our judgment that Dr. O'Neil's difficulties arise from an inadequate and erroneous understanding of means and ends—difficulties, by the way, which should lead Dr. O'Neil to question St. Thomas's account of the virtues, as well as the demonstrability of Democracy. That we saw the point of Dr. O'Neil's original objection is indicated by the fact that the question he now asks is sufficiently answered in this Part, though this Part was written before the question was asked. The further consequences of our answer will be developed in Part III, in which, considering temporal happiness and eternal beatitude, we shall deal with the plurality of last ends—a plurality which does not in any way destroy the unity of the moral order, because that unity is, and must be, proportionate to the unity of man who both is a perishable substance and has an immortal soul.

our problem by showing the moral hierarchy of good forms of government as means productive of unequal common goods.

The last statement is not quite accurate. In this Part we shall not be able to show the *existence* of such a hierarchy, but only its *possibility*—as compatible with the generic distinction between all good and all bad forms of government, and as consistent with sound principles of practical philosophy. Showing the existence of such a hierarchy, by validating the specifying criteria, in themselves and as separated or combined, will be the work of Parts IV and V.⁴² Furthermore, in this discussion, we shall assume that there is a happiness in the temporal order as well as in the eternal. The truth of that assumption, and the fuller analysis of the plurality of common goods in relation to the unity of temporal happiness, belongs to Part III.

2. In order to examine the various significations of “common” as qualifying “good,” and to determine with precision the meaning of “common good” which is peculiar to political discourse, we must first briefly consider the good itself in its very essence—as appetible perfection.

Every good can and must be regarded in two ways: as the object of some being’s desire, natural or elicited; and as the perfection of some being’s nature. In the first way, the good is a final cause and as such the term of operations tending to achieve it. In the second way, the good is a formal cause of the greater perfection in being which has been achieved through operation. As final cause, the good is an end, first in the order of intention. As formal cause, the good is also an end, but last in the order of execution. This distinction between the good as *finis causa* and as *finis effectus*, not only correlates with the distinction between the good *as desired* and the good *as enjoyed*, but also indicates a difference between two modes of the good’s existence. As desired, the good is a future contingent: it is a perfection which a being does not now have, but can have through change.

⁴² Herein lies the distinction between the demonstrability and the demonstration of the thesis about democracy, made in reply to Dr. O’Neil’s objection. Vd. *The New Scholasticism*, XV, 2, pp. 162-168.

As enjoyed, the good exists, not potentially, but actually: it is a perfection now possessed. The convertibility of good with being must, therefore, be understood in terms of being's two dimensions: potency and act.⁴³

But not all the goods which are desired by a given being are, when achieved, enjoyed as perfections added to that being's existence. We desire change in other things as well as in ourselves. When we desire to change any of the operable things of the physical world, our aim is to convert them somehow into the greater perfection of our own being. Through material or efficient causality, such changes contribute to our own perfection. Herein lies the distinction between goods which are *used* and goods which are *enjoyed*, between *extrinsic* and *intrinsic* goods, between the type of good which is *bonum utile* and the type which is *bonum honestum*, between all the economic goods, which Aristotle called "external," and virtuous habits or activities, which Aristotle called "goods of the soul."⁴⁴

Furthermore, we desire not only our own perfection, but also the perfection of other human beings, whose goodness we love as we enjoy our own. In short, every good is an object of desire, but every object of desire is not, when achieved, a good enjoyed, for it may be a good used or a good loved, according as it is the perfection (or change) of some material thing,

⁴³ The good as object of desire is convertible with the potency of a being for additional perfection; the good as enjoyed is convertible with the actual possession of such possible perfections. We shall not here be concerned with the distinction between real and apparent goods as objects of elicited desire, or with the foundation of that distinction in reason's conformity to the natural good—the object of natural desire. A discussion of these matters will be found in Dr. M. J. Adler's "A Dialectic of Morals," Part VI, in *The Review of Politics*, III, 3, pp. 354-65. Here we shall always use the word "good" to refer to what is truly good. Furthermore, we shall restrict ourselves to the human good.

⁴⁴ For the analysis of such goods as health and sensual pleasure, which Aristotle called "goods of the body," cf. "A Dialectic of Morals," *loc. cit.*, pp. 367-71. Suffice it here to point out that they are not intrinsically *human* goods, and *bona honesta* in the strict sense, even though both are perfections of man's being, and even though pleasure is essentially enjoyable, not useful. Since our chief concern here is with the analysis of social goods, and principally the common good, we need not do more than indicate these adjacent distinctions.

causally related to our own perfection, or according as it is the perfection of some other human being which we "enjoy" by that sympathetic extension of our own being through the union of love. The division of enjoyment against use is adequate if "enjoyment" be understood in these two related senses: primarily, the possession of perfection in ourselves; secondarily, and by derivation, the possession by other human beings of similar perfections, which we enjoy vicariously through love. It is necessary to add here that the good which is an object of desire may be a good already possessed (by ourselves or other human beings), *not as possessed*, but only in so far as it can be augmented or must be sustained by further activity on our part. *As possessed*, it is not an object of desire, but an object of proper enjoyment (i. e., of *amour propre*) or of vicarious enjoyment (i. e., the love of others); only as capable of increase or as needing preservation is there an object still to be achieved, and hence some good desired.

Although the perfection of another human being (desired or loved) is not an intrinsic good, in the strict sense in which one's own perfection is immanent, neither is it an extrinsic good, in the strict sense in which the perfection of material things renders them useful to us. The strict distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic goods, useful and properly enjoyable, is relative to our own perfection. Properly to classify social goods, such as friends, it is necessary, therefore, to group them with such intrinsic goods as the virtues (because they are essentially human and *honestas*, not *utilitas*), and yet to distinguish them by recognizing their separate mode of being, i. e., their existence as perfections of some other being. To do this, we can extend the meaning of "intrinsic" to include both what is properly possessed and what is only vicariously enjoyed through love; and within the sphere of intrinsic goods, we can divide perfections according as they are *immanent* or *separate*, with respect to the given individual who desires, enjoys, or loves these goods.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ The various distinctions can be summarized as follows. The unachieved good is an object of desire. The achieved good is an object of use, enjoyment, or love.

These preliminary considerations enable us now to ask what the word "common" means as a qualifier of "good." In its most general signification, the word "common" means any unity in which a multitude *somehow* participates: the mode of participation may not always be the same. Thus, a name is common if it can be imposed upon many with some unity of meaning; an essence or nature is common if it is the essence or nature of many individuals, retaining an analogical unity throughout this existential diversity; an idea or knowledge is common if, through it, many minds know the same object.⁴⁶ The common as a unity shared by many involves a divided (or multiplied) one and a united multitude. This type of unity is, therefore, properly called a *community*, and the common is said to be the *communicable*: that in which a multitude can communicate or achieve some unity. Opposed to the common is

As achieved, the good is either the perfection of a human being or of some other (material) thing; and the human perfection achieved is possessed either by the person who desired it, or some other person, *for whom* it was desired. Since the same good may be, at different times or in different respects, both desired and achieved, the triple distinction among goods (as used, enjoyed, or loved) divides them into three fundamental types: extrinsic (the useful), intrinsic and immanent (the enjoyable), intrinsic and separate (the lovable); and the intrinsic is divided against the extrinsic as *bonum honestum* against *bonum utile*. If now we add the subordinate distinction among intrinsic immanent goods according to whether they are possessed by man and brute in virtue of their common generic nature, or possessed by man alone in virtue of his specific difference, we can exhaustively classify every type of finite and partial good (thus excluding temporal happiness and beatitude as immanent complete goods, and God as the transcendent, hence separate, infinite object of love). There are: external goods (extrinsic, useful); bodily goods (intrinsically animal, and either useful as health or enjoyable as sensual pleasure); goods of the soul (intrinsically human, immanent, and enjoyable); social goods (intrinsically human, separate, and lovable). Cf. "A Dialectic of Morals," *loc. cit.*, pp. 369-71; the classification there given is here improved by the consideration of the good as loved, as well as of the good which is used and possessed. Vd. *ibid.*, fn. 32, in which the account of love will be found inadequate or erroneous.

⁴⁶ The multiplication of the essence or common nature in the many individuals in which it exercises real existence does not affect its unity as one and the same essence, absolutely considered, that is, considered apart from the exercise of either real or intentional existence. Similarly, the multiplication of the essence as exercising intentional existence in many minds (*qua* idea or actual universal) does not affect that unity of intentionality by which many minds are able to conceive the same object.

the individual which, as such, is indivisible and unique. Thus, the proper name and the singular nature are individual in signification or in being; both are incommunicable; they are unique in belonging to one thing alone. The opposition of individual and common is clear in the case of names and natures, but some analysis is required to make it clear in the case of goods. It would appear that there are two quite distinct meanings of "common" as applied to goods.

(1) A good may be common in the same way that a nature is common. Just as a specific nature is an essential one existentially multiplied in individuals, so a good, as achieved, may be essentially the same though it exists actually only as multiplied in the individuals perfected. When individuals having a specific nature achieve the perfection proportionate to the potentiality of that nature—the real good which is the object of their natural desire—that good as achieved, or as desired, is a common good in the sense that it is essentially the same good for all. It is in this sense that St. Thomas speaks of happiness as a common good.⁴⁷ Happiness is essentially the same for all men because they are all essentially the same. What is true of happiness is true of any of its constitutive parts: any partial good, the possession of which is indispensable to the attainment of happiness, is a common good in this sense. This meaning of "common" applies to goods as desired or achieved, and, as achieved, enjoyed or used. But the fact that "common" in this sense *can be* applied to extrinsic goods for man and intrinsic goods of man—his immanent perfections—does not mean that all goods of these two sorts *are* common in this sense. Apparent goods are desired and achieved by individuals: goods that are not real because they are not objects of natural desire. Moreover, some perfections are proportionate to the individual, not the specific, nature of this man. Hence we must distinguish between acci-

⁴⁷ Now happiness is the end of the human species, since all men naturally desire it. Therefore, happiness is a common good that can be attained by all men, unless some obstacle occur to debar some from achieving it (*Summa Contra Gentiles*, III, 39). Cf. *ibid.*, 44. Vd. also *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 90, a. 2.

dentally individual and *essentially common* goods, and we must qualify this opposition by noting that both are *existentially individual*. Precisely because the commonness of the good here rests upon the community of a nature, it must be true that such common goods exist, as the nature does, only as multiplied in individuals.⁴⁸

(2) A good may also be common in a way that no nature is common. For whereas a common nature always exists *immanently* in a number of individuals, a good may be common and

⁴⁸ If one is asked whether happiness and virtue are individual or common goods, one cannot answer simply, because the dilemma, lacking proper qualifications, is a false one. These goods are certainly individual as they exist: this man's happiness or his virtues are perfections of his individual being and life. But they are also common in that this man's happiness or virtues, being essentially human, are essentially the same as that man's. Hence the answer to the question must be: that they are essentially common and existentially individual. Cf. *Summa Theologica*, II-II, 58, 7, ad 2.

In so far as health and a certain amount of wealth are indispensable constituents of natural, temporal happiness, they, too, are essentially common, though existentially individual, goods. With respect to wealth, as the class of all extrinsic goods for man, which man desires to use for the sake of his immanent perfection (the intrinsic goods of his individual being), there seems to be another meaning of "common." Here "common" is said of these economic goods to distinguish public from private property. Vd. *Summa Theologica*, II-II, 61, 1, 2, 3. This is a juridical sense of "common" which refers to those natural resources that belong, in the first instance, to a community of persons. One of the works of distributive justice is to divide such "common goods proportionately" among the members of the community. Certain economic goods (whether natural resources or the products of labor) may be juridically common in the sense that they are commonly used by a community, such as a family. But this does not mean that any determinate instance of such common goods is existentially common: two men cannot breathe the same quantum of air, eat the same food, wear the same clothes, work with the same tool, at the same time. What is meant here is that a certain stock of economic goods juridically belongs to a community to be divided among its members for use, though in any actual use, any part of this stock is existentially individual, i.e., is used by this one man at this time. Furthermore, the moral fact that a man is obliged to use economic goods with regard for the well-being of other men in his community, does not make such goods existentially common as objects of use. Cf. Maritain, *Freedom in the Modern World* (New York: 1936), Appendix I, esp. pp. 204 ff.; and also *Summa Theologica*, II-II, 32, 5, ad 2; 66, 2. We shall be able to reconsider this juridical meaning of "common goods" and the moral obligation to make a common use of economic goods (i.e., for the service of all), after we have analyzed the political meaning of "the common good."

yet exist *separately* from the individuals for whom it is good. Since this cannot be true of the types of good which are, as achieved, either used or enjoyed (in the strict sense of "exclusive individual possession"), it must be true of the remaining type of good which, as desired or achieved, is an object of love, for this is always the perfection of a being other than the person who desires or loves. It is in this sense that St. Thomas speaks of God as the supreme common good of all his creatures.⁴⁹ But a friend may also be a separate common good in this sense, existentially separate from, and yet the common object of, the many who love him. All social goods are separate common goods, and in the temporal order the supreme good of this type is that social good which is the well-being of a political association, for it is the perfect natural community.

There is, as we shall see, an important difference between the way in which God or a human friend is a separate common good and the way in which the state is a separate common good; but before we proceed to more precise definitions, let us summarize the distinction, so far seen, between the two radically different connotations of "common" as said of good. Let us call the good which, as existentially individual, is common to many because they have the same nature, the essentially common good. Let us call the good which, as existentially individual, is common to many because they are directed to it or by it, the existentially common good. In the first case, the good is common because of a unity of essence in the multitude. In the second case, the good is common because of the unity of a

⁴⁹ "The supreme good, namely, God, is the common good, since the good of all things depends upon him; and the good whereby each thing is good is the particular good of that thing" (*Summa Contra Gentiles*, III, 17). Here St. Thomas divides the common against the particular, or individual, good on existential grounds; for obviously the good whereby each of a number of things is good may be an essentially common, though it cannot be an existentially common, good. Thus, the beatific vision of God is the supreme essentially common good of all human souls, whereas God as the cause of that vision, and as the object of its knowledge and consequent love, is existentially separate from each of the blessed. God is the supreme existentially common good, or, in Maritain's language, the transcendent separate common good.

being—the perfection of which exists separately from each member of the multitude but unites them through being their common object. Of these two meanings of “common,” the second is peculiar to the sphere of the good, whereas the first is shared by goods and natures. There is some justification, therefore, for the emphasis in traditional usage; when the common good is spoken of, what is usually meant is the separate common good, the good we have called existentially common.⁵⁰

Let us now consider God and the state, the two supreme separate common goods for man, the one supernatural and eternal, the other natural and temporal. God is not only existentially separate but transcendent in the order of being, whereas the state, though existentially separate, is also immanent in the order of being. The state is a multitude as politically organized. The existence of the state, and its temporal endurance, is separate from the existence of any one, or more, of its individual members, though obviously not from the existence of all at any given time.⁵¹ Whatever exists naturally in any way can have more or less perfection of being; hence the state must have some well-being proper to its nature. The well-being of the state is the good of a unity which, in its very mode of existence, is the unity of an organized multitude. The many, precisely as members of the political community, participate in the goodness or well-being of the community they constitute through association with one another. Here, then, is a very special mean-

⁵⁰ Individual good is opposed to common good according to two principles: the *numerical* principle which divides what is peculiar to *one* (the accidental) from what is common to *many* (the essential); and the *formal* principle which divides the good which inheres in the *substantial* being of a man from the good which inheres in the *accidental* being of a community. It is according to the second, not the first, principle that the common good of the state is opposed to the good of the individual, whether that also be common, because essential, or private, because accidental. St. Thomas makes the second point (about the formal difference), though not the first point (about the numerical difference as related to the accidental and the essential): *Bonum commune civitatis et bonum singulare unius personae non differunt secundum multum et paucum, sed secundum formalem differentiam* (*Summa Theologica*, II-II, 58, 7 ad 2).

⁵¹ We shall give a fuller analysis of this fact in a subsequent discussion of the state's mode of being in relation to the being of its members. Vd. Section 9 *infra*.

ing of "common" as said of a good. The common good, which is identical with the well-being of the state, is a good common to a multitude precisely because the many are organized into a one. Though this one (an individually existing state) is separate in its being from the existence of each of its individual members, the goodness of this one is not only a perfection of the state as a political association, but also a perfection of each of its members who are, by nature, social animals and tend naturally to political association. This common good is, therefore, both separate and immanent: as separate, it is an object loved and worked for; as immanent, it is a social good possessed and enjoyed. Nor is there any contradiction in the same good being both existentially a common good and existentially an individual good, for it is not both in the same aspect: it is existentially common *as separate*, existentially individual *as immanent*.⁵² God is the separate common good of the whole universe and of all its parts, but the goodness of God transcends the goodness of the created universe as a whole. Only by causality, not by being, is the goodness of God immanent in creatures. But precisely because the being of the state is the being of an organized multitude, precisely because its individual existence and their individual existence are interdependent, the state is both a separate and an immanent good—at once a goodness possessed by the whole as a perfection of association itself, and a perfection enjoyed by the parts as needing and tending toward such association. And in both ways it is a common good, for it is both a separate object for which the members

⁵² "The common good (*communicatio in bene vivendo*) is a different thing from the mere aggregation of particular goods, and is not the peculiar good of the whole which (like the species, for example, compared with the individual) relates only to itself and sacrifices the parts to itself; it is the common good of the whole and its parts, a good which integrates particular goods in the whole in so far as they are communicable (externally, in the natural manner of human communication here below), and as it is itself communicable to the parts—whether the material prosperity of the State be in question, or its intellectual and moral patrimony" (Maritain, *The Things That Are Not Caesar's*, New York, 1931: p. 139, fn. 2). The common good of which Maritain here speaks is not a good common in any sense; for what he says applies only to the good which is identical with the well-being of a community, and of the political community *par excellence*.

commonly work, and also a good essentially common to the members, not only as organized, but also as specifically the same in their natural and rational desire for social life.

There is justification, therefore, for regarding the well-being of the state as that which, in the order of goods, most peculiarly deserves the appellation "common" for it combines the aspects of both a separate and an immanent good, and in these aspects it is, respectively, both existentially and essentially common. Though God is the supreme, transcendent, separate common good, though temporal happiness and eternal beatitude are, in their respective orders, the supreme, immanent, essentially common goods, the well-being of the political community has a greater *commonness* than these. Traditional usage bears witness to this by the fact that when the phrase "the common good" is used without qualification, explicitly or by context, what is usually signified is the political common good, the last end (the first principle *secundum quid*) in the political order. If such usage requires further justification, it can be pointed out that the political common good is not only a good which, as possessed, is actually shared by many, but also that it is the only good which, as an object of love, elicits a concordance of many wills and, as an object of desire, requires the concerted activity of many persons.⁵³ We shall, therefore, use the phrase "common good" without qualification always to refer to the political common good, the well-being of the political community.⁵⁴

⁵³ Happiness and virtue are shared by many only in the sense of an essential community, but the state is an existential community whose well-being is shared by many. It is true that a mutual friend is a good commonly loved, but a friend need not be common to two or more, whereas the state must be, both as an object of love and of desire. The political common good cannot be established in existence, preserved, or augmented, except through a concordance of wills and concerted action. In contrast, only the right direction of my own will and the right regulation of my own conduct is required for the attainment of virtue. It is fitting, therefore, that we should regard as common, in the most complete sense, that good which can neither have being in separation, nor objectivity in relation to appetite, except through the cooperation of many in the formation of a community and in sharing its fruits.

⁵⁴ In fact, there is no other name for this good, whereas other goods, which are

We have seen that the common good is a good of each man individually, as well as the good of them all as an organized multitude. The question, therefore, arises, how the common good is related to other goods in the life of a single individual. As individually possessed, the common good is not identical with happiness, nor with virtue or any of the other partial goods constitutive of happiness. That the common good is not identical with happiness is seen in the fact that it is a means to happiness: happiness is the last end *simpliciter* in the temporal and natural domain of human life, whereas the common good is only a last end *secundum quid* (in the political order) and hence, as an intermediate end, like virtue, it must be a means to happiness. As the last end, happiness is that which leaves nothing to be desired: it must, therefore, be the whole of goods—all good things. Boethius's definition of happiness as the state of those made perfect by the possession of all good things, applies analogically to temporal happiness and eternal beatitude (in the one case, the possession is successive throughout the extent of a whole life; in the other, it is simultaneous). Now, being social by nature, man cannot lead a good human life apart from the political community. A peaceful and benevolent society is as indispensable to human happiness as the air a man breathes, the natural resources he converts into consumable wealth, his physical health, and his spiritual rectification through virtue. Though happiness is often spoken of as the life of virtue, for its highest manifestation is in good activity (activity in accordance with virtue), the life of virtue requires more than virtue as a cause: it is impossible apart from sufficient wealth to sustain existence, sufficient health to facilitate activity, and

common in some sense, can be spoken of as God, happiness, virtue, public property, etc. The Latin phrase "*bonum commune*" has much more ambiguity than the English "common good." For "*bonum commune*" signifies "the good in general"—the last end, formally defined as the infinite or unlimited good, in contrast to every type of partial good; it also signifies happiness, concretely understood as the complete satisfaction of man's natural desires and, as such, common to all members of the species; and it also signifies the political common good. The Latin phrase "*bonum communitatis*" would be a more exact equivalent of the English phrase "common good" as we shall henceforth use it.

sufficient social peace and order to provide conditions for the formation of virtues and their exercise. All the social goods, and principally the common good, are both constitutive of happiness (in that they satisfy certain natural needs), and also causative of happiness (in that they contribute to the production of good activity).⁵⁵ Hence, the common good is a partial good, contrasted with temporal happiness as the whole good of a human life, and, among the partial goods, most closely related to virtue, because like virtue, and unlike wealth or health, it is an intrinsically human good. Whereas the common good and virtue are, as partial goods, essentially common to all men because of their common nature, the common good is also existentially common to all men who, as members of the same community, share its fruits.

The truth of this analysis has been missed or obscured by those who appeal to an unqualified opposition between individual and common good, or who too simply enumerate the types of good as individual, common, and divine.⁵⁶ If the phrase "common good" is used ambiguously to signify both happiness (as essentially common) and the well-being of the political community (as existentially common), it is not true to say that the common good is *always* greater than the individual good, and takes precedence over it in the order of means and ends. For there is a parallel ambiguity in the phrase "individual good": (a) as opposed to what is essentially a common good, a good is individual if it is only accidentally a good—a good of or for this person according to the accidents of his individual nature; and (b) as opposed to what is existentially a (separate) common good, a good is individual if it exists immanently as perfecting this one person. Now, happiness is an individual good existentially and a common good essentially. In the latter status, it is the supreme good in the

⁵⁵ We shall return subsequently to a fuller discussion of the common good as an end and as a means. Vd. Section 4 *infra*. Cf. "A Dialectic of Morals," *loc. cit.*, pp. 391 ff.

⁵⁶ Cf. fn. 48 *supra*. Vd. *Summa Theologica*, II-II, 58, 5; 6; 9 ad 3; 12; also 26, 2; 3; 4 ad 3.

temporal order and subordinates *the* common good as it subordinates virtue and every other partial good, though these also may be essentially common goods.⁵⁷ Common goods are superior to individual goods only in the sense in which the latter are accidental, not essential, human goods; and in this way not only *the* common good but virtue and every other essential good subordinates individual goods. An adequate ordering of human goods requires the subordination of the accidental to the essential, the partial to the complete (within the temporal order) and the temporal to the eternal. By the first subordination, individual goods (in one sense) must be ordered to *the* common good, because it is essential; by the second subordination *the* common good must be ordered to happiness (an individual good in another sense) because happiness is the whole of which the common good, wealth, health, virtue, etc., are constitutive parts; by the third subordination, all temporal goods must be ordered to divine goods (common in God's separate being, and individual in each soul's immanent enjoyment of the beatific vision) because they are eternal.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ In this clarification of ambiguous usage, we are forced to use "*the* common good" to signify the political common good which, in the broader use of the phrase "common good" is only one of the essentially common goods.

⁵⁸ We are here concerned only to clarify the meaning of "common" as opposed to "individual" good for the sake of indicating the place of *the* common good in the total order of goods, especially its subordination to happiness. This is done by viewing both happiness and *the* common good as *essential* individual goods (for *the* common good is immanent as well as separate), and seeing them related as whole and part, respectively. There is another problem, of course, about the subordination of the citizen to the state—the apparent sacrifice of his well-being to the welfare of the community—but we shall deal with this problem elsewhere. Vd. Part III *infra*.

At least one thing is now clear. When we say that "the good of the whole is greater than the good of the part," we must remember that this maxim requires the subordination of *the* common good (a partial good) to happiness (the whole good of a human life), as well as the subordination of the citizen to the state, *in certain respects*. What these respects are remains to be seen, but we now see why the subordination of man to the state cannot be complete and unqualified. If it were, happiness would not be the temporal end *simpliciter*, and the common good a temporal end only *secundum quid*; if it were, the common good (i.e., the state) would not be a means to happiness. Those who make the error of identifying *the* common good with happiness (falsely interpreting the truth that *the* common good

One other point remains to be clarified. We have spoken of the common good as identical with the well-being of the state. It is the goodness of a political community. This raises two related questions. (1) Has the state any being apart from its goodness? (2) In what sense can the common good be said to be the end of the state, if it is the well-being of the state? To answer these questions, we must consider, first, the mode of being of the state, and, then, the common good as an end.

is at once the good of the whole and of its parts), or the worse error of regarding *the* common good as the supreme good in the temporal order, subordinate only to the Divine good, cannot save man from complete subordination to the State except by reference to his supernatural destiny. Vd. Father John F. McCormick, "The Individual and the State," in the *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, XV, pp. 10-21. The root of error here is the confusion of *the good of the whole* with *the whole of goods*, and of *the good of a part* with a *partial good*. The truth that the whole good is always greater than any of its parts does not mean that the good of the whole is greater than the good of its parts, but rather the exact contrary, in view of the fact that the good of the whole (i. e. the common good) is a partial good, and the good of the part (i. e. happiness) is the whole of goods.

Nor is Maritain's distinction between individual and person entirely satisfactory, if what is intended is a contrast between the individual good as temporal and the personal good as eternal. "Every individual, considered in his formal aspect as a constituent part of the State, is ordered to the common good of the State. But he is ordered in the first place, as a person destined for immortality, to God Himself, and on that score the State is but a means for him" (*op. cit.*, p. 139, fn. 2). Cf. *Freedom in the Modern World* (New York: 1936), pp. 46-54; *True Humanism* (New York: 1938), pp. 128-29, 199; *Scholasticism and Politics* (New York: 1940), Ch. III. If, however, the individual is opposed to the personal as the accidental to the essential or specific good, then we see how it can be said that the individual good (*qua* accidental) is always subordinate to *the* common good (or any other essential good), and that *the* common good (*qua* partial) is always subordinate to the personal good (*qua* the whole essential human good) whether temporally, as the good of the specific nature of man's composite being in this life; or eternally, as the good of man's soul hereafter. The invariable subordination of the common good to the personal good, thus understood (and in the temporal order without any reference to man's supernatural destiny), still leaves the aforementioned problem of the citizen's subordination to the state, as one to be solved by specifying the respects which justify it. But the difficulties which have caused so much controversy over Maritain's distinction between individual and person are removed by this clarification of the ambiguities in the word "individual" (as opposed both to the "essential" and to the existentially "common") and by the insight that the personal good is individual in the second of these two oppositions rather than the first, and also both temporal and eternal.

3. Whatever exists must exist either as a substance or as an accident; and if as an accident, either as the accident of a single substance, or as the accident of a number of substances through organizing this aggregate in some way. Some artificial forms are accidents of the latter sort: they are forms of composition and order by which, in the case of a house, for example, a number of substantial units are accidentally united to constitute the work of art—an artificial whole.⁵⁹ Now the state is not a substance any more than a house is; nor can it be the sort of accident whose total existence is through inherence in a single substance, such as a quality or quantity. Hence it would appear that the state is a form of organization through which a substantial many becomes an accidental one, for the mode of unity which a thing has conforms to its mode of being.⁶⁰

But though it is an accidental being—having actuality through a form of composition and order—the state is not an artificial thing, as a house is. We know, in the first place, that political activity is in the sphere of prudence, not art; and, in the second place, we know that the state is natural, not merely conventional. The precise sense in which the state is natural,

⁵⁹ "The substantial form perfects not only the whole, but each part of the whole. For since a whole consists of parts, a form of the whole which does not give existence to each of the parts of the body, is a form of composition and order, such as the form of a house; and such a form is accidental" (*Summa Theologica*, I, 76, 8).

⁶⁰ "Those things which are distinct in substance, and one according to an accident, are distinct simply, and one in a certain respect: thus many men are one nation, and many stones are one heap, which is a unity of composition or order" (*Summa Theologica*, I-II, 17, 4). Cf. Maritain, *The Things That Are Not Caesar's*, p. 139, fn. 2: "And this whole"—the State—"not being a substantial whole, like a living organism, but a community of persons and families, ought to have regard for the more fundamental rights which natural law confers on human personality and domestic society. Otherwise it corrupts its own good." This fact, that the state is an accidental being and an accidental one, confirms the truth that the common good must be subordinate to temporal happiness, for the goodness of an accidental whole is inferior to the goodness of a substantial whole, even though the latter is, in a certain respect, a part of the former; for, as we have seen, the former (the common good) is a constitutive part of the latter (happiness) in more fundamental respects, i. e., in the order of essential, though existentially individual, goods. Cf. fn. 58 *supra*. The good of an accidental whole is not greater than the whole good of any of its substantial parts.

as well as conventional, illuminates its mode of being. As we have already seen,⁶¹ the state is natural in the order of final causality, and conventional in the order of efficient causality. That man is by nature a political animal means that man cannot live well, cannot enjoy all the goods of a characteristically human life, apart from political association. Hence, political association is an indispensable means to human happiness; and what is a necessary means to the natural end of human life has its naturalness, as it has its necessity, from the final, not the efficient, cause of its being. Such naturalness is not incompatible with being a product of reason in the order of efficient causes. In the same passage in which Aristotle says that "the proof that the state is a creation of nature and prior to the individual, is that the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing," he also says: "the man who first founded the state was the greatest of benefactors."⁶² The apparent inconsistency here is removed by the distinction between final and efficient causality. States are not prior in time to individuals, for it is by the rational action of men in the exercise of prudence that states are instituted by men who associate for their common good. Here "their common good" must be understood as signifying the individual happiness of each, which is essentially common to all persons of human nature. But the association itself is a good (for it is an indispensable means to happiness), and a common good both as *the good of an organized multitude* and as *a good for each of its members*. Precisely because it is a good of this sort, the state is natural as well as conventional, i. e., instituted by the work of reason in the sphere of prudence rather than art.

The very being of the state thus *seems* to be the being of a good. This would *seem* to be true of anything whose nature is defined by reference to final causes. The nature of a law is to be an ordination of reason for the common good; hence, we say that an unjust law, or a law which is not ordained to the com-

⁶¹ Vd. Part I, *supra*, loc. cit., p. 417, 441, fn. 28.

⁶² *Politics*, I, 2, 1253^a25-30.

mon good, is a perversion of law, or a law in name only.⁶³ But unless this truth is somehow qualified, we cannot speak of good or bad states, for "bad state" would be contradictory and "good state" would be redundant in signification. A corrupt or perverted state is not identical with anarchy, which is the total annihilation or non-being of political association. Even *civil* war is within the framework of *civil* life, though it almost destroys the unity of peace which is the common good. If that unity were entirely destroyed, a political revolution, accomplished through the violence of civil war, could not bring about the transformation of one and the same community—from a worse to a better, or a better to a worse, political form. The being of a state cannot, therefore, be identical with its well-being (the common good), any more than the being of a man is identical with his well-being (happiness). Just as man is subject to good and bad development, to perfection through virtue and corruption through vice, attaining happiness thereby or losing it, so is the state subject to moral growth and decay. But man is a substance and has a nature due to the efficient causality of creation and generation, whereas the state is an accidental being and seems to have a nature only by reference to final causes, which makes its very being good. How, then, can we distinguish between the good which *the very existence of the state seems to be*, and the good which the state can *have or lose* in the course of progressive development or corruption?

In order to solve this difficulty, we must, *in the first place*, recall the distinction between the metaphysical and moral signification of "good." Whatever exists has a goodness convertible with its being. Whatever can change through voluntary operation can gain, or lose, perfections which are goods in relation to natural appetites (and potencies) for additional being.

⁶³ "A tyrannical law, through not being according to reason, is not a law, absolutely speaking, but rather a perversion of law; and yet in so far as it has something of the nature of a law, it aims at the citizens being good" (*Summa Theologica*, I-II, 92, ad 4). Laws which are unjust "are acts of violence rather than law, because, as Augustine says, a law that is not just, seems to be no law at all" (*ibid.*, 96, 4).

Now the good which can be an object of desire for a voluntary agent is the moral good; the good which is convertible with the being a thing has is the metaphysical good. But a thing may have both substantial and accidental being: first act and second acts. Hence, we see that the moral good may also be a metaphysical good, when the perfection desired is achieved, for the perfections desired and achieved by voluntary agents are accidental, i. e., second acts. But even substantial perfection may be desired in the sense that a man desires to preserve his existence—the substantial being he has received by creation and through generation. The fundamental difference here is that the good which is convertible with man's first act of substantial being is never an object of desire except as a good to be *preserved*, whereas the goods which are convertible with man's completion by second acts are objects of desire with respect to *attainment as well as preservation*. These differences occasion St. Thomas's distinction between the good simply and the good relatively, which are respectively convertible with being relatively (second acts or accidental being) and being simply (first act or substantial being).⁶⁴ Any human good can, therefore, be regarded in two ways: metaphysically, as being possessed; morally, as being desired. The good which must be regarded as primarily metaphysical is the good of man's substantial existence itself and with it, of course, the proper accidents of his nature; for these goods are prior to voluntary operation and become moral goods only secondarily as goods which, though possessed without our effort, we nevertheless desire to preserve. In contrast, all those goods which are initially attained through our own efforts should be regarded as primarily moral; they are only secondarily metaphysical goods in so far as, once achieved, they are perfections of our being; but even so they are also moral as goods we seek to sustain in being.

But the state is itself an accidental being and a good initially attained through the efforts of voluntary agents. It has neither nature nor being apart from the social natures of the rational

⁶⁴ Vd. *Summa Theologica*, I, 5, ad 1.

beings who institute and compose it. Unlike man, the state has no metaphysical goodness (because it has no actual being) prior to voluntary operation. But once it has been instituted and exists, the state has a metaphysical goodness as an accidental being, and this goodness is also moral in that it is an object of desire and activity with respect to preservation. Furthermore, just as a virtue, which is an accidental being and primarily a moral good, can be augmented and diminished, as well as preserved, so the goodness of the state is subject to improvement and corruption. It is possible, therefore, to say without inconsistency that the state, in so far as it exists in any degree of perfection, or of corruption short of total annihilation, *is* the common good which men must seek to preserve; and also that the state can attain a greater common good than it now has, or lose, in some degree, the perfection of communal life which is convertible with its present grade of existence. Although the state, in so far as it exists, is a good, we can speak of a bad state as one which has changed or is changing for the worse (one which, in the course of its individual history, has undergone or is tending toward corruption); and we can speak of a good state as one which, not only has preserved itself from corruption, but is tending toward improvement, toward the attainment of a greater common good than now exists.

One further step is required to solve our problem. We must explain the sense in which we speak of the state, which is only an accidental being, as a subject of change: as tending toward improvement or corruption. When we have done this, we shall be able to see how the common good can both *be* the state and *be* its *end*.

To complete the solution we must, therefore, *in the second place*, observe that the nature of the state is not, in every way, identical with its being morally good. Habits and acts are subject to natural as well as to moral specification. As *good* habit, a virtue has moral being; as *habit*, a virtue has the natural being of an accident, the same type of natural being which a vice has. Like virtue, and vice, the state has some natural being apart

from its goodness or badness, even though in its natural being it always has some metaphysical goodness, just as a bad habit is better, metaphysically, than no habit at all.⁶⁵ But the state is not like virtue, or vice, in one important respect: though both are accidents, the state is, like some artificial forms, an accident which cannot exist in a single substance, but only through simultaneous inherence in many. If we examine a work of art, such as a house, we find two senses in which this artificial thing is natural: not that it ever exists as fully natural, but that its coming to be and its endurance in being have roots in nature. In the order of final causes, the house is natural in so far as a domicile of some sort (whether it be specifically house or tent or cave) is necessary to compensate for man's lack of protection from the elements. A domicile is natural as a necessary means to a naturally desired end, even though in the order of efficient causality, it is also a voluntary work of art and not the result of purely natural causes. This is the sense of natural in which we have already discussed the nature of the state, which is also, in the order of efficient causality, voluntary rather than natural. In short, so far as coming to be is concerned, a house and a state are partly natural (final causality) and partly voluntary (efficient causality), in contrast to a plant which, in coming to be, is entirely a product of natural causes. But there is another sense in which a house is natural, now with respect to its being rather than its generation. The matter of which it is composed must ultimately consist of natural substances. We regard a house, not as a substance, but as substantial, in so far as it endures in being only so long as the substances of which it is composed endure. Furthermore, just as the accidental unity,

⁶⁵ The metaphysical goodness of a bad state will be understood if it is remembered that the state is a more perfect mode of association than the family or the village. The annihilation of the state, with the consequent return of its members to less perfect modes of association, is a worse evil than its corruption. That a bad state is better than anarchy or than pre-political forms of social life indicates that the metaphysical goodness of the state as a certain type of accidental being (i. e., a certain mode of association) can be separated from the moral criteria by which we distinguish good and bad states.

signified by "white man" is placed in the category of substance by reduction to its substantial component, so a house is, by similar reduction, in the category of substance. On the part of its matter, the house is a substance, or, more precisely, a plurality of substances; on the part of its form, the house is an accidental unity and being. Hence, with respect to its persistence in being, the house is partly natural (material causality) and partly artificial (formal causality), in contrast to a real substance which is natural with respect to both matter and form. Like the house, the state persists in being through the endurance of the men who compose it; it is thus substantial on the part of its matter, a plurality of substances; but it is not a substance because this plurality is a one only through an accidental form, the convention of association. Hence, with respect to persistence in being, the state is partly natural (material causality) and partly conventional (formal causality), in contrast to a real substance which not only is, but is one, through a substantial form.

By summing its four causes, we now see that the state is natural in two ways, not one, where before we considered the state as natural only in the order of final causality.⁶⁶ In so far as it exists naturally, in terms of its material causes, the state can be subject to change in moral quality, i. e., in the grade of perfection of its formal cause. The same multitude of men (defining *sameness* here by the *continuity* of generations) can be more or less perfectly organized in that unity of peace which is the common good. Since the unity of the state as an accidental being comes from its organizing principle, its formal cause, diversity of political forms, differing in grade of excellence, must

⁶⁶ In the order of efficient and final causality, the state is like a work of useful art: coming to be, through *voluntary* action, as a means to a *natural* end. In the order of material causality, the state is like a work of useful art in that it persists in being through the existence of *natural* substances, though here there is a radical difference between the types of substances involved: inorganic *vs.* human. In the order of formal causality, the state is like a work of useful art in that its unity in being is only *accidental*, due to an accidental form of composition and order, but here again there is a radical difference between the type of order which is the work of prudence and the type which is the work of art.

be correlative with degrees of unity in the state, degrees of perfection in the common good.⁶⁷ Moreover, the state's potentiality for political change, progressive or corruptive, is on the part of its matter, residing in the natural potentialities of its human components for various forms of political organization. Hence, there is no difficulty about the state's being an accident (formally) and also being subject to change (materially) in so far as it is composed of substances with a range of potentialities for social life. Nor is there any difficulty about the state's being naturally a good (in the order of final causality) and also being subject to moral change through voluntary action (in the order of efficient causality).⁶⁸

The analogy between the state and a work of useful art, such as a house, helps us to see one further characteristic of the state. It is not only a moral being (in that, like virtue, it is a being relatively and a good simply), but also a moral person. By reduction to the natural substances which compose it, a house is regarded as an inorganic thing, quasi-substantial because its unity is accidental. By similar reduction, the state

⁶⁷ In the order of final causality, the end is also a principle of unity, being the source of concordant wills and concerted action, without which the state could neither come into being nor be preserved in being. That there must be two principles of unity in the state follows from the fact that it is not natural in two orders of causality: efficient and formal.

⁶⁸ We are now able to see a natural basis for the existential unity and commonness of the common good. We said earlier that "a good may also be common in a way that no nature is common" (p. 600 *supra*). That statement must now be qualified by noting the fact that the accidental form of organization—the form of composition and order through which a multitude is associated in a single community—is both one form and the accident of many substances. If it were not one, and if it did not inhere in many substances, the multitude would not be associated in the accidental unity which is the state. An artificial form which organizes a plurality of substances into a single work of art (e. g., a house) is, as a single accident, inherent in many; the same must be true of the political form as an organizing accident; the only difference between the two being that the artificial form is a passive accident of inorganic substances, whereas the political form exists accidentally in a multitude of men through the active quality of their habits. Cf. "A Dialectic of Morals," *loc. cit.*, pp. 389 ff. As the political form is, existentially, a one and yet in a many, so the good of the entity thus constituted as an accidental being, is existentially a single good (of the organized whole as such) and also a good commonly enjoyed by each member of the multitude. Cf. fn. 50 *supra*.

must be regarded as a living thing, again quasi-substantial because its unity is accidental. The human beings who compose the state are natural persons. The personality of the state is derived from the rational natures of its members. But because its unity is accidental and in the moral order, we speak of the state as a moral person, just as we speak of the house as an artificial substance, because its unity is accidental and in the order of artistic production. These modes of speech are not metaphorical, but analogical, though the analogy is one of attribution (by material causality), not proportionality. Just as a natural person is a voluntary agent, exercising reason and will, so the state, as a moral person, is, analogically, a voluntary agent, and exercises, again analogically, reason and will. Of course, there is no action by the state which is not the action of individual men (i. e., of natural persons), but the action of individual men *qua* isolated individuals is never the action of the state. The action of the state is the action of men in their corporate capacities, whether as rulers or ruled. Just as a multitude politically organized constitutes the state in being, so the action of this organized multitude constitutes the state's activity. Just as political activity on the part of each individual is only such activity as is performed in virtue of a political status, a role derived from membership in the community, so the action of the state is not constituted by any sort of activity on the part of the men who compose it, but only by their political actions.⁹⁹ Finally, wherever there is a mode of action there is

⁹⁹ Obeying the law is just as much political activity as making or enforcing it; and the action of the state is just as much constituted by the political activity of the ruled as by the governing operations of those who hold ruling offices. This fact does not deny real diversity in political status nor the hierarchy of political functions. The powers and responsibilities of the citizen are not the same as the powers and responsibilities of the legislator. But though only some members of the community are empowered, and have the responsibility, to make laws for the common good, all its members are required to act for the common good by obeying the law. Governmental action, in short, is not the only mode of political action; and when the state is falsely identified with its governors, the action of the state is erroneously confused with governmental operations. If, speaking loosely, we say that the state makes law, we should counteract the error involved by also saying that the state obeys law. Strictly speaking, legislators make law, and all citizens

a principle of agency. Thus, the virtues as stable habit formations are the principles of moral activity on the part of the individual. In the case of the state, as an organized multitude, the institutions of government are the principles of specifically political activity. The institutions of government assign political status to every member of the community, distribute powers and responsibilities, prescribe duties and functions. Since a man cannot act politically except in terms of his political status, and the powers and functions thereto appertaining, the institutions of government are the proximate principles of such action.⁷⁰ Moreover, like habits, the institutions of government (including always the status of the ruled as well as the status of rulers), are stable formations, the enduring principles of countless acts by many individuals. One form of government differs from another according to the way in which these institutions are determined, the way in which rulers and ruled are politically related, etc. But every good form of government is a means to the common good, in the same way that every good habit is a means to happiness; it is the proximate principle of good political activity, on the part of the natural person as a political agent, or on the part of the state as a moral person.

We are now prepared to summarize the foregoing analysis by showing how it is true, on the one hand, that the state is the common good and as such the end of good government and good political activity; and, on the other, that the end of the state is the common good. As we pointed out earlier,⁷¹ all the difficulties here are due to ambiguities in such words as "com-

should obey law: the action of the state, rightly viewed, is the resultant of these two modes of political activity. The reason why we persist in saying that the state makes law, and seldom, if ever, say that the state obeys law, is because the authority of the law is derived from its end, the common good of the state.

⁷⁰ This does not deny that the individual's habits, good or bad, are also principles of his political activity: they are an indispensable, but never a sufficient, cause. It is only through justice, generally conceived (i.e., the moral virtues in their social aspect), that a man acts politically; but general justice (or, what is the same, political justice) is the virtue of the individual, not in isolation, but as a member of the community, having therein a definite status.

⁷¹ Vd. Part I, *supra*, loc. cit., pp. 427-428.

mon good," "state," and "government." These are now sufficiently clarified to effect a resolution.

There are two distinct meanings of "common good" as the end of political activity; and there are three ways in which "state" must be viewed.

The common good is either *existential* or *ideal*. In so far as the state exists, the political common good exists in some degree of perfection. In so far as the imperfection of the state permits progressive development, there is a greater common good to be achieved than now exists. The existential common good must not be regarded as a good merely in the metaphysical sense (as convertible with the actual being of the state) for it is also an object of desire and effort: the state must be preserved in whatever degree of well-being it now possesses. In contrast, however, the ideal common good is a good primarily in the moral sense, for it is always a perfection not yet achieved in the political order (and, as such, convertible with the state's potential, not actual, being). Furthermore, the preservation of an existing imperfect good is always for the sake of attaining the more perfect good that is relative to unrealized potencies. The bare existence of the state is a good which must be sustained in being in order to achieve the additional perfections that develop the state's capacity for complete well-being. Hence the ideal common good is the primary object of political activity; the existential common good is a secondary object, for the work of preservation is ordered to the work of progress.

In the practical order, the three fundamental terms are *end*, *agent*, and *means*. The state can be viewed in each of these three ways. In so far as it exists, and has some degree of well-being which is convertible with the existential common good, the state is an end of political activity. In so far as its agency is constituted by the political activity of its members for a greater common good than now exists, the state is also an agent working for an end. And in so far as the common good, existential or ideal, is not the last end *simpliciter* in the temporal order, but an intermediate end, the state is also a means.

Hence the traditional statement that *the common good is the end of the state* must be given two distinct interpretations according as the end is said as the end of an agent or as the end of a means. Thus, for example, happiness is the end of man as an agent; it is not the end of man as a means, but of the virtues. But the state, unlike man, is both an agent and a means. The end cannot be the same in the two cases. When the state is viewed as a means, the end is not the political common good, but happiness, which is also a common good, in a different sense already noted.⁷² When the state is viewed as an agent, the end is the political common good, primarily as ideal, secondarily as existential. But the existing state is also an end; in whatever degree of well-being it possesses, it is the existential common good. With respect to the state as an end, the agent is man as member of the community, and the means are political activity and the institutions of government as the principles of agency. The statement that *the common good is the state* does not conflict therefore, with the statement that *the common good is the end of the state*, for the meanings of "common good" and "state" are not the same. Nor need there be any confusion due to the fact that with respect to the common good (existential or ideal) as the end of political activity, the men who compose the community are the primary agents, whereas the state, not being a real person, is the agent only in an analogical and derivative sense.⁷³ The only difficulty

⁷² In this case, the political common good, convertible with the well-being of the state, is a means to happiness as the essential good common to each man *qua* man.

⁷³ There is certainly no difficulty about regarding the existential common good, as well as the ideal common good, as the end of the state as agent, even though this requires us to say that the state works for the preservation of its well-being as well as for its improvement. A man works both to preserve himself in virtue and to augment his character by additional virtue.

Although, metaphysically, the real person is always the primary agent, and the state, as a moral person, is only an agent secondarily and by derivation, nevertheless, practically, the state is the only adequate agent with respect to the common good as an end. The individual man *as such* is not a political agent at all; the individual man is only a political agent in his political status as a member of the community; and even so he must join with other political agents to act effectively for the common good. Hence, the individual man, even as member of the com-

which seems to arise concerns the state as a means, for the existential common good can be regarded as a means to the ideal common good, in so far as it is to be preserved, not for its own sake, but as a condition of progress toward greater political perfection. This difficulty is removed by seeing that the proximate end of the existing state as means is the ideal common good still to be achieved, whereas the ultimate end of the common good, existential or ideal, is happiness. When we view the state as a means, we must note whether the end being considered is the ideal common good or happiness; and when we view the state as a means to happiness, we must note whether the means being considered is the state as it now exists imperfectly or the state as it can exist in some greater degree of perfection.⁷⁴

4. The distinction between the existential and the ideal common good is related to a fundamental point in Thomistic political theory. St. Thomas, speaking of the king as principally concerned "with the means by which the multitude subject to him may live well," says that this concern is threefold: "first of all, to establish a virtuous life in the multitude subject to him; second, to preserve it once established; and third, to promote its greater perfection."⁷⁵ Now, the state or common good is not identical with happiness, but like virtue it is one of the means which enable men to lead the life of virtue. Hence, the

munity, is by himself inadequate as an agent acting for the common good. The adequate agent is the organized multitude as a whole, i. e., the state. Cf. fn. 53 *supra*. We said at the very beginning that "the being which is the agent in the case of the common good, the being in whose perfection the common good exists, is not a human being *without qualification*" (p. 594 *supra*). We have seen that the being in whose perfection the common good exists is a human being *only as qualified by union with others through political organization*. Vd. fn. 68 *supra*. And we now see that the being which is the agent in the case of the common good is a human being *only as qualified by cooperation with others in political activity*. Hence, as we promised to show (p. 594 *supra*), "a plurality of common goods is not impossible by reason of incompatibility with the unity of human nature."

⁷⁴ This last point becomes important subsequently when we consider the grades of goodness of the common good as *end*, in relation to the degrees of efficiency of less and more perfect states as *means* to happiness.

⁷⁵ *De Regimine Principum*, I, 15.

three aims of political activity, on the part of any political agent, not merely the king, must be strictly understood in the following manner: (1) to establish the state, to bring the political common good into being; (2) to preserve the state once established, to sustain the existential common good in whatever grade is convertible with the existing state's well-being; and (3) to promote the perfection of the state, to work for the attainment of the ideal common good that is the fullest development of the state's potentialities, or of human potentialities for political life. According as the state is brought into existence, an indispensable means to human happiness is established; according as it is sustained in being, this indispensable condition of the life of virtue is preserved; according as it is developed toward its own characteristic perfection, the virtuous life is more thoroughly promoted by political means.⁷⁶

The generic distinction between all good and all bad states cannot be made in terms of the existential common good as

⁷⁶ Whereas Aristotle considered the common good primarily as *finis effectus*, a good achieved, St. Thomas considered the common good primarily as *finis causa*, as a good to be preserved and promoted. Cf. L. Lachance, O. P., *L'Humanisme Politique de Saint Thomas* (Ottawa: 1939), pp. 473 ff. Both considerations are indispensable to an adequate political theory, since the existential common good to be preserved must be analyzed both as *finis effectus* and as *finis causa*. More than any other political writer, John Stuart Mill, in his *Essay on Representative Government*, combines both points of view. He uses the terms *order* and *progress* to name the two related ends of political activity: "Order is the preservation of all kinds and amounts of good which already exist, and Progress consists in the increase of them" (*op. cit.*, Ch. II). Furthermore, as he points out, these two ends are functionally related: "Progress includes Order, but Order does not include Progress. Progress is a greater degree of that of which Order is less. Order, in any sense, stands only for a part of the prerequisites of good government, not for its idea and essence. . . . Order, thus considered, is not an additional end to be reconciled with Progress, but a part and means of Progress itself" (*ibid.*). Or, in other words, the primary end of political activity is the ideal common good, the end of progressive action, whereas the existential common good, the end of preservative action, is secondary in that it must always be regarded as a means or condition of further political developments. The three concerns of the king (or, what is the same, the three objectives of political activity) which St. Thomas enumerates are named by him in the order of temporal priority: the state must first be instituted, then sustained, and then improved. This is the order of execution. In the order of intention, the enumeration would be reversed, for the ultimate end precedes what are ends only conditionally and as means.

finis effectus. Apart from their motion toward or away from a single end, existing states can be arranged only according to the degree of achieved goodness, with the best existing state at one extreme and the worst at the other, for, as we have seen, even the worst state has a certain grade of political goodness convertible with its actual being.⁷⁷ Unity of end, and distinction between motion toward and motion away from this single end, is required for the generic classification of states as good and bad. The common good as *finis causa*, and here especially the ideal common good, provides what is required.

All good states are generically alike in being in motion toward a common good greater than that which is convertible with their present actual well-being—the term of this progressive motion consisting in the ideal common good, *absolutely speaking*, i. e., the maximum perfection which can be achieved in the political order. This can also be said in terms of the activity of the primary agents and in terms of the forms of government through whose institutions, as the principles of agency, such activity occurs: good political activity on the part of any agent, ruler or ruled, aims at the ideal common good and seeks to preserve the existing common good for the sake of its attainment; good forms of government set up the stable institutional means whereby political activity is directed to these ends.⁷⁸

In sharp contrast, all bad states are generically alike in being corruptive of the existing common good, and hence in motion away from the ideal common good, since the preservation of the state in its present well-being, however imperfect, is a necessary condition of progress toward its greater well-being. This, too, can be said in terms of the activity of primary agents and in terms of governmental forms: bad political activity, aiming at the accidental good of the agents, be they rulers or

⁷⁷ The order of states, from monarchy to tyranny, set up by Plato in *The Republic*, VIII-IX, appears to be of this sort. There is no generic distinction between good and bad; each of the six forms of government is regarded as better or worse than another; the four intermediate forms being both better than some and worse than others.

⁷⁸ Vd. Section 3, *supra*; at p. 609.

ruled, tends to destroy the existing common good; and a good form of government is perverted by such misuse of its institutions.⁷⁹

5. The theory of Democracy requires, however, more than a generic distinction between states as good and bad, or between forms of government as rightly used and perverted. It requires us to show that the several, specifically distinct, forms of government are capable of being morally ordered as good, better, and best.⁸⁰ This moral gradation of forms of government can

⁷⁹ Three things should be noted here. In the first place, we do not define bad political activity as directed toward the individual good of the agents, as opposed to the common good of the state, because happiness and virtue are individual goods, and if political activity were directed toward them as ultimate ends, it would have to aim at the common good of the state as at an indispensable means; therefore, we must define the end of bad political activity as that individual good which is accidental rather than essential, and thus opposed to the existential common good of the state and to the essential common good of the individual man. In the second place, misrule is not the only form of bad political activity; criminal action is another type of activity for the accidental good of the individual and opposed both to his own essential good, and the common good of the state; hence the definition of bad political activity is the same whether the agents be rulers or ruled. In the third place, the bad forms of government are not distinct in definition from the good forms; whatever institutional elements define a given good form of government are also present in bad forms of the same species, but these institutional elements are perverted to a wrong use; thus, to use the familiar traditional distinction between monarchy and tyranny as an example, both have the same definition (the institution of rulership by one man), but tyranny corrupts this institution by the use of its powers and privileges for the accidental good of the ruler. Just as a virtue and its related vices all have the same definition as habits subjected in a given power, differing morally with respect to end, so a good and a bad state may have the same form of government, which is rightly used in the one case, i. e., for the due end, and perverted in the other.

⁸⁰ It must be remembered here that the thesis to be proved is in opposition to the notion that the several forms of government can be ordered only as more or less efficient means to one and the same end which generically distinguishes all good states from bad.

In a recent article, "St. Thomas Aquinas and Popular Sovereignty" (*Thought*, XVI, 62, pp. 473-92), Father Wilfrid Parsons reiterates the traditional position to which we are opposed, namely, that the only distinction among governments, *on moral grounds*, is the generic distinction of the good forms from the bad, and that the several good forms, as species, are all equal *morally*. But Father Parsons departs from the tradition in that he defines good government not merely in terms of "a rule for the common good," for he adds, as indispensable elements, two

be accomplished or by reference to a moral hierarchy of ends, one form of government being better than another in terms of the end which is achieved by political activity through its characteristic institutions. The common good as *finis causa* cannot serve this purpose, because it is the end which determines whether any form of government is well-used or perverted: the ideal common good, absolutely speaking, is the same end for every good form of government; and, though the existential common good may differ in the case of different forms of government, it is, as *finis causa*, as a good to be preserved, only a secondary end—a means to the ideal common good. But if there is a plurality of existential common goods, differing intrin-

other notions: (1) that the rule must be "representative of the people," and (2) that it must be "derived for the ruler immediately from the community itself." Such (generic) good government, Father Parsons insists, is not identical with democracy, but with "popular sovereignty." It may be monarchical in species (rule by one man), aristocratic (rule by the worthy few), or democratic ("rule by the people"). Whereas the traditional generic distinction between good and bad government, in terms of "rule for the common good," can be supplemented by specific moral distinctions among good governments, in terms of elements of justice, Father Parson's version of the traditional position makes such supplementation impossible. His analysis, it seems to us, is wrong on two counts: first, by insisting on constitutionality (rule derived from the community) he fails to comprehend the sort of justice which can exist in a strictly non-constitutional government (i.e., under what Aristotle calls "personal rule"); second, by failing to insist upon universal suffrage (i.e., by failing to equate "the people" with all members of the community), he is unable to comprehend the sort of justice in which Democracy exceeds Republican government. He has, in short, identified the essence of good government with the grade of justice inherent in the Republican form, which is not enough to constitute the best form of government, and is too much to represent the least perfect of the good forms. In consequence, of course, he has confused forms of government (classified according to principles of justice) with modes of governmental operation (classified according to the distribution of ruling offices). We will return to these matters demonstratively in Parts IV and V, wherein we shall consider critically the sort of texts Father Parsons cites as supporting his position, and the kind of reasoning which argues for it. Here suffice it to say that Father Parsons' theory cannot possibly account for the dynamics of political history—for the obvious facts of political progress and for the complex processes of political corruption. This, by itself, is enough to make the theory untenable. Vd. fn. 107 and 110, *infra*. Cf. C. W. McIlwain, *Constitutionalism Ancient and Modern* (Ithaca, 1940). The history of constitutionalism reveals that the notion of "popular sovereignty" neither represents nor exhausts the essence of good government.

sically in grade of political perfection achieved, then these, as *finis effectus*, can constitute a hierarchy of ends correlative with a moral ordering of specifically distinct forms of government.⁸¹ Fully to explain such a hierarchy of governmental forms, differing specifically according to the grade of common goodness achieved, it is necessary to examine the existential common good as *finis effectus*, and to see how its characteristic excellence in each case is related to the specific characteristics of the form of government in that case. We must analyze the common good as an achieved end, and understand how a form of government is the means directly productive of this end.

The relation between happiness and virtue provides an instructive parallel. Happiness as constituted by the possession of all good things includes virtue among the partial goods possessed by the happy man in the course of a complete life. Regarding happiness as the whole of temporal goods, we must regard every type of partial good as a *constitutive means* to happiness, for the whole cannot be possessed except through the attainment of its parts. As a constitutive means, virtue (intellectual or moral) is not more indispensable than any other constitutive means, even though it is *bonum honestum* and has intrinsically greater worth as a good than such goods as wealth, health, and pleasure. The primacy of virtue among partial goods (and here the emphasis must be upon the moral virtues and prudence), is in the functional, as opposed to the constitutive, relation of means to ends. Whereas a constitutive means stands

⁸¹ The several good forms of government, specifically distinct, will be correlative with the several kinds of good state. The grade of achieved common good, which is convertible with the degree of well-being of the existing state, will vary with the grade of goodness in each form of government. The reason for this co-variation will be presently indicated in an analysis of the functional relationship of a form of government, as means, to the existential common good, as achieved end. It should be noted here, however, that the fact of political progress involves not only a distinction between an existential and an ideal common good, but also some gradation among existential common goods in degree of perfection attained. The only question concerns the precise character of these degrees of perfection—whether the less perfect is related to the more perfect as the child is to the man or as brute is to man; or, in other words, whether the variation is continuous or discontinuous (i. e., as in a hierarchy of essential species).

to its end in a relation of material causality, a functional means is related to its end by efficient causality. One type of partial good may thus function as a means to another type of partial good as end (e.g., wealth for the sake of health, health for the sake of activity, good activity for the sake of virtue or virtue for the sake of good activity), but only virtue is the functional means directly productive of the last end, of happiness itself as the whole of goods. The reason is clear as soon as we remember that happiness cannot be constituted as a mere aggregate of goods: it is all good things in a right order and in due proportion to one another.⁸² Only when every type of good is ordered according to its use or worth, only when it is duly proportioned to the other parts of happiness and to the whole of which it is a part, is it possible for a man to possess all good things in the course of his life. Now moral virtue is an habitual right ordering of desires; hence moral virtue, with prudence, is the principle of the right choices which must be made on every occasion if happiness is to be achieved. Even though a man cannot be judged happy until his life is completed, we know that he is becoming happy if his character is formed by virtue. Because virtue is related to happiness as its directly productive means, the degree of happiness in the process of becoming is

⁸² There is a further reason, which should be mentioned. Happiness, being the welfare of a whole life, cannot be achieved by a single good act. That is why the virtues, as stable habits, must be the means directly productive of happiness, even though it remains true, of course, that the virtues themselves are produced by good activity. Vd. "A Dialectic of Morals," *loc. cit.*, p. 376. Just as the virtues are the enduring source of the multiplicity of good acts without which happiness cannot be achieved in the course of a whole life, so the stable institutions of government are the enduring source of the multiplicity of political acts without which the common good cannot be achieved in the life of the state, which is temporally so much more extensive than the life of a man. The fact that good political activity is necessary to establish the institutions of just government does not alter the fact that the common good, which is convertible not merely with the momentary well-being of the state, but with its enduring welfare, cannot be directly produced by such activity. The cause must be equal to its effect in stability and endurance. Hence, the institutions of government, as the principles of political activity (analogous to the virtues as the principles of individual action), are the cause proportionate to the common good as effect.

correlative with the degree of virtue possessed. As a man's character is, so is his end.⁸³

Now, like happiness, the common good is a whole of goods. As the last end in the political order, it is the whole constituted by every type of social good, goods which can be enjoyed by individuals only as members of a community. The use of natural resources and geographical benefits corresponds to such goods as wealth and health in the case of individual happiness;⁸⁴ the cultural development of the community by all those institutions which socialize the life of reason corresponds to intellectual virtue and activity in the case of happiness; good government and good political activity correspond to moral virtue and virtuous action.⁸⁵ Each type of social good is a part of the common good, and a constitutive means thereto. The state, whose actual well-being is convertible with the existential common good *as a whole*, is thus seen to be constituted by more than purely political institutions and activity.⁸⁶ Every type of social good is a constitutive means to the common good which, in existence, is the state's well-being, and among these good government is only one. But, like happiness, the common good is not a mere aggregate of goods: it can be achieved only through a right ordering of its several constitutive parts. The various types of social good must be functionally related to one another in due pro-

⁸³ For a fuller account of the types of partial good, for a thorough analysis of the fourfold dimensionality of the means-end relationship, and for a demonstration that virtue is productive of happiness, vd. "A Dialectic of Morals," *loc. cit.*, pp. 373-76; and 376-80. .

⁸⁴ Vd. *De Regimine Principum*, II, 1-4, wherein St. Thomas considers such factors as climate and health, agriculture, industry and trade, as partial social goods constitutive, in part, of the common good.

⁸⁵ To make the comparison complete, recreational facilities should be mentioned as corresponding to pleasure as a partial good constitutive of happiness. Vd. *De Regimine Principum*, II, 4.

⁸⁶ Cf. Part I, *supra*, *loc. cit.*, pp. 440-443, wherein we distinguished between the state, in its narrower signification, as the community in its purely political aspect, and the state, more broadly understood, as including economic and cultural aspects. Although the common good is the end of political activity, it is not wholly constituted by such activity and the governmental institutions through which it is directed.

portion and right subordination, and, above all, because they are *social* goods, they must be rightly shared by all the members of the community through just distribution. In no other way, can the common good as a whole be at once the good of the community and of its members. When, in traditional speech, the common good is epitomized by the phrase "unity of peace," the right order and distribution of social goods is signified as essential to the common good as a whole, for a whole which is not a mere aggregate can be constituted as a *unity* only through *order*, and that unity can be shared by many in *peace* only through *just distribution*. The unity of peace is not one aspect or part of the common good; rather it *is* the common good as the complexly constituted well-being in which a multitude shares.

Although good government is merely one of the social goods constitutive of the state's well-being, it is also, like moral virtue in relation to happiness, the one partial good which stands in special relation to the common good as its productive means. Whatever is productive of the unity of peace—of the activities of a multitude peacefully cooperating in the attainment of the various social goods—is productive of the common good, constituted by those goods as ordered and shared. Government functions to produce the common good in so far as, through its institutions, it orders men to one another in their cooperative pursuit of the social goods, justly proportions the social goods to one another (as components of the whole), and justly distributes them (as an ordered whole shared by an ordered multitude). Justice, said Aristotle, is the principle of order in states. The goodness of government as the means productive of the common good is convertible with its justice.⁸⁷ As virtue is both

⁸⁷ "Justice is the bond of men in states, for the administration of justice . . . is the principle of order in political society" (*Politics*, I, 2, 1253^a7). And St. Thomas says: "The welfare and safety of a multitude formed into a society is the preservation of its unity, which is called peace, and which, if taken away, the benefits of social life are lost. . . . The chief concern of the ruler of a multitude, therefore, should be to procure the unity of peace" (*De Regimine Principum*, I, 2). Cf. *ibid.*, I, 15. These two statements are not inconsistent; for the unity of peace is impossible without the administration of justice, which is the principle of civil

a constitutive and the productive means of happiness, so political justice (in which consists the *moral goodness* of government) is not only a part of the common good, but the source of its coming to be and the mainstay of its endurance.⁸⁸

Two points should now be clear. *First*, good government, as a part of the common good and, even more so, as its indispensable productive means, is itself an intermediate end in the political order. One of the marks of good political activity is that it establishes and maintains the institutions of just government. As good acts form the virtues which, as intermediate ends, are means to happiness through directing activity to happiness as the ordered whole of goods which can be possessed in a complete life, so good political acts shape the institutions of just government which, as intermediate ends, are means to the common good through directing political activity to the

order. The state is a peaceful association of men (as opposed to a unity imposed by the coercions of violence) only through justice. This is further confirmed by St. Augustine's conception of a *people* as "not any crowd of persons, but the assembly of those who are united together in fellowship recognized by law and for the common good" (*De Civ. Dei*, II, 21). Without justice a multitude cannot be peacefully unified in fellowship. "*Remota itaque justitia, quid sunt regna, nisi magna latrocinia?*" (*De Civ. Dei*, IV, 4.) Cf. Part I, *supra*, loc. cit., p. 417.

According to St. Thomas, "peace is the *work of justice* indirectly, in so far as justice removes the obstacles to peace; but it is the work of charity directly, since charity, by its very nature, causes peace" (*Summa Theologica*, II-II, 29, 3 ad 3). Cf. Francis E. McMahon, "A Thomistic Analysis of Peace," in *THE THOMIST*, I, 2, pp. 169-192. But the common good is not identical with peace, but with the unity of peace or what might be more accurately expressed as the peace of a unified multitude. Social peace is a condition prerequisite to the attainment of the ultimate peace of the individual, imperfectly on earth, perfectly hereafter. In its ultimate signification, peace is identical with happiness, and this is the work of charity, of love rightly directed toward the good; in its social signification, peace, or the unity of peace (i. e., the peace of a unified multitude) is the work of justice. Hence, peace (i. e., happiness) is the work of justice indirectly, in so far as justice, working for social peace (i. e., the common good) removes obstacles to happiness; it is also the work of justice *remotely*, albeit now directly, in so far as the common good positively contributes to the happiness of individual men. When we say that justice is the cause of the unity of peace, the emphasis should be placed on the word "unity" for it is this word which signifies that the peace being considered is the social peace of an organized multitude, i. e., the common good.

⁸⁸ Vd. fn. 82, *supra*. "A thing is maintained in the end and moved towards the end by one and the same cause" (*Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 93, a. 6, ad 3um).

total well-being of the state as the ordered whole of social goods which can be shared by a multitude.⁸⁹ *Second*, viewing the existential common good as *finis effectus*, we see that there must be a correlation between the degree of justice in a form of government and the grade of well-being which is the realized common good of the state. But, in this connection, there are two important differences between the diverse forms of government and the species of moral virtue. One is that the several cardinal virtues can and must be possessed together; it is of their very essence to be conjunctive. The other is that in whatever degree, approaching perfect integrity, the moral virtues are possessed, the variation in degree is primarily a continuous variation in intensity, so that the correlation is between the strength of the virtues and the degrees of happiness in process of being achieved. In contrast, the several forms of government cannot co-exist in the same community: it is of their very essence to be disjunctive and successive. Furthermore, although one form of government may be more or less just than another, the variation here is not in the intensity of the same justice, but according to lack or possession of a distinct element of political justice. Hence, the forms of government are related as species in a moral hierarchy, analogous to the natural hierarchy of species of composite substance. The correlation, therefore, is between the specific grade of justice in the several forms of government and the specific grade of existential common good achieved in the community thus governed. As Royal, Republican, and Democratic governments are ordered in a moral hierarchy, so accordingly there is a moral hierarchy of existential common goods—i.e., the common good of the Royal kind of state being not only less than, but specifically different from,

⁸⁹ Political justice (i.e., the justice of government) is thus seen to be both a final and an efficient cause of good political activity. Vd. Part I, *supra*, loc. cit., p. 417. Cf. p. 443, where it is said: "A form of government may be the end or objective of political activity, and the good which is thus aimed at must be conceived as a common good," i.e., as a social good; "but the form of government may also be viewed as a means to the well-being of the state when that is considered in its larger sense as connoting more than the political organization of the multitude." Cf. fn. 86 *supra*.

the common good of the Republican kind of state, and similarly in the case of Republican and Democratic. In short, the moral specification of kinds of state, and their hierarchy as morally unequal, arises from viewing them *as* a diversity of ends (a diversity of existential common goods as *finis effectus*), and not from referring them *to* a diversity of ends (a diversity of ideal common goods as *finis causa*). And the moral specification of forms of government, also hierarchized as morally unequal, is intrinsically determined by the distinct elements of justice which, according to their presence or absence, define several species; as well as extrinsically determined by the correlation, through efficient causality, between each species of government, according to its grade of political justice, and each kind of state, according to the grade of its existential common good.⁹⁰

We have now reached a solution of the difficulty which made our thesis (that Democracy is, on moral grounds, the best form of government) appear to be *indemonstrable*. We have not yet demonstrated that thesis, but we have at least shown it to be demonstrable by answering an objection which relied for its force upon an inadequate account of the common good. To

⁹⁰ Fully to understand what is here being said, the reader must remember the specification of Royal, Republican, and Democratic government, according to three elements of justice, which can here be briefly named as: A: the just exercise of political power; B: the just constitution of political power; and C: the just distribution of political status. Vd. Part I, *supra*, *loc. cit.*, pp. 418-422. Using these letters to signify the distinct elements, and parentheses to signify an element not possessed, we can symbolize the three species of government as follows: I, i.e., Royal: A (B, C); II, i.e., Republican: AB (C); III, i.e., Democratic: ABC. I, II, and III are ordered hierarchically, as are the three species of living substance (plant, brute, man). As *plant* signifies vegetative life exclusively, as *brute* signifies sensitive life exclusively, though that includes the vegetative, and as *man* signifies the rational life, including both the vegetative and the sensitive, so *Royal* signifies government which can be just exclusively in the way power is exercised, *Republican* signifies government which can be just exclusively in the way power is constituted, though that can include the justice of its proper exercise, and *Democratic* signifies government which can be just in the distribution of status, as well as with respect to the other factors. The hierarchy of governments is a *moral* hierarchy because the essential differences by which specification takes place are in the moral order, i.e., they are elements of political justice. Cf. Part I, *supra*, *loc. cit.*, p. 438, and fn. 24.

demonstrate the thesis, we must prove that the elements of justice, which we have used to specify three forms of government, are separable and cumulatively combinable, as specifying differences must be to set up a hierarchy, moral or natural.⁹¹ But to defend its demonstrability, we had only to show that a moral gradation in forms of government does not violate the unity of the common good, as the end of political activity, even though it involves a plurality of common goods, as diverse and unequal ends correlative with the diverse and unequal species of government. That has now been accomplished by the basic distinction between the ideal and the existential common good, between the common good as *finis causa* and the common good as *finis effectus*; for the unity of the former as an end is the single principle for distinguishing all good from all bad governments and states, whereas the plurality of the latter as ends (but now in a different sense, *effectus*, not *causa*) is correlative with the plurality of unequally just governments. As the objection pointed out, it would be impossible to specify forms of government as morally unequal *by reference to* a plurality of ends *to be achieved*, diverse and unequal ideal common goods. But, as we have shown, it is not impossible to specify forms of government as morally unequal by regarding them *as correlative with* a plurality of ends *already achieved*, diverse and unequal existential common goods.⁹² We have shown that the

⁹¹ This will be the main work of Parts IV and V *infra*.

⁹² Good is a transcendental term, predicable analogically rather than univocally. The analogy of goodness, like the analogy of being, involves an inequality among the various species or modes which it subsumes. Hence, whenever a number of things participate in an analogy, whether of being or of goodness, they must be ordered hierarchically. Vd. *Summa Theologica*, I, 5, 5; cf. 6, ad 3. The qualification of *good by common* does not alter the analogical character of good, any more than the qualification of *being by corporeal* alters the analogical character of the being that is said of corporeal substances diverse in species. To say of each of the several distinct grades of well-being (of the specifically distinct kinds of state) that it is is a common good (existential, *finis effectus*), is to recognize the analogy of common goodness in which these diverse kinds of state participate, as the unequal members of a moral hierarchy. That the goodness which is convertible with the natural grade of being of a man and the goodness which is convertible with the natural grade of being of a brute are unequal and analogical is a fact

necessity for this correlation lies in the functioning of governmental institutions as the principal means productive of the common good that is achieved at any moment. The grade of goodness in the existing effect (the grade of the common good as *finis effectus*) must be proportionate to the grade of goodness in its productive cause (the grade of political justice in each form of government). And, finally, since forms of government are themselves intermediate ends in the political order, their specification by distinct elements of justice, separable and cumulatively combinable, also permits them to be viewed as a moral hierarchy of ends, in the sense of *finis causa*.⁹³

which should enable us to understand that the common good achieved in a Royal state and the common good achieved in a Republican state are unequal and analogical, even though in the first case the goodness is not the result of voluntary achievement, and in the second case it is. It might be more fitting, therefore, to compare the analogy of the common good with the analogy of happiness in which temporal happiness and eternal beatitude participate unequally. It is a more perfect parallel, not only because the analogical goods being compared are, in both cases, the ends of voluntary action, but also because the inequality of the ends achieved is proportionate to the inequality of the causes (natural and supernatural virtue, in the case of happiness; diverse forms of government, in the case of the common good). And these causes are themselves unequally good within the analogy of goodness, whether goodness be attributed to them as productive means or as intermediate ends. Finally, if one compare any existential common good with the ideal common good, the analogy is primarily with respect to their mode of being (actual and potential), and only secondarily with respect to their grade of goodness. Cf. Maritain, *True Humanism*, pp. 131 ff.; and St. Thomas, *In Pol.*, VII, 3; *Summa Theologica*, II-II, 61, 1, ad 1.

⁹³ That a form of government is specified by principles of justice indicates that it is a *bonum honestum*, and that it can be an end having intrinsic moral worth, not merely a means having extrinsic utility. As an end, a form of government may be either an already achieved good to be preserved, or an ideal good to be attained. In either case, a form of government is an end in the sense of *finis causa*, just as the common good as an end to be preserved or attained is *finis causa*, though in the first case it must also be existential and *finis effectus*. Political activity working for progress must, therefore, aim not only at an ideal common good (to be attained) and at the existential common good (to be preserved as a condition of progress), but it must aim also at an ideal form of government, correlative with the ideal common good to be attained, and at the existing form of government correlative with the existential common good to be preserved. Thus we see the sense in which a form of government, as existing or ideal, is a *finis causa* of political activity, as intermediate end and productive means. But this must not lead us to confuse the two ways in which forms of government can be ordered in a moral

6. Two things remain for discussion to conclude the analysis of the common good in the Theory of Democracy. The first is the problem of putting together the two classifications of government, of relating the generic distinction between good and bad government to the several specific distinctions among good governmental forms.⁹⁴ The second concerns the dynamism of political change, the steps of progress and the processes of corruption in the political order.⁹⁵ We shall treat briefly of these matters in the order indicated.⁹⁶

(1) The problem of relating the one generic and the three specific distinctions is focused by the ambiguity of the tra-

hierarchy: *primarily*, though *extrinsically*, by correlation with the grades of existential common good which they effectively establish in being; *secondarily*, though *intrinsically*, as intermediate ends (*finis causa*), unequal because specified by principles of justice.

The crucial difference between the Theory of Democracy and the traditional classification of governments should now be perfectly clear. According to traditional theory, there is only a generic moral distinction among forms of government: as rightly used or perverted. The several forms of government which *can be good* are specified by non-moral criteria: by the number of rulers, or by the aspect of the common good being emphasized. According to the first mode of specification, monarchy, is supposed to be best because most *efficient* in procuring and sustaining the *unity* of peace; according to the second mode of specification, the mixed regime is supposed to be best because combining the three aspects of the common good which each of the pure forms of government stresses; even so, the mixed regime is best because it most *efficiently realizes* all aspects of the common good. Hence, in neither case, is one form of government morally better than another, either intrinsically as a *bonum honestum*, or extrinsically by correlation with a higher grade of achieved common good (note: not a fuller realization of the same, univocal, grade of common good). Once forms of government are seen to be specified by principles of justice, once they are understood as the effective means for producing diverse existential common goods (as *finis effectus*), the classification of specific forms of government, and kinds of states, is radically shifted. It ceases to be a prudential ordering in terms of efficiency with respect to the same end; it becomes a moral ordering in terms of the achieved goodness of diverse ends, and in terms of the intrinsic worth of their correlative means.

⁹⁴ Vd. Part I, *supra*, loc. cit., pp. 425-26.

⁹⁵ Vd. *ibid.* The second of these problems is inseparable from the first, because the generic distinction depends on the ideal common good which is the end of progressive action, and progress itself must be understood in terms of the various grades of existential common good through the successive achievement of which a community is transformed from one kind of state to another, and better, kind.

⁹⁶ These matters will be more fully discussed in Parts IV-VI, *infra*.

ditional phrase: "rule for the common good." Aristotle and St. Thomas used the criterion expressed by this phrase to make the generic distinction.⁹⁷ But because neither Aristotle nor St. Thomas recognized the possibility of specific moral distinctions among good forms of government,⁹⁸ they did not distinguish between the just exercise of political power (i. e., *effecting* an *existential* common good) as one of the three elements of political justice and the right use of political institutions (i. e., *aiming* at the *ideal* common good) as the trait which divides good from bad government generically. The phrase, "rule for the common good,"—generalized to mean a *just exercise of political power on the part of any political agent*, not simply rulers or officeholders—has this ambiguity because of the fundamental distinction between the common good as *finis effectus* and as *finis*

⁹⁷ By making the generic distinction, according to this criterion, Aristotle departs from the Platonic ordering of the six forms of government from best to worst. "The true forms of government," says Aristotle, "are those in which the one, or the few, or the many, govern with a view to the common interest; but governments in which the rule is with a view to the private interest, whether of the one or the few or the many, are perversions" (*Politics*, III, 7, 1279^a28-30). Cf. *ibid.*, III, 6, 1279^a17-21; and also *Ethics*, VIII, 10. St. Thomas follows Aristotle on this point without modification. "If, therefore, a group of free men is governed by their ruler for the common good of the group, that government will be right and just. . . . If, however, the government is organized, not for the common good of the group, but for the private interest of the ruler, it will be an unjust and perverted government" (*De Regimine Principum*, I, 1).

⁹⁸ The very heading of Ch. 2 of *De Regimine Principum*, I, "It is more *expedient* that a multitude of men living together be ruled by one man rather than by many" (italics ours), reveals that St. Thomas makes subordinate distinctions among good forms of government in prudential terms—in terms of their efficiency or degree of utility in achieving the one end that is the same for all good forms of government. Cf. fn. 93 *supra*. Thus, he writes: "It is manifest that what is itself one can more efficaciously bring about unity than several. . . . Therefore, the rule of one man is *more useful* than the rule of many" (italics ours). It should be noted, furthermore, that in this chapter, St. Thomas says that "the chief concern of the ruler should be to *procure* the unity of peace" (italics ours), whereas in Ch. 15, he speaks of the ruler's threefold concern; the establishment, the preservation, and the improvement of the common good. If the word "*procure*" as used in Ch. 2 is intended to signify the improvement of the common good, as well as its establishment and preservation, then it would be difficult for St. Thomas to avoid the unhappy consequences of an ambiguous use of the criterion expressed by "rule for the common good."

causa. Failing to make that distinction, Aristotle and St. Thomas used the criterion expressed by this phrase, to divide true from perverted governments, but they used it in a sense which either emphasized the common good as *finis effectus* (Aristotle), or failed to exclude the common good as *finis effectus* (St. Thomas).⁹⁹ Hence the traditional analysis is not merely inadequate, but somewhat confused.

We have used the criterion (*just exercise of political power*) as one of three separable and cumulatively combinable elements of political justice. We have symbolized it as the A factor; the B factor being *just constitution of political power*; the C factor being *just distribution of political status*.¹⁰⁰ Our analysis will be as confused as the traditional account unless we can separate the A factor which, taken by itself, specifies the least perfect of the good forms of government, from the generic factor (still to be named and symbolized) that qualifies all good governments.¹⁰¹ It may be thought that such separation is not necessary because, since the A factor is the minimal condition of justice in government, it must be possessed not only by the least perfect of the good forms, but by the superior forms as well. This would seem to be indicated by the symbolization of the three forms—I: A (B, C); II: AB (C); III: ABC. It appears that A is common to all three; hence, it may be asked, why is not this A factor the principle of the generic distinction between all the true forms and their perversions?

There are two reasons why this is impossible. The first is that the three good forms cannot be morally specified or ordered in a moral hierarchy unless the common goods which are the achieved ends (*finis effectus*) of each are themselves diverse and unequal within the analogy of common goodness. That being so, the A factor is not univocal in the three cases; but a generic difference must be univocal, at least in so far as it

⁹⁹ Vd. fn. 76 and 98 *supra*.

¹⁰⁰ Vd. Part I, *supra*, loc. cit., pp. 418-422.

¹⁰¹ It was such inadequacy of analysis, with consequent confusion, that Father Farrell detected in Dr. Adler's original memorandum, *The Demonstration of Democracy*. Vd. Part I, *supra*, loc. cit., pp. 405 ff.

divides one set of species from another; hence the presence of the A factor in the moral character of each of the three good forms of government cannot be the root of generic differentiation.¹⁰² The second reason is that, if the three specific factors can be separately corrupted in the perversion of the good forms, then it is at least *conceivable* that, in the perversion of III (specified by ABC), bad forms of government will occur in which A is conjoined with the corruption of B or C or both. If we symbolize the corruption of the elements of justice by small letters, Democracy would seem to be capable of three degrees of corruption, indicated by ABc, Abc, and abc. That seeming to be possible, how can A be regarded as the root of generic differentiation, since two of the three possible corruptions of Democracy retain the A factor? Hence, paradoxically, the attempt to use the A factor to make the generic distinction (because it is present in all three of the good forms) must result in the denial, or violation, of any generic distinction (because some of the perversions of the morally best form are also characterized by the presence of this same factor). Our task, therefore, is double: we must not only formulate the generic criterion in a manner clearly distinct from what is signified by A, but also consider whether the perversions of Democracy, symbolized by ABc and Abc, are possible.

The problem is solved by distinguishing the generic from the specific meaning of "rule for the common good," according as the common good is understood as existential or ideal, *finis effectus* or *finis causa*. In its generic signification, "rule for the common good" means that whatever elements of justice are present in the moral character of the specific forms of government are *all* being directed toward the end of progress; or, in other words, that political activity through governmental institutions (whether on the part of the primary agents, i. e., real persons, or on the part of the state) aims at the ideal common good to be achieved, as well as works for the preservation of the ex-

¹⁰² The point here about analogy and univocity will be more fully discussed very shortly.

istential common good for the sake of progress. In its specific signification, "rule for the common good" means that political power has been justly employed with the result that a common good, of some grade of perfection, exists; or, in other words, the A factor is indicated as the cause of the state's minimum well-being; hence, when this factor is the only cause of the state's well-being, the least perfect common good is achieved as a result; and when it is combined with one or both of the remaining factors (B and C), the actual well-being of the state is increased—more perfect grades of common good are achieved. Since the common good must first be achieved, and exist in some grade, before it can be improved, or preserved for the sake of improvement—since, in the order of generation, the common good as *finis effectus* is prior to the common good as *finis causa*¹⁰³—the generic factor must be understood as qualifying each of the specific factors which is already present; for once they are present and effectively establish the state in some grade of well-being, they can also be directed to the state's improvement, i. e., its motion from a less to a more perfect grade of well-being. Therefore, the generic factor should be represented as an exponent which either does or does not qualify the significance of each of the specific factors. The presence or absence of this exponent divides each of the good forms of government from its characteristic perversions, and thus all the good forms are univocally distinguished from all the corruptions.

Let us summarize this analysis by using the letter x, as an exponential factor, to symbolize the generic criterion of political goodness. The three good forms of government will then be represented in the following manner, and the symbols thus interpreted.

I: A^x (B, C): Royal government, through which the least grade of common good is effected by the just exercise of

¹⁰³ This is not inconsistent with the fact that, in the logical order, i. e., the order of analysis, the common good as *finis causa*, being the source of generic distinction, must be prior to the common good as *finis effectus*, which is involved in the specific distinctions.

political power, A; and in which that achieved common good is also an end (*finis causa*) to be preserved for the sake of attaining the ideal common good. (Here the B and C factors are not corruptible for they have not yet come into being as political institutions; and, since they are non-existent, they cannot be directed to a further end; hence the exponential factor, x, does not qualify their significance.)

- II: $A^x B^x (C)$: Republican government, through which the next grade of common good is effected by the just exercise of political power, A, combined with the just constitution of political power, B; and in which that achieved common good is also an end to be preserved for the sake of attaining the ideal common good. (What was said before about the factors in parentheses applies here.)
- III: $A^x B^x C^x$: Democratic government, through which the highest grade of common good is effected by the just exercise, A, of justly constituted, B, political power, combined with the just distribution of political status, C; and in which that achieved common good is also an end to be preserved for the sake of attaining the ideal common good.

The following commentary is necessary to interpret what is here set forth. The generic factor (symbolized by the exponent x) has univocal signification throughout. In every case, it is the same qualification of existing governmental institutions—that political activity is being directed, through them, to the ideal common good (both by the work of preservation and by the work of improvement). This univocity is not affected by the fact that the proximate stage of improvement is not the same in Case I and Case II, for example, because the ultimate term of improvement, the end which defines the motion of progress, is the same: the ideal common good, absolutely considered. Nor is it affected by the fact that it qualifies factors which are specifically distinct from one another, for the meaning of x remains the same whether it is the exponent of A or B or C: it signifies that a just constitution, achieving a certain grade of

common good, is directed beyond this achievement to the ideal common good not yet attained; or that a just distribution of status, beyond achieving a higher grade of common good, is similarly directed. The only difficulty here arises with respect to the meaning of x as applied to A . How can the A factor (just exercise of political power) ever exist apart from x (the direction of political activity toward the ideal common good)? And, on the other hand, if the A factor be totally corrupted, i. e., totally lost, how can the state exist at all? If the least good state is one in which A is the only factor operating to effect a common good, then the total negation of this factor, symbolized by a , must result in the annihilation of the state, the non-being of a common good. Hence we see that the corruption of the Royal state, $A^x(B, C)$, cannot be understood in terms of what is signified by $a(B, C)$. There must, therefore, be a mean term between A^x and a .

This difficulty is solved when we realize that, in the process of corruption, the B and C factors can be totally lost as well as diminished, whereas the A factor can only be diminished, but never totally lost, even though it approach the vanishing point; for when its vanishing point is reached, the state itself ceases to be, and no common good remains to be mulcted for the private interests of the miscreants. Even the worst tyrant works against anarchy, and so long as he succeeds there must be some political action which keeps the state in being. Such action usually takes the form of obedience to the tyrant's decrees; and this action, on the part of the members of the community, is a just exercise of their political power, even though the decrees themselves are unjust and deleterious to the common good. When the justice of civil obedience reaches the vanishing point, civil war occurs, and the very being of the state is in peril. In short, whereas A^x signifies the just exercise of political power on the part of both rulers and ruled, the absence of x signifies that the rulers are exploiting the common good, and that the state continues to endure only because some of its members, i. e., the ruled, continue to act justly, even though the justice of their action must

be qualified by its relativity to an unjust state.^{103a} Here, then, is the mean term between A^x and a , and we shall symbolize it by α . There is no problem about B^x and b , or C^x and c , for constitutionality or distributive justice may be totally lost as well as attenuated. When Republican or Democratic governments undergo corruption, the negation of x first results in the attenuation of A (symbolized by α); concurrently there must be some attenuation of B and C (symbolized by B and C); and subsequently there may result the total loss of B and C (symbolized by b and c). In other words, none of the elements of justice can continue undiminished when political action is no longer directed to the ideal common good; but neither can that element of justice which is an exercise of political power for the existing common good ever be totally lost; for if it be not sustained (by the action of the ruled, if not by the action of the rulers), the political malefactors cannot aggrandize their private interests by despoiling or looting the fruits of the common good, convertible with the state's existence in some degree of well-being, however reduced or depleted that may be. To succeed in their nefarious enterprise, tyrants must obtain obedience and cooperation from the people they misrule, whether by force or guile, for without this wraith of justice, the bad state does not even imitate a political community, and the tyrant cannot privately profit at the expense of the common good.¹⁰⁴

And, finally, we see that A^x has only an analogical unity of meaning as it occurs in the absence of B and C , i. e., with them

^{103a} Vd. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 92, a. 1, ad 4um. Cf. *Ibid.*, q. 95, a. 4. Vd. also *Politics* III, 17, 1287^b 36-40.

¹⁰⁴ Thus, we see the impossibility of the perversions of Democracy symbolized by ABc and AbC ; and also the impossibility of the perversion of Republican government symbolized by $Ab(C)$. Vd. p. 639 *supra*. As a matter of fact, even abc , aBC , $aB(C)$, etc., are impossible. According to the analysis given above, the only perversions which are possible in reality 'are: of $A^xB^xC^x$, aBC , aBc , and abc ; of $A^xB^x(C)$, $aB(C)$ and $ab(C)$; and of $A^x(B, C)$, $a(B, C)$. These symbolizations indicate that when x is negated, the A factor must be attenuated, α , and the other factors which have already been realized, must either be attenuated (e. g., B) or lost (e. g., b). The negation 'of x causes a transformation in all of the factors to which it has been attached, but not the same transformation in all at any given moment.

in potentiality, symbolized by (B) and (C); or as conjoined with the presence of B^x , or B^x and C^x . (The same must be said for B^x in the absence of C^x or conjoined with its presence.) This follows from the fact that the achieved common good is only analogically the same in these three cases. The just exercise of political power is not univocally the same in the case in which that power is also justly constituted and in the case in which it is not; nor is a just constitution of political power univocally the same in the case in which political status is justly distributed and in the case in which it is not.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁵ The parallelism between the hierarchy of specific natures and the moral hierarchy of forms of government is thus fulfilled. Plants and brute animals are both vegetative, but animals are vegetative *eminenter* because their vegetative powers are conjoined, and elevated by cooperation, with the higher sensitive powers; similarly, both brutes and men are sensitive, but men are sensitive *eminenter*, because they are rationally sensitive. The addition of the sensitive to the vegetative, or the rational to the sensitive, nature is not an extrinsic conjunction, but a penetrating and transforming one. We affirm this truth when we recognize that the powers of the lower nature are not present simply, but eminently, in the higher; and this also means that plant and animal vegetation, brute and human sensitivity, are analogical, not univocal, by the analogy of inequality, of course, not the analogy of strict proportionality. The three species of soul participate in the generic nature of soul (as the principle of life), though unequally, because they confer less or more perfect grades of life upon the matter they inform. So the three forms of government participate in the generic moral quality of goodness in political institutions, a quality which derives from the ultimate end (*finis causa*) being served; but they are unequally good because they effect less or more perfect grades of common good (*finis effectus*). Furthermore, no element of justice is univocally common to two or more forms, being present *simpliciter* in the inferior form and *eminenter* in the superior form. Finally, it should be noted that what is a specifying characteristic, differentiating a form of government from its inferior, is also an element further differentiated by the characteristic which specifies its superior: thus, just constitution is like sensitivity: as sensitivity both differentiates brute from plant life and also constitutes a nature that is subject to further differentiation by rationality, so the just constitution of political power both differentiates Republican from Royal government, and constitutes a form of government which can be further differentiated by the just distribution of political status. As only the animal nature is capable of being either rational or irrational (and, in so being, is either specifically human or brutal), so only constitutional government can involve a just or an unjust distribution of citizenship (for there are no citizens in the Royal state), and is thus specifically either Democratic or Republican.

Cf. fn. 90 and 92 *supra*. The fact that the hierarchy of living substances can be perfectly represented by the symbols we have used to represent the hierarchy of

(2) To complete our discussion of the generic and specific factors, in relation to and separation from each other, we turn now to the problems raised by political change. Let us first consider the processes of political corruption, and then the motions of progress.


The primary cause of corruption is the same in every case, because all perverted forms of government are generically alike in being exploited for accidental, individual goods as the ultimate ends of action (*finis causa*), regardless of the difference in these institutions according to the specific form of the government being misused, and regardless of the difference in the type of accidental good, or of the particular role of the individual who misconceives his end in terms of it. What is univocally the same in every case is a turning away from the true end (i.e., the ideal common good as *finis causa* of political activity). What is not the same in every case is the *apparent good* toward which the political agent wrongly turns; nor need the political status or function of this agent be the same in every case.

The secondary causes of corruption consist in the attenuation or total loss of the several specific factors of goodness in political regimes, with the important exception, already noted, in the case of the A factor, which can only be attenuated, not lost. When political agents turn away from the true end of political activity, they no longer seek to preserve the existential common good, in whatever grade it is effected by the existing institutions of government. Such preservation is never an end in itself, but only for the sake of progress. Furthermore, the preservation of the common good, as it exists, is usually incompatible with the effort to exploit it for private interests, except, as noted, in the extreme case in which the least degree of

government forms [*Plant*: A(B, C); *Brute*: AB (C); *Man*: ABC], with every consequence of such hierarchical ordering the same in both cases, should cause us to wonder how such a parallelism can exist, in view of the fact that the State is, ontologically speaking, an accidental being, and not a substance. Vd. M. J. Adler, "The Solution of the Problem of Species," in *THE THOMIST*, III, 2, 279-379. This is a metaphysical question of great interest, but it does not concern us here. We shall return to its consideration in Part VI *infra*.

common good must be preserved, in no more than an attenuated form, for the state itself to endure and for its fruits to be appropriated, rather than distributed. These things being so, corrupt forms of government can be distinguished specifically in the same way as the true forms are specifically distinguished. Each form of government is differently subject to processes of corruption, which are relative to the grade of common good achieved through its characteristic institutions, even though the primary, or generic, cause of corruption is always the same. The important point to remember here is that institutions cannot be perverted until they exist; elements of political justice cannot be attenuated or destroyed until, in the course of political change, they have first been realized. The retrogressive motion of political corruption must, therefore, be seen in relation to the progressive motion of political improvement. And this means that the more primitive a state is (the less justice that is achieved by such regimes), the less susceptible it is to corruption. The more advanced a society is politically, the greater the opportunity for political decay, both in the variety of perversions and their extent.

The following diagram summarizes this account of the stages and causes of political corruption.



Note

The letters in parentheses indicate potential factors, i. e., factors which have not yet come into existence. The italicized *a* indicates

the attenuation of the one factor which cannot be totally lost. The italicized *B* and *C* indicate the attenuation of these factors, whereas the small letters *b* and *c* indicate their total loss. The diagram makes apparent that the negation of the generic factor *x* does not always have the same effect. The effect varies according to the grade of common good already achieved, symbolized by the factors present in the character of the several good governments, and according to the extent to which corruption has taken place. The first degree of corruption always involves the attenuation of the *A* factor, symbolized by *a*, but this is not the same on all three levels, for on level III, the attenuation of *A* is accompanied by the attenuation of *B* and *C*, whereas on level II, it is accompanied by the attenuation only of *B*; and on level I, the attenuation of *A* may be the sole perversion. Furthermore, whereas only one degree of perversion is possible with respect to I, two degrees are possible with respect to II, the second being the attenuation of *A* accompanied by the loss of *B*; and three degrees of perversion are possible with respect to III, the second being the attenuation of *A*, accompanied by the attenuation of *B* and the loss of *C*; the third being the attenuation of *A* accompanied by the loss of both *B* and *C*. The subscript numbers attached to the Roman numerals in the columns to the right thus signify the retrogressive stages through which a form of government can go in the process of corruption. The horizontal motion from left to right is the initial step of corruption, what we have called the direct, or first degree of, perversion; the oblique motion to the right and upward indicates the steps by which the corruption becomes more complete, approaching the vanishing point in every case.

This diagram must not be misinterpreted as portraying the actual historic motions of political change, progressive or retrogressive. It is rather a purely formal map of the routes which such change can take. It indicates the main stages through which a political community can pass in developing or decaying, but it does not record the actual motions; nor could they be recorded in a simple diagram, for they are not ever uniformly progressive or retrogressive. Progress may occur either in the downward path in the left column, or by lateral motion from right to left, or by oblique motion from right to left and downward—the latter two usually being motions caused by violent revolution.

We shall not pause here to describe the precise character of each of the perverted forms. That can be better done in Parts IV, V, and VI subsequently, when we undertake the fuller

analysis, as well as the demonstration of, the specificity of the three forms which can either be good or perverted.¹⁰⁶ Here suffice it to point out that the location of a form in the left or the right column is determined by the presence or absence (by negation) of the generic exponent x ; and that the further location of each form on a given plane, according to its subscript number, is determined by the number of specific factors which have been attenuated or lost. The inequality of II_1 and III_2 , or of I_1 , II_2 , and III_3 , as perversions is proportional to the inequality of I , II , and III as good forms of government, though the order is inverse. As III is superior in goodness to II , because II lacks the C factor which III possesses, so II_1 is not as bad as III_2 because the loss of the C factor, once achieved, is worse than the mere absence of this factor, i. e., its being in potentiality; furthermore, the attenuation of the A and B factors is greater in III_2 than II_1 . The partial equality of II_1 and III_2 is indicated by their being placed on the same horizontal level; that III_2 lies to the right of II_1 indicates that it is a more extensive corruption, which is due to the fact that it is the perversion of a better state *in the second degree*.

Finally, we see that the traditional saying, that the worst perversion of government is the opposite of the best, is abso-

¹⁰⁶ Furthermore, the present account of political change is non-historical. As already pointed out (in the Note attached to the diagram), we are here concerned only with the formal analysis of the stages of progress or corruption—with the definition of the points between which such political change can take place. The traditional account of political dynamics is inadequate because its formal definition of the points between which change can take place is incomplete, due to the inadequacy in the traditional classification of good states and their perversions. Vd. fn. 107 *infra*. But the present analysis will be misunderstood if its attempt to be adequate formally is mistaken as an effort to be historically adequate. The motions of political history are never simply forward or backward; they are interrupted by all sorts of see-sawing back and forth; they are usually cyclical as well as rectilinear, and the composition of these two types of motion results in a spiral motion forward. Vd. "The Demonstration of Democracy," in the *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, XV: Note 47. In Parts IV, V, and VI of the present work, we shall not only deal concretely with the various types of perversion to which each good form of government is susceptible, but we shall also try to describe the actual motions of corruption as these have occurred, for the most part, in history.

lutely false. For if III be best, then the worst perversion is clearly III₃, which is the most complete corruption of the best. Speaking diagrammatically, the truth is that the worst is not the direct opposite of the best, but the furthest removed from the best. Even if we restrict our attention to the direct opposites (the first stages of perversion: III₁, II₁, and I₁), the traditional remark, made in terms of tyranny as opposed to monarchy (on the supposition that monarchy is best, for whatever reasons), still is false: for the direct opposite, or first perversion, of the best government is better than the direct opposite, or first perversion, of the least good government, in the same proportion as the best is better than the least good, and for the same reason: more elements of justice in the common good susceptible of decay, and more still retained in that first stage of corruption. The falsity of the traditional statement about the worst being opposite to the best follows from the falsity of the traditional analysis: its inadequacy with respect to specific moral distinctions, and its confusion of the two significations of "rule for the common good." Only on the sort of suppositions which make it possible to say that monarchy is the best form of government because rule by one is more efficient in effecting or improving the common good, can it be said that tyranny is worst, because one man can misrule, can despoil or exploit the common good, more efficiently than many. But if monarchy is not even a distinct form of government, because the numerical distribution of ruling offices determines only an accidental mode of government which can occur in any form, and if forms of government are not graded according to efficiency, but according to intrinsic elements of justice and the grade of common good these effect, then the worst perversion is furthest removed from the best form, and the direct opposite of the best form is the least perversion.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁷ In fairness to Aristotle, it must be pointed out that he says, in one place, that the worst is furthest removed from the best (*Politics*, IV, 2, 1289^b3), even though, in another, he inconsistently says that the opposite of the best is worst (*ibid.*, 1289^a40). St. Thomas, however, simply says that "the worst is opposed to the best," and therefore "just as the government of a king is the best, the govern-

Although the primary cause of corruption is the same in every case, i.e., the alienation of political action from its due end (signified by the negation of the generic exponent x), and although we can enumerate the secondary causes of corruption, in terms of the several specific factors which can be attenuated or lost, we cannot formulate the aetiology of progress merely by reference to the objectives of political activity. While it is true that the direction of political activity toward the ideal common good is a cause of progress; and even true that this is the essential cause, in so far as political developments are voluntarily and intentionally achieved; nevertheless, political progress may be prompted or facilitated by the operation of all sorts of accidental causes, such as improvements in the physical conditions of human life, alterations in economy, the discoveries and inventions which produce fundamental changes in the human community by altering the modes of communication. There are also basic spiritual changes in human civilization, such as the advent and spread of Christianity, which transform the very atmosphere of political life, and condition every phase of political activity.¹⁰⁸ Finally, political progress may be effected peacefully or it may depend upon resort to revolutionary violence; in the latter case, progress may consist in a motion from right to left in the diagram, horizontally, or obliquely downward; and such motions cannot be accounted for in terms of the x fac-

ment of a tyrant is worst" (*De Regimine Principum*, I, 3). This statement is correct on St. Thomas's suppositions, indicated in the text above; but the suppositions are false. Apart from questions of truth and falsity, with respect to the traditional analysis and the one here being presented, the radical difference between these two analyses should be clear to the reader in terms of the radical divergence between the two accounts of political corruption. Just as the traditional theory seems to us to be inadequate in its understanding of progress, so does it fail to penetrate the manifold phenomena of corruption. Both are due to the same defects of analysis; unless the existential and the ideal common good are distinguished, unless specific moral gradations in forms of government are understood in terms of the common good as *finis effectus*, the motions of political change, forward or backward, cannot be rendered intelligible in the light of principles. Political dynamism is too complex to be formulated by a too simple classification of governments and their perversions.

¹⁰⁸ Vd. "The Demonstration of Democracy," *loc. cit.*, notes 51, 52, 53.

tor. Our present discussion is, therefore, limited to the simple cases in which progress occurs as a downward motion in the left column, and in which the ideal common good, as an objective of political activity, is a cause, even though not sufficient by itself. Here, as before, our aim is analytical not historical. We shall return to historical considerations, and to the details of aetiology, in Parts IV, V, and VI.¹⁰⁹

With respect to progress, only one problem needs to be discussed here. It would appear, on the one hand, that the transition from the Royal to the Republican state, and the transition from the Republican to the Democratic state, are both progressive motions, though the ideal common good which terminates these two motions is not the same in both cases; and, on the other hand, it would appear that there can be no meaning to the exponential factor x (signifying the direction of activity toward the ideal common good) in the case of the Democratic state, for, this being the best state, the ideal is already achieved once it exists. These two apparent difficulties are aspects of the same problem. To remove them, we have to distinguish several senses in which the ideal common good can be understood as the term of progress.

In the first place, we must distinguish between an ideal which is the proximate term of a progressive development and the ideal which is the ultimate term of all progress. According to the significance of the generic criterion of good political activity, a Royal state is not generically good unless it aims to supersede itself by setting up Republican institutions; and a Republican state is not generically good unless it aims to supersede itself by setting up Democratic institutions.¹¹⁰ Now, then, the com-

¹⁰⁹ Vd. fn. 106 *supra*.

¹¹⁰ In aiming to supersede itself the Royal state must work to create the conditions (economic, physical, educational, etc.), relative to which a better form of government (i. e., Republican) would be best; similarly, the Republican state must work to create the conditions, relative to which a better form of government (i. e., Democratic) would be best. The best government, absolutely speaking, is also the form of government which is best relative to the best conditions. Vd. Part I, *supra*, *loc. cit.*, pp. 432-435. Cf. *Essay on Representative Government*, Ch. IV, wherein Mill argues that, although certain inferior conditions may justify Royal government

mon good which can be effected by Republican institutions is ideal relative to the existential common good of a Royal state; similarly, in the case of the common good which can be effected by Democratic institutions, in relation to the existential common good of a Republican state; these relative ideals are the proximate ends of progressive change. Beyond them is the absolute ideal—the ultimate end of such change. The plurality of such relative ideals does not violate the principle that the common good as *finis causa* must be one, in order to establish the unity of the generic distinction; because these relative ideals are subsumed by the absolute, as the ultimate term of motion subordinates the proximate terms, which are really only halfway marks that the motion traverses to reach its goal.¹¹¹

(i. e., nonconstitutional rule) as best relative to those conditions, a benevolent despot is one who not only acts for the present well-being of the community, but one who also seeks to improve the conditions of the people so that, in the future, Republican rather than Royal government will be the best relatively.

¹¹¹ This distinction between the one ideal common good, as the absolute term of political progress, and the many ideal common goods, as the relative stages through which such development passes, must not be confused with the distinction between the best government absolutely and the best government relative to the contingent circumstances of an historic community. The relativity is not the same in both cases: when we speak of a government as being best relative to the contingent circumstances of a particular community, we are considering the grade of political institutions which can be achieved by this community at a given time; when we speak of the common good which is the next, or proximate, stage of political development, as being relatively ideal, we are considering, not the institutions which should now be achieved, but those which should next be reached in the course of progress. That which is the best form of government absolutely, however, is also the form of government which is correlative with the absolutely ideal common good—the ultimate term to be reached by progress.

In this connection, it should be noted that the progressive step from the least perfect state, A(B, C), to its proximate superior, AB (C), is only analogically, not univocally, the same as the step from the less perfect state, AB (C), to the most perfect, ABC. In the first case, constitutional government is instituted to replace the exercise of merely *de facto* power; in the second case, constitutional government is itself perfected by distributive justice with respect to political status, especially citizenship. Here there is a parallelism between evolution in the natural order and progress in the moral order, which accords with the parallelism between the natural and the moral hierarchies: the transition from plants to brutes entails the emergence of some cognitive power; the transition from brutes to men entails the perfection of cognition by the addition of reason.

In the second place, we must recognize that, although Democratic government is best absolutely, the political perfection it can effect may be less or more fully realized in the existential common good of the Democratic state. Hence, even when the Democratic state exists, the ideal common good may still remain to be achieved in its fullness. As a relative end, the Democratic state, in any degree of realization, is the proximate term of progress in the transition from the Republican state. But the fullest realization of the political perfection that is possible under the Democratic form is the ideal common good absolutely, the ultimate term of progress which is the objective of good political activity in the Democratic state, as well as in inferior states.¹¹² This will always be the case because, in the nature of man's earthly condition, the ideal commonwealth will never be perfectly embodied in any temporal community. Democracy is not, like Plato's state, a city in the skies. It has already begun to exist on earth. But the conditions for its perfect flowering impose such a burden upon the weakness of the flesh, that the human spirit will struggle throughout the rest of history to bring Democracy to mature fruition. For when the ideal common good is fully achieved, when human potentialities for political life are perfectly actualized in the community of men, the motion of history must itself be at an end. The end which is the origin of every good intention is also the complete good in which execution culminates.

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(Part III will appear in the next issue.)

¹¹² Cf. Part I, *supra*, loc. cit., pp. 436-440.

BOOK REVIEWS

The City of Man. Issued by: HERBERT AGAR, FRANK AYDELOTTE, G. A. BORGESE, HERMANN BROCH, VAN WYCK BROOKS, ADA L. COMSTOCK, WILLIAM YANDELL ELLIOTT, DOROTHY CANFIELD FISHER, CHRISTIAN GAUSS, OSCAR JASZI, ALVIN JOHNSON, HANS KOHN, THOMAS MANN, LEWIS MUMFORD, WILLIAM ALLAN NEILSON, REINHOLD NIEBUHR, GAETANO SALVEMINI. New York: The Viking Press, 1940. Pp. 113. \$1.00.

This very small book is described by its publishers as the outcome of collective thinking by a group of persons profoundly concerned about the future of civilization; it states their faith and hope. Though very small, the book is important by reason of the men and women who have sponsored it; the extended examination of it which will be given here has however, quite another basis than the importance of the editors of the book. This work must be analyzed carefully, evaluated solidly and judged with unyielding justice, for its compact thesis represents one of the most serious intellectual threats yet to be offered to western civilization. Mechanically, and logically, the book is split into three parts: the first is a "Declaration" which contains the thesis of the sponsors of the work; the second, a "Proposal," is a detailed plan for the furthering and execution of this thesis; the third, a "Note," gives the historical genesis of the Declaration and the Proposal. The book is much more intelligible if its parts are read in reverse order. The history is a plain matter-of-fact statement of the origin of the thesis, the Proposal, smacking somewhat of the grandiose and the utopian, is yet quite clear and orderly in the plans it lays down, while the Declaration, frankly apocalyptic, concentrates much more intensely on phrasing than on clarity of thought.

* * *

The story of the two documents (pp. 97-113), the Declaration and the Proposal, goes back well over two years and is dated by the catastrophes suffered by democratic countries beginning with Munich in 1938. The story begins with an exchange of ideas by a small group of friends; by May, 1939, the motives and intentions of this group had been stated in the form of a memorandum. Let it be said here that those motives and intentions were of the noblest. It was proposed to institute in America a "Committee on Europe" consisting of a small number of the most prominent intellectual and political exiles from Europe and a majority of American thinkers and scientists. It was hoped that the work of the committee "would supply

the statesmen of a period of reconstruction with decisive material in all fields of national and international affairs," even down to such details as the relations between the churches and the state, of the family and the city, eugenics, tradition and initiative in education, with a complete willingness to go into much greater detail if it should seem beneficial.

The reasons that inspired the formation of this committee were decidedly concrete. There was the actual condition of Europe, the opportunity offered to America in its possession of confidence, optimism, American scholars, and prominent European personalities. More strong, perhaps, in its motive power, was the realization that the events of the past twenty years were in great part due to the action of a misled intelligentsia. Some reparation is certainly called for; this committee was visualized as offering the intellectual élite a chance to take their proper place and do their proper work in the affairs of the world. The leading committee was to consist of not more than fifteen men to be provided with staffs of scholars and students.

Though the Memorandum was circulated among friends, the work was slowed down by the outbreak of war; soon it became obvious that there were many parallel efforts being made along the same line, but, because these somewhat rival efforts were not as sweeping in their consideration of what were considered essential criteria, the work of the original Committee was continued and a letter of invitation sent out in March, 1940. This letter outlined the motives and aims of the Committee to a limited number of prospective collaborators.

A meeting of the Committee was held in May, 1940, at which the name was changed to a "Committee of Fifteen," a plan of work discussed, and a subcommittee appointed to draft the statement of the ideas and purposes which prevailed during this meeting. Another conference in August of 1940 discussed the work of the subcommittee and approved it as a Declaration and a Proposal—the remainder of this book. Here too, William Allan Neilson was elected chairman; his assistants, Herbert Agar, W. Y. Elliot, Lewis Mumford, and G. A. Borgese, secretary, make up the Executive Board.

Before going on to the Proposal, there are several significant things to be noted in this historical note. First of all is the make-up of the Executive Board, with particular emphasis on the distinctive work of the particular officers. Another is the fact that the letter of invitation had among its original signers, Robert M. Hutchins; a name that henceforth disappears altogether. Then, too, there are many statements made in the course of the historical note that leave little doubt as to which way the wind was blowing. It is noted, for example, on p. 106, that "no definition or redefinition of democracy is practically or logically tenable without its premise in a statement of fundamental religious beliefs." On p. 100 the opportunity of America was summed up in terms of American confidence, optimism,

scholars and European personalities—odd ingredients for the fundamental statement aimed at by the Committee. On p. 103 it is insisted that:

At last the intelligentsia should be taken down to the earth from the midair between clouds and earth where it has hovered for centuries, content with the worship of undefined or approximately defined deities such as Justice, Freedom, Democracy, and be put to a real, steady, and substantial work through which those venerable and significant abstractions may become the pulp and nerve of practical statesmanship in a day to come.

* * *

The Proposal (pp. 75-96), which is the working plan outlined in the second part of the book, takes the wraps off some of the dark horses that stalked the historical note, but not all the wraps. It proposes a super-group of super-experts; not an original idea, by any means, but rather a haunting dream since the opening of the scientific era. Dr. Carrel proposed such a super-scientific group for quite another purpose in his *Man The Unknown*; undoubtedly other super-scientific groups will be planned again in the future when men come face to face with the difficulties that are outside the field of science. This particular super-group of super-experts is to consist really of four groups of experts working under the central committee. The experts are to study the four leading issues of American and world democracy, namely, the constitutional, economic, and international—all converging toward the common apex of freedom and the dignity of the human personality—and the common base which is moral belief and the religious faith of the community.

The experts studying the constitutional issue will concern themselves with the relations between democracy and individual liberties. It is necessary to have a definition of liberty and a constitutional reform both in the field of liberty and duty and in the relations between legislative and executive power. These things cannot be founded but on the spirit of a new religion.

The religious issue contemplates the relations between the community as a whole and the separate churches. It asks for definite tenets embodying the universal religion of Democracy, which shall underlie each and all of them. The experts then must investigate what limits are set by the religion of freedom and determine of what God we talk. They must determine what religious and ethical traditions are of greater or lesser value for the preservation and growth of the democratic principle. These same religious experts will explore the issue of education. The two, religion and education, are at bottom one and the same for "education in western democracy has been the substitute for a national and supra-national religion."

The experts in economics will outline in detail the law of the common wealth, the era of distributive justice.

The group on the international issue will call for a definite law of international, or supra-national, order and the sovereignty of mankind. We

need a universal law first promulgated to all humanity; it is entrusted to the good will of the groups progressively disposed to adopt it and then it is to be enforced on the rebels, finally to become the common peace and freedom of all the peoples of the earth.

* * *

Coming from such a group of American thinkers, the Declaration (pp. 11-73) with which this book begins, is a momentous document. It begins with a statement of the world today, bitterly condemnatory of Nazism and ruthlessly critical of the decay of democracy in America. This latter is described as the disintegration of what had been a strenuous unity of thought and action, a rule for life and death, a faith militant and triumphant. Among the causes of the disintegration are mentioned educational relativism which doubted all values, science shirking spiritual issues and promising material delights while withholding the fulfillment of the promise to an ever imminent future, thus goading the masses to despair. America is held out as the hope of the world if it renews the faith and hope that once made it strong and takes a stand against the enslavers of Europe. The finger of accusation for the world's plight is pointed at the heralds of antichrist, irresponsible artists and scientists, intellectual leaders and their pupils, the ruling classes and statesmen of the world, along with all contemporaries who accepted this culture and immersed themselves in it. The present peril and challenge is accepted as an ordeal by tyranny; in opposition to it is offered the ancient, imperishable dream of man.

With this introductory material out of the way, the Declaration quickly gets down to the business in hand. The order of procedure is not at all evident; as far as long study can unearth it, it would seem to be about like this:

- (1) Affirmations on the goal of man, on war and peace, and on the City of Man (including its definition, structure, nature and history, method and genesis).
- (2) The total character of the City of Man and its place as the source of morals.
- (3) Its religious and apocalyptic character.
- (4) The fate of the churches.
- (5) The common creed of the new religion.
- (6) Sociology and economics of Democracy.
- (7) The leadership of America.

AFFIRMATIONS (pp. 20-27)

There is no distinction between the individual and collective meaning and goal of human life. Both consist in progress and growth in intellect and action; for this an essential pre-requisite is universal peace. Man's

effort is, in fact, endless; there is no perfectibility which leads to an ultimate and unchanging perfection for mankind to live in happily ever after. Milleniums are the infinity of man's dream enclosed in brief myths, and each horizon opens into another. There is, however, a distinction between the perpetuity of chance and struggle and the inevitability of slaughter and arson.

War is chaos and horror. It is now returning from standards of epic piety and chivalric honor to the indiscriminate atrocity of primal murder. Peace is the harmony of strong souls, not the fightless impotence of slaves; its price is readiness to fight. It is founded only on the unity of man under one law and government and is the *sine-qua-non* of advance beyond the present threat and ruin.

The City of Man is a nation of Man embodied in the Universal State, the State of States, a necessity because the national states have built no eternal pattern of collective life. Its structure will preclude small nations, for these have freedom only as a gift from stronger states; and it will bar the giant states whose very size bids for the anarchy of violence and conquest. All centralized structures must fall into small federal units; all states, deflated and disciplined, must align themselves under the law of the world-state if the world is to have peace.

It opposes universality to totalitarianism, republican unity to autarchic despotism; that this is feasible is indicated by the existence of the Swiss and American federations. Its method will be regional centralization which will distribute power to the smallest unit, and world-wide authority assuring the cooperation of all. These two elements, the centripetal and peripheral, are essential to each other. With one or the other submerged, there results tyranny or chaos; together they give a working base for freedom—an order that is strong and flexible.

Before this State of States can come into existence, it is probable that there will be a greater spread of the area of destruction. In the first stages of reconstruction there must be leadership with power enduring until the laggards in barbarism or inertia are educated to the full responsibility of their coming freedom. All men of good will will work to make the interval of preparation short; all will be ready when the heresy of nationalism is conquered and the absurd architecture of the present world is dismantled. Then there will be a Universal Parliament representing people, not states; a fundamental body of law for all the planet in matters of interregional interests; an elected President of mankind embodying, for a limited term, common authority and common law; and a federal force to strike at anarchy and felony.

CITY OF MAN AS TOTAL AND A SOURCE OF MORALS (pp. 27-32)

Universal and total democracy is a principle of liberty and life which man's dignity opposes to total autocracy's principle of slavery and death.

There is no other principle of liberty and life possible because this alone combines law, equality and justice.

This is the ancient hope of man, its unity resting on three principles. The first of these is universal participation in government; this is the foundation of law. The second is that the state is the agent of collective human purposes, the servant of the common good; the unity of the people is the permanent source of power. This is the foundation of equality. The third, the fundamental principle, is that democracy is a community of persons. Its vigor rests on the cultivation and discipline of the person; its quality is the quality of education which it imparts to citizens and exacts from them. This is the foundation of justice.

The enemies of democracy now say that it rests on opinion, having no conviction; so it becomes necessary to make a new foundation on the rock of conviction. Such convictions as determine its character are that there is no liberty but one—the right, which is a duty, of making oneself and others free through absolute allegiance to the final goal of man; there is no comfort but one—pride in duty performed.

RELIGIOUS AND APOCALYPTIC CHARACTER (pp. 33-45)

Democracy, as a harmony subordinated to a plan, a purposive organism, must be redefined. It can be so defined as the plenitude of heart-service to a highest religion embodying the essence of all higher religions. Democracy is humanism in theocracy and rational theocracy in universal humanism.

In this new religion of democracy the value of the individual is ultimate; the community must be ordered to promote the welfare and fulfillment of each person. But there is no individual good life outside society and the single citizen must strive toward a communal good which is beyond itself as it is beyond any single community and any passing generation. Everything must be within, nothing against, nothing outside humanity. A dictatorship of humanity on the basis of law for the protection of human dignity is the only rule from which there is hope for life. The only means to attain this universality is positive legislation. That is the only means to describe the relations of individual rights and social duties. No liberty can be granted to whosoever threatens the divine spirit in man and above man.

This universal democracy, in an interpretation suited to the modern mind, is the spirit Christ called the Holy Ghost. It is ultimately sacred; Christ Himself marked the limits of tolerance and charity when He insisted that blasphemy against the Holy Ghost (that is, universal democracy) will not be forgiven. This religion of the Holy Ghost is the spirit of the New Testament of which a United States president spoke saying there is universal belief in it. There is this belief, even in those who were never

under the direct influence of Scripture, who reject all transcendent belief and cling to rational knowledge and scientific experiment alone.

This universal religion was anticipated by sages and saints of all ages; its substance matured out of whatever rose highest in man's speculations and hopes, through the prophets of Israel, the religious geniuses of Asia, Greek poetry and philosophy, Rome, the Catholic Church, the Protestant insurrection, Humanism, Renaissance, the revolutions, the era of liberalism down to the optimistic philosophies of enlightenment. Each and all contain humanity and redemption; each and all are comprehended under the all-embracing and all-interpreting religion of the Spirit.

No one of these reached the universality of the religion of the Spirit; but none wilfully conflicted with the basic tenets on which the world religion of the Spirit is founded. The Catholic Church is so serious an offender against this world religion that pious Catholics of former ages would have called its present state a Babylonian captivity; the saints and doctors against Avignon were more articulate than Catholics of today. Catholics who are freedom-loving and justice-loving, whenever they can awaken to the examples of braver ages, will see to it some day that humility in faith be no longer the lure to servility in politics and that allegiance to the City of God be disentangled from bondage to the Vatican City as a foreign potentate in feud or trade with other potentates.

The Religion of the Spirit acknowledges the incorruptible substance of truth underlying the surfaces and errors of the separate confessions which have risen from the common ground of ancient and medieval civilization. In this acknowledgment is the foundation of religious freedom in democracy. Democracy, in the catholicity of its language, interprets and justifies the separate creeds as its own vernaculars.

FATE OF THE CHURCHES (pp. 45-46)

None of these vernaculars can take the place of the universal language which expresses the common belief of man. The latter explains and annexes all dogmas as symbols. The churches anathematize as heresy the symbolical meaning that is dogma's inmost truth. We shall not turn from a higher and vaster religion to lesser ones. The old cults will have the protection of democracy; no church can be officially acknowledged as a religion of the state; no church can be granted primacy or privileges above others, in fact, the desire for such is a measure of its inadequacy to the fundamental principle of democracy. Separation of church and state is the base from which arises the supremacy of world-humanism and world-democracy—the catholicity of the common creed which embraces and interprets every lesser faith.

THE COMMON CREED (pp. 46-48)

This common creed of the world religion is already in existence and to its center all higher minds already point. Its yoke is as easy as it is inevitable; its doctrines are as plain as they are undebatable. The doctrines of this common creed can be summarized in the following propositions:

- (1) A divine intention governs the universe, call it God, deity, Holy Ghost, Absolute, Logos, or Evolution.
- (2) The direction of this intention is from matter to life, from life to spirit, from chaos to order, from blind strife and random impulse to conscience and moral law.
- (3) In the universe we know, the human species is the spearhead of the divine intention; man is the necessary ally of "that power that makes for righteousness."
- (4) Man's growth, progress or evolution is toward the radiance of an angel.
- (5) If the divine intention is to be fulfilled, the pursuit of good under the inspiration of faith, hope, and charity must imply resistance to evil—battle when necessary.
- (6) Life is service and death a gate to life—whatever the destiny of the individual in the "undiscovered country." For individual life is humble in the knowledge of its limits under the all human dogma of fallibility.
- (7) Individual life has meaning only by participation in the unlimited past into the illimitable future; no one man or race or generation can embody the heritage and the promise of man.

SOCIOLOGY AND ECONOMICS (pp. 48-58)

In general the sociology and economics of the new order are comprised in the tenets of the common creed just listed, in the Golden Rule and in Paul's injunction "Be ye members one of another." Religion or doctrine cloaking injustice and misery on earth under the promise of some transcendent bliss deserves Marx's scorn. Earth is a laboratory where the validity of the eternal ideas are tested under the limits of space and time; here and now the divine intention which governs the universe must be enforced in the field of action as it stands supreme in the heaven of the creed.

In particular, this new sociological and economic order is the American dream. It is not capitalism, which made freedom the murderer of equality; it is not communism, which made equality the strangler of freedom; it is not resurgent feudalism or corporative economy which promise peace and order in a compulsory fixity of everyone wherever birth or chance happened

to place him. In fact, corporations and guilds, as advocated by clerical and political groups of the Right, are pious nicknames of Fascism, lures for weary men anxious to be free from freedom.

The American dream is none of these. It demands that all know that they have inherited the earth; there is no place for non-working owners above working non-owners. It demands awareness that the problem of production (which is one of power) is superseded by the problem of distribution (which is one of justice). It demands an economy that is pluralistic and flexible. The primary centers must be transferred from metropolitan centers to villages. There must be federal aggregations, each for a special purpose: of sport, industry, education, art, administration, trade. These could collect, around focal points, the energies radiating from smaller communities. The factory will take the place held by the military barracks in the pre-human era: youth will be enlisted for a limited term, learn in federal factories, in public works, and on communal farms the skill of production.

Here slavery will be anathema and partnership the rallying cry. Distribution of service, assigning to each one his share of labor and leisure must make unemployment a forgotten nightmare. Private property must be admitted as biologically inevitable and socially useful. But the Bill of Rights must be supplemented by a Bill of Duties stating that no private property can be tolerated outside the framework of just social use; thus are limits set to the accumulation of wealth and its transmission. Morals will have primacy over economics, not vice versa. Injustice must be fought as soon as it rears its head; no quarter must be given to the paradox of moral man in immoral society, of poverty in the midst of plenty. Bread must know no fear; love and parenthood must unlearn fear and shame.

AMERICAN LEADERSHIP (pp. 58-66)

America has the necessary and inevitable mission to bring this new order and new religion about. No one else is strong and free enough to show the way to social reform and universal order. America is really chosen by objective circumstances of history for a privilege which is a service, a right which is a duty. Rulership by the wisest and strongest is the prescribed path to equality of all if the strong can learn wisdom and if the rulership is accepted in the spirit of reluctance and devotion that Plato suggests. In the family of nations a firm hand is required over the children to be matured, the sick to be cured, the maniacs to be confined, and the criminals to be apprehended. Yet the final goal can never be forgotten; justice, which is the common good, can never be perverted into the interest of the stronger. American leadership is world trusteeship. *Pax Americana* is a preamble to *Pax Humana*.

Obviously the evaluation of such a document as the Declaration of this book is not easy and cannot be exhaustive; for the Declaration is, at the same time, political, ethical, religious, sociological, and economic. Perhaps it will be sufficient for an appreciation of the character of this product of collective thinking to examine some of the fundamental notions upon which the whole thesis is explicitly based.

The sponsors of this declaration are, by explicit statement, working in the interests of western civilization, of democracy, of humanity. Their condemnations of Nazism, Fascism, Communism and the abuses of democracy leave little to be desired in the way of scathing repudiation. They speak in terms long familiar and sacred to the peoples of the west: the dignity of man, the ultimate value of the individual, the common good, the divine intention directing the universe, justice, law, equality, freedom, and so on. If, by any chance, the Declaration they have here sponsored destroys or attacks these sacred things, then we can legitimately conclude that the majority of the signers of this Declaration have been duped by a cleverer mind; they have been sold a bill of goods altogether different from what they asked for. The imputation, in such a case, is not on their nobility of purpose, their sincerity, their courageous attack on crucial issues, but on their intellectual acumen.

This declaration speaks feelingly of the dignity of man, the meaning of human life and the ultimate value of the individual. In actual fact, it denies dignity to man, meaning to life, and value to the individual. It insists, for example that the goal of an individual's life is growth and progress in intellect and action through endless effort with no individual attainment to mark its successful close. The individual is asked to strive endlessly that he might grow; though of course, as he gets old his growing will stop and as death comes there will be nothing to look forward to. Yes, it is said that life is a service and death a gate to life, whatever the destiny of the individual after death; but it is also insisted that individual life has meaning only by participation in the unlimited past into the illimitable future. It is said that the value of the individual is ultimate and the community must promote the welfare of each person; but it is also said that the single citizen must strive toward a communal good which is beyond himself, that everything must be within, nothing against, nothing outside humanity. In other words, there is no *individual* goal to give *individual* meaning to an *individual's* life. The individual man exists only for a mass entity, a communal purpose. For him, there is no liberty but the right to make himself and others free by adhering with absolute allegiance to the final goal of man, that is, to a process of growth indistinct from that of the community, the end beyond himself.

What of the dignity of man that is insisted on in the words of this Declaration? No basis is assigned for it; it is taken as a fundamental

assumption. Yet the one basis possible for it is explicitly denied. A man has dignity precisely because he is a superior, he is in command of his own life to his own supreme purpose; he can use the things about him, while he can *be used* by absolutely nothing else in the universe. He has an end, an individual end, of his own; he is not the tool or instrument of some other end. This is precisely what is denied in this Declaration; the bright goals he thinks he is aiming at are dreams wrapped up in brief myths, milleniums. He exists, not for his own goal, but for the goal of that vague community called humanity; he is the *necessary* ally of some vague power; he has no liberty but to hold fast to this non-personal end that renders his life individually meaningless. He is, in actual fact, used by the community; and he exists for no other purpose.

What of the freedom of man? According to the Declaration, its basis is universal and total democracy; there is no other principle. Thus the principle of man's freedom is something outside the individual, an extrinsic grant not a natural characteristic. It exists that man might work to the end beyond himself which is within humanity. That is not what the peoples of the west have meant by freedom. To them, freedom has meant the capacity to choose between means that lead to the individual goal which perfects the individual life; it has meant a natural capacity, one that flows from man's spiritual nature. To their minds, man, because he could know the universal truth, could desire the universal, unlimited good; so in the face of the partial, limited goods of the physical world he was free, free to accept or reject their proffered goodness. It has been a freedom worth fighting for, one that could be defended against any odds for it could never be taken by assault; it could be lost only by surrender.

What of the moral order upon which human life is based? If it have a religious source, then, according to the Declaration, it must come from the highest religion which embodies all higher religions, the religion of the Spirit, Democracy. But it need not have a religious source. In the concrete, then, it is stated that the foundation of law is universal participation in government; the foundation of equality is that the state is the agent of collective human purposes; the foundation of justice is that democracy is a community of persons. The words are familiar, but the concepts are altogether strange. By "law," the peoples of the west have understood reason's ordered precept to a common good or to the divine good; to them, its foundation has been the intelligence that is back of order, its force has been its reasonableness, its challenge has been reason's demand, its proof has been open to the mind of every man. Is the implication here that where there is no universal participation in government, there is no law? If so, this is a canonization of anarchy. To the men of the west, equality has flowed from the common nature of all men, from their undying spirits, each worth a king's ransom, from the supremacy of their individual goals,

from their individual mastery of their own lives, from their natural immunity to being used as tools of anyone or anything, however great, however high-sounding, however organized; not from the fact that the state is the agent of collective human purposes. Equality, like freedom, comes from within man; it is not granted him from without. Justice, to us of the west, is not the result of democracy's peculiar nature; it is the demand of the mastery of the individual man. Each man has rights, not given him by an outside agency, but pertaining to his very person precisely because he has an end of his own and consequent obligations; he has important, individual things to get done, and he has the consequent right to do them unimpeded.

The Declaration insists that there is a divine intention directing the universe. Yet it also insists that there is nothing outside, everything within, humanity. Among the names given this divine intention is that of Holy Ghost; yet the Holy Ghost is described as universal democracy; as a deity, universal democracy is ultimately sacred and Christ Himself forbade blasphemy against it. The divine intention, then, directing the universe is universal democracy which, as we are told, has never as yet existed. The words are familiar, as always, but the concepts they cloak make their use a mockery to the intelligence of men of the twentieth century.

I submit that on the basis of the words of this Declaration, its sponsors have attacked the meaning of human life, the dignity of the individual and his ultimate value, the moral code by which he lives, his freedom, his equality, his claim to justice, and the God in Whom he hopes.

A mind clever enough to sell such a program of destruction to American thinkers would see deeply enough to discern the outstanding enemy of his thesis. He would concentrate the full bitterness of his attack on the Catholic Church as the unflinching defender of these things at whatever cost, in whatever age and against whatever enemy or combination of enemies. That is, as a matter of fact, what has happened in this book (pp. 40-43).

The basic error of the Church, it is said, is the identification of the Church as a temporal kingdom with the "kingdom of God" of Christian and prophetic expectation. Historically this is ridiculous. No Christian has ever supposed that the Kingdom of God did not exist during the early centuries when the Church had no slightest pretensions to temporalities and eked out its existence hidden in dark places like a hunted animal. No historian dates the beginning of the Kingdom of God from the gratuitous grants of land that originally made up the papal territory; no historian traces the foundation of the Kingdom of God to the benefactors who made those grants. No one made the mistake of thinking the Kingdom of God had gone out of existence during the long years when the Pope was the

prisoner of the Vatican with no more than a garden to call his own. Yet in all these times, the Church as a temporal kingdom did not exist.

From this alleged, but utterly false, identification of the temporal kingdom of the Church with the Kingdom of God, it is maintained, comes the unwarranted aura of unqualified holiness, the historical usurping the sanctity of the eternal. Nothing could be farther from the truth. The holiness of the Church lies in the holiness of the divine truth of which it is the custodian, the holiness of the divine helps its ministers, and the holiness of those of its children who dare to follow the example of the Master without stint. The first two of these are holy because they are divine; the third, because these men and women have approached so close to divinity.

Laid down as the fundamentals of the rest of the attack, these first two points are, as a matter of fact, abandoned in order that the political argument might be launched untrammelled. One gets the definite impression that these first two were really red herrings dragged across the argument to give it an air of objectivity; certainly they have nothing to do with the rest of the attack. The real charge is that the Church has been political, or rather that it has been on the wrong side of politics; the sponsors of this document are worried that it will be made a subordinate ally of the political plans of the Nazis and Fascists, whereas, according to their statement of the fate of the churches, it should be made the subordinate ally of the political plans of world democracy. The fact is, of course, that the Church is by its nature not political in this fashion or that, but super-political; its task has not to do with the states or nations or masses, but with individual men.

The attack is supported by historical "evidence"—the Church has often proved Roman, French, Spanish, Austrian. The authors have perhaps forgotten that kingdoms were lost to the Church because it would not compromise the truth it guarded, that matters of faith and morals have come through the erosive action of two thousand years without a scratch of error or the false smoothness of defection. The Church is pilloried because its spiritual totalitarianism was the pattern and tool of political totalitarianism. The inference is, of course, that political totalitarianism had never entered the mind of man until the Church appeared and then only in the two-thousandth year of its history. It is a tool and has hitched its wagon to the Fascist's star; for, of course, the papal condemnations of totalitarian corruption of youth, of the philosophy of state supremacy, of the corruption of morals, and the violence of injustice are not to be taken seriously though they were paid for in blood and are still being made and still being paid for. Tears are shed over the fate of "Republican" Spain, though earlier in the book, and later, Communism is bitterly condemned; would all be forgiven if Communism changed its badge to Republicanism?

Perhaps more important than the actual charges against the Church is the manner in which they are made. A whiff of incense is tossed in the face of the Church in the early pages of the book as the necessary smile of greeting to modern broad-mindedness. The actual attack starts off with a kind of objective calmness, though there is no delay in falsifying the charges; little by little the attack gains momentum and loses rationality until it comes to a climax of frothing madness, screeching to modern Catholics to revolt from the Vatican City as a foreign potentate in feud or trade with other potentates.

The notion persists that the majority of the sponsors of this document were sold down the river. One wonders, reasonably, if they would *consciously* be partners to this sort of unfounded fury. The Syllabus of *Errors*, for example, is quoted as a challenge to the liberal world of the Reformation and the Renaissance and a contribution to political and social obscurantism. If all the sponsors had read the Syllabus of Errors, surely one of them would have thought to tabulate the subjects treated there and would have come up with this list of things defended: divine character of Scripture and its guardianship by the Church, revelation, the certitude of faith, the union of belief and action, the divinity of Christ, the death and resurrection of Christ, the sacraments, the Church, the stability of truth and the independence of religious truth from the varying condition of science. Surely, had all of them read the Syllabus, some one of these thirteen sponsors would have questioned whether this papal document was a challenge to any kind of true liberalism. One wonders, reasonably, whether, had they not been duped, the sponsors of this document would have subscribed, to such foul phrases as: "The Fuehrers and enslavers can endorse some of these promises; if not of plenty, of equality in misery and of security in the dusk of the manger" (p. 52). It is hardly consonant with the American temperament to hide the corruption of a truth behind the cloak of a sacred word, to indulge in a small boy's vulgarity by such blasphemous balderdash as the identification of the Holy Ghost with democracy, much less, to tongue in cheek, call Christ as a witness to the blasphemy.

For the rest, the document pretty well refutes itself. The sociological and economic programs suffered from the same defect that has haunted the socialist dream from the beginning, the defect inherent in the product of men who have been accurately described as amateurs. These authors have shown little knowledge of human nature; they are amateurs when they suppose that a world-wide power will be quietly laid aside once the reign of justice is established by force, that the reign of justice without blemish will be established on a world wide scale, that justice will be found where there is a universal governmental assignment of every detail of labor and leisure, that men can be adequately ruled when there is no other law but civil law.

Fundamentally, the error of this book is a combination of the modern naively complete confidence in governmental action and the world-wide drift to totalitarianism. "Humanity" has been substituted for "Aryan Race" or "Communist Party," the scope is a little wider, but all else is unchanged; the individual is sunk in the mass, the single citizen's life is stripped of meaning, government is made a divinity with its own political religion whose opponents are heretics—criminals or maniacs to be dealt with accordingly; the mastery of truth, of action, of life and death is in the hands of the human super-legislator. This book represents one of the earliest and most concrete conquests of Hitlerism in America.

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Philosophy for Our Times. By C. E. M. JOAD. London-New York: Th. Nelson & Sons, 1940. Pp. 367, with index.

Written in an impressive and mostly non-technical language this book emphasizes the need of philosophical reflection in these our days. Mankind has a mastery of means and is ignorant of ends. Religion and morals are falling into decay. Psychoanalysis and other factors destroy understanding of the difference between good and evil, and preach the dangerous doctrine of the harmfulness of suppressing impulses. "Foreheads are defiantly low." The snobbery of culture has been replaced by the snobbery of anti-culture. It is a time which more than any is in need of philosophy. Philosophy has to provide a counterweight against the dreariness and essential indifference in regard to values characteristic of the scientific view.

Dr. Joad then proceeds to analyze the world of commonsense and to point out the difficulties this view implies. The corrections and enlargement by science are neither ultimately nor exhaustively true. Science deals with only one kind of reality; it leaves out other aspects. Chap. IV states "that science tells us a little about some things and that there are no things about which it tells us everything." Also, science not less than commonsense presupposes the activity of the mind. This activity has to supply the principles for the interpretation of the behavior of the things we experience. Since the materialistic cosmogony is demonstrably defective and science is unable to give a satisfactory account of mind, the world as envisioned by physics is essentially an abstraction leaving out everything of which science cannot render account. As mind, so value is excluded from the scientific world-picture. Nor does science ever explain that of which it renders account. The teleological viewpoint is forced on the observant mind by the facts themselves, but it is outside the scope of science.

The reality grasped by science being incomplete, defective, and unsatisfactory, one has to look out for another view truer to reality and more satisfying to the needs of the mind. Part II, "Constructive," defends the notion of the reality of values. Contrary to the prevailing subjectivistic view, the author holds that values are objective and real. Truth and beauty are objective. The statement that truth is subjective must be given up as self-contradictory. If truth has no objectivity, this statement too, and all other statements become subjective and relative. That is, there is no truth at all. Appreciation of beauty and moral judgments can never be exhaustively analyzed into statements about individual feelings of approval. There are ultimate values, namely Goodness and Truth and Beauty. Although salutary, health is no ultimate good, and much less ultimate are harmful false goods like money and power. In a long chapter of 20 pages the author attempts to show that there is an immediate and specific apprehension of values. His arguments are too long to be reproduced, but they deserve serious consideration. Once the objectivity of values is recognized, the position of hedonism in ethics becomes untenable, and a system of objective rules for the right conduct of life a necessity. One has to distinguish between pleasures, to make reason the judge of the goodness of appetite. Goodness and happiness cannot be achieved unless behavior be controlled by reason. Politics refers to the same set of problems as does ethics. Politics has to determine the nature of the community in which the good life as revealed by ethics can be lived. The State is the political instrument for an ethical end. In itself the State is nothing. Absolutism which makes the State an end in itself has to be rejected. Not power, imperial or military, not wealth, or liberty makes a State great. Liberty too may be misused. As criteria for national excellence one may consider the provision of social services and the production of great men.

There is a postscript, dealing with religion and man's need of it. Dr. Joad acknowledges that the existence of a personal God, revealing Himself to man is possible or even probable. He does not, however, believe that there is any philosophical proof for God's existence, and being concerned with philosophy only he omits further reference to the problem. Secondly, the need of the times is for a code of living, and the Christian churches seem to the author not capable of providing such a code adequate to the present situation. Thirdly, he declares himself unable to see how a good God can be the creator of a world of suffering. It is not a little astonishing to see a penetrating mind stumble over such trivial objections, the more so since Dr. Joad's ideas seem to lead inevitably into a theonomic conception of the world.

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An Essay on Nature. By FREDERICK J. E. WOODBRIDGE. New York: Columbia University Press, 1940. Pp. xii + 351, with index. \$3.00.

Not often does the student of philosophy come across a work whose main thought may be summarized in one short formula. It needs a wise mind and a clear one to coin a word which condenses and, at the same time, illuminates the thought of a lifetime with one single sentence. Professor Woodbridge is one of these rare minds. His last book is an impressive defense of metaphysics and of the supernatural by one who is essentially and thoroughly a naturalist. The supernatural is nature transubstantiated. Theology is science transubstantiated. Such is the eminent author's own formula and the briefest statement of his main idea. The supernatural is therefore not the goal of the quest for knowledge, but it is the justification and the foundation of the quest for happiness. Because transubstantiated, the terms of knowledge, although they remain extrinsically and inevitably the same, refer to a different substance when used in the theological universe of discourse. This discourse is, however, not of the "ideal" but of the supernatural, that is, of being, no less than when we speak of nature. One feels tempted to apply to Professor Woodbridge's philosophy, although in a much modified way, the famous Kantian saying, that he had to destroy knowledge to make faith possible. With this author it is rather that knowledge had to be preserved for the sake of ensuring faith.

Nature is what we perceive. There is no convincing reason for turning the percept into a symbol of something else. Our perceiving capacities are limited, but we become aware of these limitations only in perception. The dependence of knowledge on the organization of our bodies does not dethrone mind, nor do we lose our souls when we discover the use of words. Words and formulae do not represent a second world, truer than the one of percepts, and Sir Arthur Eddington's famous two tables are no argument at all, since Sir Arthur never in his life wrote upon a "scientific table." Scientific objects are, Professor Woodbridge contends, the most amusing fictions ever invented. Natural philosophy, being the reflections suggested to the mind by the perceived world, engenders mathematics and science. Natural science gives birth to scientific language; it is the source not the offspring of the latter.

Without being a "naïve realist," the author insists on the right of the visible world and the space which is its order. Light and space are the two great fundamental principles. All our knowledge ultimately rests on light and on space. Our language talks of them. They are laws of nature, as is time, and we are parts of the same nature. Again, our language pictures nature in its temporality. There are things that move; but there is no event "moving." Nor does the inability of man destroy nature's working. At a given moment the events of nature are synchronized, whether we can

ascertain this or not. Causal explanation does not do away with teleology; they are not opposed but correlated. All our knowledge is bound up with time and thus with history. Neither mathematics nor language is "applied" to nature; they stem from her. We can never escape reality because we are reality too and because reality *is*. Justifying nature's ways and knowing them are two different things. The only true problem is how to enlarge our knowledge of nature's ways. Morality pertains to nature not less than anything else, although nature "does not intend moral order, but rather sub-tends it." Nature is the only object of knowledge, but there are things as necessary as knowledge to which not knowledge but faith is the adequate answer. Ceremonial cult is the expression of the acknowledgment of the supernatural, and religion is the personal acceptance of this acknowledgment. It is the pursuit of happiness which reveals the supernatural. The dualism of knowledge and happiness is fundamental in human existence. Knowledge discovers nature, but does not justify it. This justification the mind demands, faith supplies. The supernatural is the justification of nature.

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Experience and Substance. By DEWITT H. PARKER. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1941. Pp. x + 371, with index. \$3.00.

The title indicates the two main sets of problems: experience refers to knowledge, substance to metaphysics. The general viewpoint is idealistic, although not without some peculiarities. The basic metaphysical conception is monadistic and finitistic. There is much of Kantianism, but it is modified so as to go farther beyond Hume than Kant himself does. Parallel to the idealistic trend runs a definitely antinomialistic and, therefore, antipositivistic strain. The latter becomes particularly noticeable in Chapters X-XIV, dealing with the theory of relations and the problem of causality. Hume's solution is rejected because it does not afford any explanation of the note of necessity adhering to all awareness of causal relations. These chapters also contain an interesting analysis of probability and of many of the statements, common among philosophers of science, regarding the philosophical implications of modern physics, especially the relativity theory, the notion of statistical law, and the general bearing of science on philosophy.

Substance is characterized by being subject, never predicate; independent, causally efficient, conserved through change. These characteristics apply to what Parker calls the matrix self; they do not apply to matter as conceived by materialistic metaphysics. Experience is substance, and substance is only an experience. Existence can be credited only to what is actually in ex-

perience, neither possible nor past events have existence, nor have universals existence apart from the *concreta* in which they are discovered. The universals are timeless objects, not however eternal. The eternal reveals itself to an examination of the levels of causality, of which there are three. There is first the personal level, secondly, the level of biological causation, and finally, underlying the other two, the physico-chemical level which is referred to as the "Omega system." The higher level depends in its existence and in its functioning on the next lower level. The lowest level, on which all being and eventing depends is the eternal level. Eternal and Omega system are identified.

The reader, at this point, may recall that a similar notion has been proposed, under perhaps not dissimilar conditions of general mentality and problematics, once before in the history of human thought. This reviewer, at least, cannot help remembering the curious notion of David of Dinant who identified prime matter with God Himself. And back of David's mind there may have been a dilemma not unlike the one which apparently determines Professor Parker's somewhat startling assertion. The question is how to co-ordinate the fact that the inferior level undubitably conditions the functioning and the existence of the beings of the higher levels, on one hand and the equally impressive and evident ontological superiority of the higher levels on the other. David and Parker solve the difficulty by locating, as it were, ontological eminence in the level of being which apparently is the most necessary and most general. But the relation of foundation—the higher being founded on the lower—is by far not the same as the relation of ontological superiority. Dr. Parker holds that metaphysics cannot do without the notion of God, as the source of being or of creation, the unifying factor keeping together the disparate elements of the universe, and as the "locus for truth."

This God is very unlike the God of theology. Although the idea of providence is acknowledged, it is restricted by man's own efforts. Evil is considered as an inevitable feature of creation (which reminds one somewhat of certain ideas in Schelling's later philosophy).

A short chapter summarizes the author's ideas on values, to which he devoted a volume some years ago. Value is seen as in relation to desire, whose satisfaction it is. This does not mean, however, that the interest nature of values, as in R. B. Perry's philosophy, is accepted. Rather, the relation between the two conceptions may be likened to the one obtaining between Kantian idealism and a psychologistic distortion of this philosophy, a view which would posit the origin of law and order of reality in the individual human mind and its functioning.

Professor Parker's book is no easy reading. It raises difficult questions and deals with them in a manner too thorough for the casual reader. But

it is an exceedingly interesting reading for any serious student of philosophy and for anyone who wants to find out how the modern mind wrestles with philosophical problems, old and new. The author's sympathy lies—if such a statement may be made in regard to the views of a philosopher—more with the problems of the Beautiful and the Good than with those of mere knowledge. There is something of the artist, especially of the musician, in the way he looks at things, and also in the way he marshalls his ideas. Some chapters may not inaptly be compared to a piece with complicated counterpoint, something like a Bachian fugue. Goethe, in his later years, or any of his younger Romantic friends, would have spoken of Dr. Parker, probably, as *eine musikalische Natur*. But he is, for all this, a true philosopher whose ideas deserve serious consideration. However little one may agree with his fundamental viewpoints, there is much one may learn from his studies. His work may be recommended especially to all those concerned about the place of science within the totality of knowledge.

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BRIEF NOTICES

ANNOUNCING: *A Dialectic of Morals: Towards the Foundations of Political Philosophy*. By MORTIMER J. ADLER. *The Review of Politics*, Notre Dame University, Notre Dame, Indiana.

This latest work of Dr. Adler appeared originally in the pages of *The Review of Politics*. In it Dr. Adler proceeds "dialectically against those who say there is no moral knowledge; who say that good and bad, right and wrong, are entirely matters of opinion; who say, as a consequence, that might makes right in the sphere of politics." This dialectical treatment of morality is lively and interesting, for, as Dr. Adler says, "The dialectic of morals which I shall now proceed to outline is not an imaginary process. It is rather a distillation of actual arguments which President Hutchins and I have had with students in courses devoted to the reading of great works in ethics and politics." Publication is promised for October.

Man's Triumph With God in Christ. By FREDERICK A. HOUCK. St. Louis: Herder, 1940. Pp. 244, with Index. \$2.00.

Widespread ignorance, error and indifference in matter of religion, and large-scale atheistic trends in our modern life are the occasion of this latest book of Father Houck. A summary of the chapter titles—Knowability of God; The God-Man; Man, the Image of God; The End and Purpose of Man; The Mystical Body of Christ and Blissful Eternity—will indicate the book's scope as definitely broad. In spite of the excellent choice of sources, the same as the Council of Trent, the very breadth of the author's intention demands that some of these subjects receive sketchy attention. It is regrettable that St. Thomas is made to speak for himself in long quotations from the *Summa Theologica* and the *Summa Contra Gentiles*. While St. Thomas speaks the truth, very often it is a truth which, unexplained, will be unintelligible to the average reader.

The Divine Crucible of Purgatory. By MOTHER MARY OF ST. AUSTIN. Revised and edited by Nicholas Ryan, S. J. New York: P. J. Kenedy and Sons, 1940. Pp. viii + 185. \$2.25.

The reality of the fire of Purgatory is a paramount issue in this book. The first of its two sections is dedicated to the establishment of the conclusion that the fire is only metaphorical. As such, the sensible suffering of the souls in Purgatory is caused by infused knowledge, in a manner similar to the sufferings of the soul immersed in the "dark night." Just as the soul on earth is purified by this infused contemplation, so too the

souls in purgatory are purified and prepared for the beatific vision in much the same way. The meditations, which comprise the second and major portion of the book, trace and describe the progress of the departed soul through the sufferings of the "dark night," the silence of the "twilight" and, finally, the soul's transformation and union with God. Comparisons to the sufferings of Christ and of the Church Militant add to the clarity and practicality of the meditations. The conclusion of the first section will undoubtedly be considered by many as untenable—and with reason—but the utility of the meditations for souls who already have a fair grasp of the principles of the ascetical life will be questioned by few.

Science, Philosophy and Religion: A Symposium. New York: Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion in Their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life, 1941. Pp. 443. \$1.50.

As most of our readers know, this volume contains the papers read at the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion in Their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life, held in New York City, on September 9-11, 1940. Many of the papers are simply learned articles on their authors' special subjects, with a few introductory or concluding remarks on democracy. There are some very valuable papers, especially those by Finkelstein, Sorokin, Adler, Maritain, Van Wyck Brooks, and Johnson. The papers of this first conference give us very little opportunity of judging the success or failure of the conference itself. Success or failure can be judged only by those who were present at the discussion of the papers. Van Wyck Brooks, in his introductory paper, quotes a statement released to the press at the end of the conference by a special Committee; part of the statement reads as follows: "As the discussion at the Conference proceeded, it became obvious that the various groups of philosophers, as well as the scientists of different fields, were being drawn more closely together. The scientists who presented papers were able to issue a common statement of their views. The philosophers narrowed the area of disagreement among themselves. Thomists recognized the position of Logical Positivism as applicable to the field of science, though they denied its applicability to other fields. Logical Positivists seemed to recognize the right of Thomists and other philosophers to carry on their speculations and arrive at conclusions, but denied that the term "knowledge" could be applied to such speculations." In other words, the Thomists were able to grant much; the Logical Positivists were willing to grant nothing. Unfortunately, many of the philosophers and theologians were definitely on the side of the Positivists. However, it is good to know that a clear-cut division is appearing between those who maintain the validity of philosophical and theological knowledge, as knowledge, and those who deny validity to any type of thinking that is not positivistic.

Saint Thomas Aquinas. By GERALD VANN, O.P. London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1940. Pp. ix + 182. 6s.

Fr. Vann, leaning heavily on the historical researches of Gilson and Dawson, presents an interpretation of the actual position of St. Thomas Aquinas. To the Angelic Doctor he looks for the needed synthesis between eastern and western culture, for a corrective to the exaggerated contemplative and activist theories of these two worlds. To prove his thesis he is led to show that Thomas is not the chilly rationalist moderns portray him to be; in his life and teaching there is ample room for the intuitive, the contemplative, the mystical. The work gives a well-rounded picture of Thomas the man, of his intellectual environment and of the work he accomplished. This last section, which should have been the strongest part of the book, is really the weakest, for the nature of the non-rational elements of the Thomistic synthesis is too cursorily treated.

Wars of Families of Minds. By WILLIAM L. BRYAN. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940. Pp. xv + 143, with index. \$2.00.

The title of this work expresses completely the author's intention in writing it: he shows that there are families of minds, the unschooled man, the scholar (who may belong to the sceptics, the scientists, or the philosophers), and the poets; he also points out that these families of minds are at war with one another. Numerous instances of intellectual combats are cited. The author seems to think that these conflicts are inevitable. He does not study the careers of those men who have been successful in many fields, although he does mention a few names. Most noticeable is the omission of the religious-minded, among whom many examples of harmony could have been discovered. In his Introduction, the author touches on the reasons for the division of human minds into families; they are valid reasons and should serve as the theme of frequent consideration for those who tend to become one-sided in their mental outlook.

A Guide to the Intellectual History of Europe from St. Augustine to Marx.

By FREDERICK B. ARTZ. Boston: Ginn & Co., 1941. Pp. xix + 140, with index. \$1.75.

The purpose of this volume is to enable the student to read and understand some of the most important books of the European intellectual tradition. There is a wide choice of books; the author prefaces each study with a few bibliographical references, then gives a list of questions on the sections of the books to be read. Unfortunately, the title is much too pretentious in view of the authors studied. Plato and Cicero are included before St. Augustine. Why not, then, Aristotle and the Bible? Roger Bacon is the only representative of scholastic thought. Such omissions may be justifiable; but, then, this is not a guide to the intellectual history of Europe. Rather it is an aid to the reading of certain important books in the western tradition.

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- Bradshaw, M. J. *Philosophical Foundations of Faith*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. Pp. xi + 254, with index. \$2.50.
- Brennan, R. E., O. P. *Thomistic Psychology*. New York, Macmillan, 1941. Pp. xxvi + 401, with index. \$3.00.
- Burke, Kenneth. *The Philosophy of Literary Form*. Louisiana State University Press, 1941. Pp. xvi + 455, with index. \$3.00.
- Ducasse, C. J. *Philosophy as a Science*. New York: Oskar Piest, 1941. Pp. xx + 242, with index. \$3.00.
- Edman, Irwin and Schneider, H. W. *Landmarks in Philosophy*. New York: Reynald and Hitchcock, 1941. Pp. x + 1008, with index. \$4.00.
- Einstein, Ira. *The Ethics of Tolerance*. New York: King's Crown Press, 1941. Pp. 87. \$1.50.
- Farrell, Walter, O. P. *A Companion to the Summa, I: The Architect of the Universe*. New York, Sheed & Ward, 1941. Pp. 457, with index. \$3.50.
- Frank, Philipp. *Between Physics and Philosophy*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1941. Pp. 238, with index. \$2.75.
- Galvao de Sousa, J. P. *O Positivismo Juridico e O Direito Natural*. Sao Paulo, Brazil, 1940. Pp. 101.
- Leclercq, Jacques. *Marriage and the Family*. (Trans. by T. R. Hanley, O. S. B.) New York: Pustet, 1941. Pp. xx + 395, with index. \$4.50.
- Les Methodes scientifiques dans l'éducation*. 2ième Congrès annuel, 18-21 juin, 1941. *Les Parents et l'enfant*. Ottawa: Les Editions du Lévrier. Pp. 207.
- Magid, H. M. *English Political Pluralism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. Pp. 100, with index. \$1.25.
- Manchester, F. and Shepard, O. *Irving Babbitt, Man and Teacher*. New York: Putnam's Sons, 1941. Pp. xiii + 337. \$3.00.
- Niebuhr, Reinhold. *The Nature and Destiny of Man, I: Human Nature*. New York: Scribner's Sons, 1941. Pp. xii + 306, with indices. 2.75.
- Shute, Clarence. *The Psychology of Aristotle*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. Pp. xiv + 148, with index. \$2.00.

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